PATTERNS OF POWER

BRITISH JAMAICA

The Complete Study

1655 — 1834 — 1866

Thomas J. Bryan
with Claude (Anthropic)

Held as tested, not revealed.

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PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH JAMAICA — PREFACE AND OUTLINE

PREFACE AND OUTLINE

> *Front matter · how this study was made, the disciplines it holds itself to, and a map of its thirteen parts*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The collaboration

This is a case study in the Patterns of Power series, applying the series' framework to the British colony of Jamaica, from Cromwell's Western Design in 1655 to the Morant Bay rebellion and the suicide of the House of Assembly in 1865–66. The framework is a lens for reading how any order of power is founded, dressed, and held: the floor of force beneath every order; the robe of doctrine laid over the floor to make the force cheap; the settlement that divides the spoils; the cost column in which each subject prices defection; the seam that separates what is said at the centre from what is done at the edge; the default by which an elite coordinates without instruction; and — running through all of it — position logic, the proposition that rulers in like positions converge on like solutions, because a position poses a problem with only a few good answers.

Jamaica was chosen for what it does to two things: the recursion, and liberty.

The recursion is the series' rule that a conqueror never meets a timeless baseline, only a former conquest that has naturalised into the furniture of reality — the Islamic North Africa that France met in 1830 was the seventh-century Arab conquest, worn in until it was simply the way the world was. It is a rule about *substrate*, and it has a zero point. Saint-Domingue, the study immediately preceding this one, found the substrate absent: an island emptied by an earlier conquest, a vacancy that could not be rented. Jamaica is the same zero point reached by the same road, and the two studies are twins — the same crop, the same emptied field, the same imported subject, the same mountains with the same maroons in them, the same two deaths for every birth.

And one of them produced the only successful slave revolution in the history of the world, and the other produced a hanging in a square at Montego Bay and an Assembly that voted itself out of existence rather than admit a black majority.

Much of this study is an attempt to say why. The answer arrives in Module 12, and it is the coldest sentence in the collection: **Jamaica did not become Haiti because Britain did not become France.**

Then liberty. Jamaica possessed, on paper, the most plural constitution in the British colonial world — an elected Assembly that had fought the Crown and won, an independent bench, trial by jury, habeas corpus, a free press, property secure against the executive, every institutional guarantee that an Englishman of 1750 would have called the birthright of a free people. And it was the least free society in the British Empire. That is not a paradox to be dissolved by cleverness. It is the finding, and Module 9 is where the series' liberty variable is taken apart and rebuilt around it.

The division of labour was this. Thomas J. Bryan set the subject, the brief, and the disciplines, and held the collaboration to them. Claude, Anthropic's model, did the research — verifying every load-bearing quotation, date and figure by web search against a source reproducing the primary text before any module was written — and produced the drafts, applying the framework module by module, each presented and confirmed before the next was begun. The framework's concepts are the series'; the Jamaican application, and the refinements it yielded, are the work of the collaboration.

Its engine throughout is the method of information asymmetry. The study exists to show the gap between what was said at the metropole and what was done in the colony, and it works by setting the exact public words beside the exact words of the ground: the Western Design's godly justification beside Thomas Gage's private admission that beneath the Spanish title he could see nothing but force; the King's proclamation of 1661 promising the children of Jamaica the liberties of free denizens of England beside a slave code requiring a fortnightly search of every dwelling for wooden swords; John Locke's *Fundamental Constitutions* beside a colonial statute that had written the same clause five years before he did; the twenty millions voted in compensation in 1833 beside the register that lists the compensated by name and the compensated-for by number. It lays out the arithmetic and leaves the sum to the reader. It does not preach the conclusion.

Three premises the study began with were tested against the sources and corrected, and all three corrections are left visible on the page.

The first was that the Baptist faith of the Jamaican chapels was a **stolen** robe. Module 4 called it that. Module 12 withdrew the word. It was not stolen; it was **given**, handed over by people who did not understand what they were handing over — and the creed

contained its own refutation, and Samuel Sharpe found it exactly where he told Henry Bleby he had found it. The correction is not smoothed away, because it changes the study's verdict on the strongest case for the defence.

The second was the brief's own prediction that a colonial order ends when the metropole's will empties. It did not empty. It was **replaced**. The Parliament that abolished slavery in 1833 was not the Parliament of 1830 having changed its mind; it was a different Parliament, produced by an Act whose Schedule A abolished fifty-six English boroughs for reasons that had nothing to do with Jamaica. *Collapse by franchise, not by conversion* — and the refinement matters, because a will that has emptied can be refilled, and an electorate that has been abolished cannot.

The third was an assumption the framework had never quite stated but everywhere implied: that plurality is a serviceable proxy for liberty. Jamaica refutes it flatly, and the refutation is Module 9.

The disciplines

Quotation. Public-domain primary sources — laws, proclamations, treaties, charters, parliamentary speeches, official despatches, memoirs, letters, period newspapers — are quoted exactly, and at the length the argument needs, because a law is a legal fiction whose precise wording *is* the point. Modern copyrighted scholarship is paraphrased, briefly, and credited.

No fabrication. No quotation, date, attribution or figure is ever invented or reconstructed from memory. What cannot be verified is dropped or flagged, never guessed. Contested figures are given as ranges.

Contribution. Every module returns a refinement to the framework, stated plainly in its closing section, rather than merely applying the framework to the case.

Gravity without partisanship. The suffering is held with gravity, and the order is explained without being excused. *Legibility is not pardon.* The refrain closes every module, and it is a warning addressed to the writer, not a licence granted to the reader.

Held as tested, not revealed. The pattern is treated as something discovered and tested against the evidence, not handed down as doctrine — a lens laid over the record, a tendency and never a law.

The no-fabrication rule was tested in the writing, and the tests are recorded in the modules' closing notes rather than buried. Thomas Thistlewood's diaries — the most quotable and the most terrible document in the whole archive — are deliberately not

quoted anywhere in this study; the account rests on Trevor Burnard's scholarship and is credited to it, because past a certain point reproduction becomes consumption. The ceiling of the Devises Act of 1761 appears in the sources as both £2,000 and £1,200; the discrepancy is noted rather than resolved. Several load-bearing lines — the Whitehall memorandum on the Assembly's dependence, George William Gordon's warning about being governed by such a governor, Bleby's record of Sharpe in his cell — are flagged in their own modules for collation against original printings this collaboration has not seen.

And one figure was corrected against the study's own convenience. The dead of the West Africa Squadron, routinely given in British public argument as seventeen or twenty thousand men, numbered approximately sixteen hundred. The larger number would have made the counter-position of Module 12 more formidable and the answer to it more impressive. It is not the number — and the inflation is itself one of the study's findings, because a robe grows in the direction its wearers need.

What British Jamaica added to the framework

Because this is a conquest with no substrate to rent, an imported subject population, and a metropole whose floor never once faltered, the case was able to isolate features the other colonial studies could not.

Chief among the refinements it contributed: that where the subject population is **imported**, the settlement divides not land among conquerors but **bodies**, and the headright — thirty acres per head landed — makes the human being the unit in which the land grant itself is denominated. That **caste is the cheapest dividend an order can pay**, because rank costs the treasury nothing and buys a militiaman. That a settlement's boundary is a **price**, and moves exactly as far as the floor's shortfall requires and not one inch further — which is why Juan de Bolas was given his acres in 1660 and the free people of colour their civil rights in 1830, and why they fought for the order in 1831.

That **a robe is defined by its audience and not its content**, so that the doctrine of English liberty could be worn, without strain and without irony, by an order of total unfreedom, precisely because it was never addressed to the unfree. That **a robe which can be swapped without touching the floor was never load-bearing** — Jamaica changed metropolitan robes three times in forty years, from commonwealth to kingdom and back, without altering a single provision of the machine. And that **a universalising creed forces a biological exclusion**: where the robe says *all men*, the order must deny that the enslaved

are men — which means that the race science of Edward Long is not the cause of the slavery but the **cost of the liberty**, and was invoiced accordingly.

That **formation is admission**, and an order which cannot admit will not form — a finding this case can prove rather than assert, because it has a control group: Virginia cleared the theological obstacle to baptising the enslaved in 1667, and conversion was refused for another hundred and thirty years, which establishes that the obstacle had never been theological. That an order which withholds formation from its own caste as well will never become a nation, and therefore can never secede. And that only a robe which arrives from outside the order's gift can cross the seam.

That **total extraction requires no mechanism** — no tax, no tribute, no percentage, no clerk — and therefore **generates no documents about the extracted**, so that the archive of such an order will name its beneficiaries in exquisite detail and count their property. That **the seam is a barrier to attention and not to information**: the truth about Jamaica was printed in London in 1740 and read by nobody, and a seam of that kind is broken not by a leak but by an **audit**. That **the floor is the leash** — a colonial elite which cannot man its own floor cannot secede, which is why the richest and most slave-holding colony in the Empire was also its most obedient, and why Whitehall could say so, in writing, without anxiety.

That **retail enfranchisement is the most efficient instrument of foreclosure in the corpus**: a right that must be petitioned for is a favour; a favour creates a client; a client cannot form a class; and a class that cannot form cannot demand. That **plurality among the enfranchised is not liberty but a division of the spoils**, and can be the very *engine* of foreclosure, since every constitutional victory the Jamaica Assembly ever won was won against the only authority on earth capable of restraining it. And that **when representative government can no longer be a caste monopoly, a caste will abolish representative government** — from which follows the diagnostic this collection should carry: do not test an elite's constitutionalism by its rhetoric, which will always be magnificent and may well be legally correct; wait until the constitution begins to admit the excluded, and watch what the elite does then.

That **a rebellion changes the price and not the decision**, and its effect therefore depends entirely on who is holding the ledger when the bill arrives. That **development is a function of the coloniser's need and not of his benevolence** — which predicts the thinnest development records in the most profitable colonies, and finds them. That **the satrap's bargain contains a termination clause the satrap does not write**: *for themselves and posterity for ever* lasted fifty-seven years. And that **an order's archive is its moral system made durable, and is still operating** — so that a historian working from the

surviving documents without asking whose documents they are will reproduce the order's priorities exactly, in perfect good faith, and produce a history in which the owners are individuals and the owned are a quantity.

And three findings the collection should carry out of Jamaica whether or not it accepts anything else in it. **The metropole's stability is the colony's fate. A moral achievement is not retired but capitalised** — so that the question to ask of any great act of public conscience is not only whether it was sincere, since it usually was, but what was subsequently bought with it, and from whom. And **a robe you have genuinely paid for is the strongest robe there is**, because it recruits its wearer's self-respect rather than his interest, and a man defending his self-respect will go very much further than a man defending his money.

The arc

A landscape opening and twelve modules, each with a framework function and its own evocative title.

Landscape — the two societies on the eve of conquest. *No Title But Force.* A regicide republic six years old, holding itself upright with thirty thousand men under arms and hunting for a story that would let it put the sword down; and, across the Atlantic, an island that was not a society at all but a Spanish cattle range, its people already destroyed by an earlier conquest. The recursion arriving at its zero point for the second time in the collection — and Thomas Gage, the friar turned Protestant, who wrote in 1648 that beneath the Spanish title he could see no title but force, and who then sailed with the fleet as its chaplain and died on the island he had helped to take.

1 — The Floor of Force. *No Perfect Track to Guide Us.* A conquest so incompetent that it nearly failed, and a floor the state could not afford and therefore **leased** — to buccaneers, to Henry Morgan, to men it would later hang; and the slave code of 1664, written before there was anything resembling a robe to lay over it.

2 — The Settlement. *Himself, His Servants and Slaves.* Thirty acres for every head landed, which makes the human being the unit of the land grant; a census that counts the guns in the same column as the people; and a caste dividend paid in rank, because rank was the only thing the treasury had.

3 — The Robe. *The Liberties of Our Native Country.* The most swappable robe in the collection; John Locke writing absolute and arbitrary power over the negro into the *Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina* in 1669, five years after the Assembly at Spanish

Town had written the same clause without having heard of him; and Edward Long, in 1774, discovering that the people his great-grandfather had bought were *a different species of the same genus* — which is not the cause of the slavery but the price of the liberty.

4 — Formation. *The Baptist Ticket*. An order that refused to form the people it owned, because forming them would have meant admitting them — and refused to form its own caste either, and therefore never became a nation and never could have seceded; and George Liele, arriving in 1783 as war-refuse of the American Revolution, carrying the one thing that could cross the seam.

5 — The Cost Column. *Ten Shillings a Head*. The treaty of 1739, in which the order hired the force it could not beat, and agreed to pay ten shillings for every runaway brought in; the Scott's Hall Maroons striking for their arrears in the middle of Tacky's Revolt, because an auxiliary is a creditor; and the provision grounds, which fed the island and armed the enslaved with everything except a weapon.

6 — Extraction. *The Axe Beside the Rollers*. A hatchet kept by the mill, because a hand caught in the rollers costs less than a stopped crop; total extraction, which requires no mechanism and leaves no archive of the extracted; and a planter class which turned out, when the accounts were finally opened, to have been living not on slavery but on a tariff.

7 — Information and Suppression. *No Country Excels Jamaica*. A seam that was never a barrier to information — the truth was printed in London in 1740 and read by nobody — but to **attention**; and the three instruments that broke it: the boycott, the audit, and the admissible witness, who was handed a pair of iron shackles by the men who had burned his chapel.

8 — Elite Coordination and the Default. *Depending As They Do For Their Daily Existence*. The most slave-holding elite in the Empire was also its most obedient, and Whitehall knew exactly why and wrote it down; a lobby that was never defeated but **paid**; and free coloureds admitted to the franchise in 1830 because the militia roster was short.

9 — Plurality or Foreclosure. *With Certain Restrictions*. The most plural constitution in the British colonial world producing its least free society; rights granted by private Act to named individuals, for a fee, on proof of baptism, always *with certain restrictions*; and an Assembly which, in 1866, having beaten the Crown for two centuries in the name of the rights of Englishmen, voted itself out of existence rather than let those rights become general.

10 — Change and Collapse. *Fifty-Six Boroughs*. The second landscape, placed at the head of the module because that is where the collapse happened: a schedule in an English electoral statute abolishing fifty-six boroughs and never mentioning Jamaica; Samuel Sharpe planning a strike at the mill in crop time and getting a war; and the discovery that a

rebellion changes the price and not the decision, so that its effect depends on who holds the ledger.

11 — The Grim Accounting. *Forty Thousand Names*. A development column containing a road to the port and a breadfruit tree fetched across the world to feed the enslaved more cheaply; a built environment located in Yorkshire; a treaty made *for themselves and posterity for ever* and kept for fifty-seven years; and an archive that names forty thousand claimants and counts the three hundred and eleven thousand people they were paid for.

12 — Convergence and Divergence. *The Same Book*. Why Jamaica was not Haiti; and the strongest case against this whole reading — that the civilisation which built the plantation also built the thing that destroyed it, at ruinous cost, before it had to, and then policed the oceans for sixty years to make everybody else stop — stated at full strength and answered without flinching. Edward Long and Samuel Sharpe read the same book.

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A note on sources. This front matter is descriptive and makes no primary-source claims of its own; every factual assertion about the case is established, with its sources and its flags, in the module that carries it. The framework it describes is the series'; the disciplines it lists are the ones the modules hold themselves to and document in their own closing notes. The reader who wishes to test this study should begin with those notes, which are written to make such testing possible — including in the places where it would embarrass the argument.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH JAMAICA — LANDSCAPE I

NO TITLE BUT FORCE

> *Landscape I · The two societies on the eve of conquest — the England that built the fleet, and the island that Spain had already emptied*

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The order that had just killed its king

To understand what England did to Jamaica in May 1655 it is necessary first to understand what England had just done to itself, because the two are the same act performed at different scales, and the men who did the second had been trained by doing the first. Six years before the fleet sailed, on a scaffold outside the Banqueting House, the government of England had beheaded the King of England; and six weeks after that, on 17 March 1649, the Rump Parliament passed an act whose language is worth setting out at the length it deserves, because it is the founding legal fiction of the state that took Jamaica and it says, with a candour that later regimes would have edited away, exactly what such a fiction is for. It had been found by experience, the act declared, that the Office of a King in this Nation and Ireland, and to have the power thereof in any single person, was *"unnecessary, burthensom and dangerous to the liberty, safety and publique interest of the people,"* and that for the most part *"use hath been made of the Regal power and prerogative, to oppress, and impoverish and enslave the Subject."* The title of the act specifies the reach of the new authority precisely: *An Act for the abolishing the Kingly Office in England and Ireland, and the Dominions thereunto belonging.* The dominions were in the frame from the first sentence. Whatever England seized abroad, it would seize as a republic that had abolished kingship in the name of a people it declared could no longer be enslaved, and it would seize it, within six years, in order to build the largest slave society in the English-speaking world.

That contradiction is not a gotcha, and the collection does not treat it as one. It is the ordinary structure of a robe, and naming it is the beginning of the analysis rather than the end of it. What matters structurally is the sequence. The floor came first. The Commonwealth was the creature of the New Model Army — an instrument of organised

violence that had beaten the King's field armies, purged the Parliament that had raised it, tried and killed the King, conquered Ireland and Scotland, and then found itself in possession of a state it had no legal title to and no story with which to hold it. The floor was so obviously the load-bearing fact that the constitution written for it in December 1653, the Instrument of Government, budgeted the floor by name: a constant yearly revenue was to be settled and established, as the Instrument's twenty-seventh article had it and as the Protector's own excise ordinance of February 1655 recited it back, *"for Maintaining of Ten thousand Horse and Dragoons, and Twenty thousand Foot in England, Scotland and Ireland,"* and also *"for a convenient number of Ships for Guarding of the Seas,"* besides two hundred thousand pounds a year for everything else the government did. Thirty thousand men and a fleet, entrenched in the founding document as a permanent line item, with the whole civil business of the state as the smaller entry beneath. Few orders have ever written the floor into their constitution with less embarrassment.

The robe of providence, and what it was for

Over that floor the Protectorate laid a robe, and the robe was providence: the doctrine that God's hand was legible in outcomes, that victory was endorsement, that a nation and an army who had done what this nation and this army had done could know they were right because they had won. Its logic is on display at Drogheda in September 1649, in Cromwell's own despatch to the Speaker of the Commons, and the despatch is worth reading as a specimen of the mechanism rather than merely as an atrocity report. Having put the garrison to the sword, Cromwell wrote: *"I am persuaded that this is a righteous judgment of God upon these barbarous wretches, who have imbrued their hands in so much innocent blood; and that it will tend to prevent the effusion of blood for the future. Which are the satisfactory grounds to such actions, which otherwise cannot but work remorse and regret."* Read the last clause slowly. The robe is described, by its wearer, as the thing that converts an act which *would otherwise produce remorse* into an act that produces none. That is what a managed belief is for, and here is a man saying so in a state paper, without noticing that he has said it.

Note also who is in the audience. The despatch is addressed to Parliament, and beyond Parliament to the godly of England and the soldiers of the army — to the people whose taxes and whose bodies the order needed. It is not addressed to the Irish, whose belief the floor did not require and did not seek. That is the reversed robe of the colonial bend,

already fully assembled in 1649 in the nearer colony, and it is the shape that will be carried across the Atlantic intact.

And the robe was strained, in 1655, precisely because the outcomes had begun to misbehave. The Protectorate was six years old, unloved, and expensive. Penruddock's rising in March 1655 was a small and easily crushed royalist conspiracy, but the response tells the true state of the order: in the autumn England was divided into districts under Major-Generals, soldiers set to govern counties, licensing alehouses and suppressing horse-races, a regime of godly supervision that reopened the wounds of the war and deepened the country's dislike of the men who had won it. Surveillance, the framework says, is the tell of a belief that never took. In 1655 the Commonwealth was watching its own countrymen because it could not be sure of them — an order still at the expensive pole, still on the sword, still hunting for the story that would let it put the sword down. It was in exactly that condition that it decided to conquer the Indies.

The reason for a fleet

The decision was not madness, and it was not, in the first instance, piety. It was arithmetic. The Rump's Navigation Act of 9 October 1651 had already laid down the principle on which an English empire would be built — that no goods of the growth, production or manufacture of Asia, Africa or America, *"as well of the English Plantations as others,"* might be brought into the Commonwealth or its plantations except in English ships — and it opened with a preamble whose eleven words dispose of any notion that trade policy and providence occupied separate compartments in this regime's mind. The increase of shipping and encouragement of navigation, the Act declared, *"which under the good Providence and Protection of God, is so great a means of the Welfare and Safety of this Common wealth."* God is in the shipping statute. He is not decoration there; he is the guarantor of the freight.

The Act made war with the Dutch, and the Dutch war made debt, and the debt sat on top of an army of thirty thousand men who had to be paid whether or not they were fighting. A regime in that position has a standard solution available to it, and the Council of State began discussing it in June 1654: take the Spanish Indies. Break the monopoly, seize the silver, plant a Protestant colony where a Catholic one had stood, pay for the army with the proceeds, and export the most dangerous surplus the Protectorate possessed — idle soldiers — to a place where their idleness would be someone else's problem. John

Lambert, the ablest soldier on the Council, objected that the scheme was grandiose and would cost more than it earned. Cromwell answered that it was God's will.

The intelligence on which the design was built came from a renegade. Thomas Gage had been a Dominican friar in Mexico and Guatemala for a dozen years, had abandoned the order, returned to England, turned Protestant, and in 1648 published *The English-American his Travail by Sea and Land*, dedicated to Sir Thomas Fairfax, then Captain-General of the Parliament's army. It is a travel book and a prospectus at once, and its Epistle Dedicatory contains the single most remarkable sentence in this landscape — remarkable because it is the framework's own central claim, stated seven years before the conquest, by the man who sold the conquest, as an argument *in favour of it*. Anticipating the objection that Spain held a lawful title to the Indies and that to dispossess her would be against conscience, Gage replied:

> *"I answer, that (the Popes donation excepted) I know no title he hath but force, which by the same title, and by a greater force may be repelled."*

There it is, in 1648, from the pulpit of the conquest itself: beneath the treaties and the bulls and the discoveries there is a floor of force, and a floor of force is answerable only to a larger one. Gage even took the next step and took it correctly — *"No question but the just right or title to those Countries appertains to the Natives themselves"* — and then, having seen the whole machine and named it in a single paragraph, he went out with the fleet as its chaplain and died on the island it took. Seeing the machine, the framework insists, frees nobody; this landscape adds the harder corollary, which is that it restrains nobody either. The clearest statement of the floor in the whole English seventeenth century was written by a man using it as a licence.

What actually happened

The fleet — eighteen warships and twenty transports, the largest England had yet sent to the Caribbean — left Portsmouth at the end of December 1654 under a divided command: William Penn at sea, Robert Venables on land, with civilian commissioners over both and no one clearly in charge. It picked up three to four thousand more men in Barbados and the Leewards, mostly indentured servants and freemen of no military value, and in April 1655 it attacked Santo Domingo on Hispaniola with something in the order of seven to nine thousand men. A Spanish force generally estimated at a few hundred,

largely militia, drove it off. The English lost heavily — to ambush, to thirst, to dysentery — and re-embarked in disgrace.

Jamaica was the consolation. It was not the target; it was what was left. The fleet made the south coast in the second week of May 1655, landed near the harbour the Spanish called Caguaya, walked into a capital that had been abandoned, and within a fortnight had articles of surrender from the governor. The precise date of the capitulation is given variously in the sources, and the honest statement is that it fell somewhere in the second half of May; the substantive point is that the island the English acquired, and would hold for three hundred and seven years, was acquired by an army that had just been beaten, in a place it had not been sent to, as the salvage of a failure.

The island that Spain had already emptied

And here the framework must be handled with care, because Jamaica does something that no other case in this collection does.

The rule the collection has established is that a conqueror never meets an aboriginal or timeless baseline. What he meets is a former conquest that has been naturalised — an earlier build that took, and went on taking until the people inside it experienced it as the furniture of reality. France in 1830 met an Islamic North Africa that was the seventh-century Arab conquest matured across a millennium into simply *the way the world is.* France in Indochina met the Confucian village and the mandarinate, and could rule thinly and cheaply precisely because that naturalised substrate was already forming and running the population for nothing.

Jamaica had no such substrate, because the previous conqueror had destroyed it and then failed to build anything in its place.

The island the Taíno called Xaymaca had been a populous Arawakan society — the estimates vary widely and should be given as a range rather than a figure, with tens of thousands the usual order of magnitude and sixty thousand a commonly cited upper reckoning — organised in villages under caciques, living on cassava and maize and fish. Columbus sighted it in 1494, was shipwrecked there in 1503, and the Spanish crown granted the island not to itself but to his family, as a private proprietorship. Juan de Esquivel planted the first settlement at Sevilla la Nueva in 1509; the *encomienda* followed; and within a few decades, between forced labour and epidemic disease, the Taíno of Jamaica had effectively ceased to exist as a society, though individuals and mixed remnants survived in the interior longer than the older histories allowed. Africans were brought in

to replace the labour that had been consumed. The capital moved to Villa de la Vega. And then, having found no gold, Spain simply lost interest.

What the English took in 1655 was therefore not a kingdom, and not a peasantry, and not a church with a hold on a people. It was a cattle station. Spanish Jamaica in its last years was a provisioning depot of hides and hogs and a little sugar, its total population variously estimated at somewhere between fifteen hundred and three thousand souls, or up to about four thousand if the enslaved are counted in — figures that should be handled as ranges, since the sources disagree and none of them counted carefully. There was no clergy worth co-opting, no chieftaincy worth redirecting, no legal code worth translating, no calendar worth borrowing, no tax base worth inheriting. A hundred and fifty years of Spanish rule had produced an order that ran on almost nothing because it *held* almost nothing, and it held almost nothing because it had killed the people it would otherwise have had to naturalise.

This is the framework's null case, and it should be stated as such rather than smoothed over. The recursion rule is not refuted here; it is given its limiting condition. A conqueror inherits a naturalised former conquest *where the former conquest succeeded*. Where it failed — where the earlier build consumed its own subject population and never reached the cheap pole — the new conqueror inherits an emptied field, and an emptied field is the most expensive thing a conqueror can be handed. He must supply the entire floor himself, from the first day, forever. And because there is no population to hold down, he must first *bring one*, which means the order will begin by importing the very subjects it will then have to coerce. The ordinary sequence of the framework — a floor laid over a people already in place — is here inverted: in Jamaica the floor stands first and the people are shipped in beneath it. Almost everything extreme about the two centuries that follow is already implied in that inversion, and the study will test it module by module.

What was already in the hills

One thing, however, the English did inherit, and it was the thing that would define the island.

When the Spanish colonists withdrew, they freed their enslaved Africans and armed them, and those men went into the mountains. Some had gone earlier. They fought alongside the last Spanish governor, Cristóbal Arnaldo de Isasi, in a guerrilla war that ran on for five years after the surrender — through the actions at Ocho Rios and Rio Nuevo in 1657 and 1658 — and when Isasi finally gave up and left for Cuba in 1660, they did not

leave with him. They stayed in the interior, under captains whose names survive: Juan Lubolo, called Juan de Bolas, who came to terms with the English in 1660 and was given land and a commission and turned his men against the Spanish; and Juan de Serras, who did not come to terms, who raided the plantations for decades, who is said to have struck at the capital itself, and whom the English never beat.

Hold the shape of that. On the day the English landed, the population that would be Jamaica's actual counter-order was already in the hills, already armed, already at war, and already — in Juan de Bolas — being purchased. Before the colony existed, the conqueror had made his first bargain with the one force he could not defeat, buying its loyalty with land and a title and turning it against his enemies. The satrap's bargain that the framework finds everywhere is present in Jamaica at the founding, before there is anything for it to be a bargain about. And the counter-formation that a colonial order withholds, and thereby leaves the field to — the thing the collection has watched the Islamic clergy do in Algeria and the Confucian village do in Vietnam — was in Jamaica not found but *built*, in the mountains, by the conquered themselves, out of what they had carried across the water and what they made up when they arrived. Where the field is empty, a substrate does not fail to appear. It is manufactured under the floor. That is the second prediction this landscape hands to the study.

The rebuke, and the sin that was not the generals'

Return, at the end, to England, and to what the robe did with the failure.

The Design had been sold as God's will. It had been beaten by a few hundred militiamen. For a regime whose entire legitimating claim was that outcomes are God's verdicts, this was not a military embarrassment but a theological emergency, and Cromwell met it as such: he shut himself away, he threw Penn and Venables into the Tower, and — on the reading historians have long given his private language of that season, in which he compared the nation's condition to Israel's after Achan's theft brought defeat at Ai — he concluded that God had rebuked England for a sin England had not yet found.

The public form of that conclusion survives. On 23 September 1656 the Protector and Parliament issued a declaration appointing Thursday 30 October a day of solemn fasting and humiliation in the three nations, and its indictment of the people is unsparing. *"Ah sinful Nation! a people laden with iniquity, a seed of evill doers, children that are corrupters,"* it says, borrowing Isaiah's words against Judah and applying them, without

softening, to England. And among the sins it enumerates is this one, which is the whole mechanism in a single clause — the sin of *"not being sensible under, nor making a sanctified use of, those Rebukes we have of late received; But rather charging such miscarriages upon Instruments, chiefly, if not only, when every Individual hath helped to fill up the measure of those sins after which such Iudgements were to follow."* The declaration does not name Hispaniola, and this study will not claim that it does. But its instruction is unmistakable: do not blame the men. The failure was not Venables's. It was yours. And the remedy it asks of God is that he *"remove whatever accursed thing there is amongst us"* — which is Joshua's phrase for Achan's plunder, hidden in the camp.

That is a robe absorbing a fact that ought to have broken it, and doing so by turning the fact into evidence for itself. The defeat is not a refutation of providence; it is providence, operating in the register of chastisement. And the mechanism is not cynicism — Cromwell's anguish was real, and the men who kept that fast kept it in earnest. The Architect and the Inheritor is exact about this: that the origin was built does not make the belief a lie. It makes it a thing that was built and then became real, and a real belief is far harder to break with a defeat than a cynical one, because a real belief can eat the defeat.

Five days earlier, Cromwell had told the Second Protectorate Parliament why England was at war with Spain at all. *"Why, truly, your great Enemy is the Spaniard. He is a natural enemy. He is naturally so; he is naturally so throughout, — by reason of that enmity that is in him against whatsoever is of God."* It is the whole robe in three sentences, and it is addressed — as every word of it was always addressed — to the Englishmen whose money and sons the thing required. Not one syllable of it concerns the island. In the entire public justification of the conquest of Jamaica, Jamaica does not appear.

Reading Jamaica's landscape against the framework

Four contributions, stated plainly, and each of them a revision rather than an application.

First, the recursion rule needs a limiting condition. The collection has held that a conqueror never meets a timeless baseline but always a naturalised former conquest. Jamaica shows the exception, and it is not a trivial one: he may meet a *failed* former conquest — an earlier build that destroyed the population it would have had to naturalise and therefore never travelled the gradient toward the cheap pole at all. Call this the **emptied field**. Vietnam handed France a substrate to borrow and so permitted a thin, cheap colonialism; Jamaica handed England nothing, because Spain had already spent it.

The rule survives, with its condition now written in: *the conqueror inherits a naturalised order only where the previous conqueror finished the job.*

Second, the emptied field inverts the framework's founding sequence. Ordinarily the floor is laid over a people who are already there. In Jamaica there was no people to lay it over, and so the order had to import its own subjects — which means the floor stood *before* the population, and the population was shipped in beneath it. This is not a decorative difference. It predicts, and the study will test, that the settlement will be a settlement of *cargo* rather than of conquered estates; that formation will be withheld not merely from prudence but as a structural necessity, since a population manufactured for labour is a population no one ever intended to bind; and that the resulting order will sit at the expensive pole permanently, with no prospect of ever running itself.

Third, the reversed robe is confirmed at its strongest. The colonial bend predicts a robe cut for the metropole and not the conquered. Jamaica's founding robe goes further than that prediction: it does not merely fail to address the conquered, it does not mention them. The war was justified against Spain, to Englishmen, in the language of Antichrist. The island is absent from its own conquest's rationale — which is what one should expect when the thing being justified has no audience whose belief the floor requires.

Fourth, and hardest: naming the floor does not restrain the man who names it. Thomas Gage set out the framework's central claim — that beneath every title lies force, answerable only to greater force — with a clarity the collection would be glad to have written itself, and then sailed with the fleet as its chaplain. *The Machine That Runs Itself* holds that seeing the machine does not free the governed. This landscape adds the darker half: it does not restrain the governors either. Legibility is not pardon, and it is not prophylaxis. A man can see the whole engine, describe it correctly, and use the description as a warrant. That is the standing warning under which the rest of this study is written.

A note on sources. The primary quotations here are exact and are drawn from public-domain texts reproducing the originals: the *Act for the abolishing the Kingly Office in England and Ireland, and the Dominions thereunto belonging* (17 March 1649) and the *Act for increase of Shipping, and Encouragement of the Navigation of this Nation* (9 October 1651), both from Firth and Rait's *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642–1660* (1911); Article 27 of the Instrument of Government as recited in the Protector's excise ordinance of February 1655, from the same collection; Cromwell's despatch to Speaker Lenthall of 17 September 1649 (spellings differ slightly between the Carlyle and Abbott editions — *"imbrued"* is Carlyle's — and the reading given here follows the text as reproduced in the standard editions); Thomas Gage's Epistle Dedicatory to *The English-American his Travail by Sea and Land* (1648); *A Declaration of His Highnes the Lord Protector and the Parliament ... for a Day of Solemn Fasting and Humiliation in the Three Nations*, 23 September 1656, printed by Hills and Field, from the EEBO-TCP transcription; and Cromwell's speech to the Second Protectorate Parliament of 17 September 1656, which survives principally through Carlyle's edition and carries his editorial interpolations — the sentences quoted here

are those which the editions agree upon, and any load-bearing use of that speech in a later module will be checked against a cleaner text. That Cromwell privately likened the Hispaniola defeat to Achan's sin at Ai is the reading of the standard biographies and is given here as scholarship, not as quotation; the fast-day declaration does not name the West Indies, and no claim is made that it does. Figures are contested and are given as ranges: the pre-contact Taíno population of Jamaica (tens of thousands, with sixty thousand a common upper estimate); the total population of Spanish Jamaica in 1655 (roughly fifteen hundred to three thousand Europeans, up to about four thousand including the enslaved); the English landing force at Hispaniola (about seven to nine thousand after the Barbados levies); and the Spanish defenders of Santo Domingo (a few hundred, chiefly militia). The account of the Design's planning, of Lambert's objection, of Gage's role as informant, and of Cromwell's reaction to the defeat rests on modern scholarship — Pestana above all — and is paraphrased and credited rather than quoted. The date of the Jamaican capitulation is given in the sources variously across the second half of May 1655 and is left as a range rather than fixed.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH JAMAICA — MODULE 1

NO PERFECT TRACK TO GUIDE US

> *Module 1 · The Floor of Force — how an order that could not afford an army leased its violence to pirates, wrote its own law where England's law was silent, and made a caste out of its enforcers*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The army that dissolved

The conquest of Jamaica took a fortnight. The founding of the floor of force took fifty years, and for most of that time it was not obvious that there would be one.

What the English had on the island in the summer of 1655 was not an occupying army but the wreckage of one. Something between seven and nine thousand men had gone against Santo Domingo; a few hundred Spanish militiamen had beaten them; and the survivors, who then walked into an abandoned Jamaica, proceeded to die. They died of dysentery and fever, of hunger in a place whose cattle they had been forbidden on pain of death to shoot, of the ambushes of the Spanish irregulars in the hills. They deserted where they could. Their commanders had already left: Penn and Venables both sailed for England within weeks of the capitulation and were both thrown into the Tower for it. By 1662, when the first English census of the island was taken, the entire population under English rule was something in the order of three thousand six hundred whites and about five hundred and fifty enslaved Africans — a number so small that the whole colony would have fitted comfortably inside one of the regiments that had been sent to take it.

This is the first fact of the Jamaican floor and it governs everything that follows: **England took an island it could not garrison.** It had no navy stationed in the Caribbean, no money to keep one there, and no population willing to go. Cromwell called for godly Englishmen to settle the new colony and few came; the New Englanders, invited, declined, having quite enough of God's work to do where they were. The Protectorate

shipped what it had — soldiers, and Irish and Scots prisoners and children, and vagrants and felons under sentence of transportation — into a disease environment that killed them at a rate which the historian Trevor Burnard, surveying white mortality across the first century and a quarter of English Jamaica, found appalling even by the standards of the tropics. The metropole had supplied a conquest and then declined to supply a floor.

An order in that position has three options. It can abandon the conquest. It can pay for the floor. Or it can find someone else to hold the floor on its behalf, and pay them in something other than money. Jamaica took the third.

The floor as a franchise

In 1657 the acting governor, Edward D'Oyley, invited the buccaneers of the Caribbean to make Port Royal their home port. It was not an eccentric decision; it was the only decision available. The men in question — the *boucaniers* of Hispaniola, cattle-hunters turned raiders, later joined by every kind of masterless man the Atlantic could produce, including escaped slaves — possessed exactly the thing the English state did not: a standing capacity for organised violence in the Caribbean, already assembled, already armed, and requiring no appropriation from Parliament. What they wanted in exchange was a market for plunder and a legal fig leaf. Jamaica supplied both.

The fig leaf was the letter of marque, and it is worth pausing on what a letter of marque actually is, because the framework has a name for it. It is the state's monopoly of organised violence, *leased*. The sovereign does not perform the violence and does not pay for it; he licenses it, and takes a percentage. Under Sir Thomas Modyford, governor from 1664, the licensing became systematic. Modyford issued Henry Morgan a commission — its terms, as reported from the colonial record, authorising him to draw the privateers together and take prisoners of the Spanish nation, so that the governor might learn of any Spanish design against the island, "of which I have frequent and strong advice" — and later a commission in still broader words, "to do and perform all manner of exploits, which may tend to the preservation and quiet of this island." That is the whole legal architecture of a decade of sacked cities: a defensive pretext, a blank warrant, and a governor who wanted deniability.

What it produced was not defence but a revenue stream. In July 1668 Morgan stormed Portobello, one of Spain's three great treasure ports, using captured friars and nuns to shield his men as they came up to the walls. The plunder is estimated at between seventy and a hundred thousand pounds — more, on the standard reckoning, than the entire

annual agricultural output of Jamaica at the time, and something approaching half the value of Barbados's sugar exports. Each buccaneer took about a hundred and twenty pounds, five or six times a seaman's yearly wage. Morgan took a five per cent share. And Modyford, the King's governor, took ten per cent, which was the price of the letter of marque.

Hold that arithmetic beside the framework's definition and the picture is exact. The floor of force in Jamaica between 1657 and 1671 was a private army, paid entirely out of the property of the people it attacked, operating under a licence for which the colony's chief magistrate charged a tenth. The state supplied no men, no ships, no wages and no discipline. It supplied only the licence — and it turned a profit on that. This is the cheapest floor in the collection, and it is cheap for a reason the framework should name plainly: **a leased floor costs the lessor nothing because its costs are paid by third parties who were never asked.**

In January 1671 Morgan crossed the isthmus with fourteen hundred men and burned Panama.

The repossession

The lease ended because the metropole's interest changed. The Treaty of Madrid of 1670 had already given England what the buccaneers were nominally fighting for — Spain conceding that the King of Great Britain should "have, hold, keep and enjoy for ever, with plenary Right of Soveraignty, Dominion, Possession and Propriety" all the lands and islands in the West Indies which he and his subjects then held — and a colony that has been granted legal title has no further use for men who exist to violate it. Worse: a colony that is beginning to grow sugar has a great deal to lose from a Spanish reprisal, and a great deal of capital sunk in fields that cannot be carried away in a boat. The planter's ledger and the buccaneer's had begun to point in opposite directions.

So the state repossessed its floor, and the manner of the repossession is the most instructive episode of the century. Sir Thomas Lynch arrived in 1671 with sealed orders. Modyford — who had made the island, who had brought hundreds of Barbadian planters and their enslaved workforces with him, who had signed the slave code — was arrested and sent to the Tower of London, where he sat for some four years, never charged and never tried. Morgan was arrested and shipped home in 1672 aboard a vessel named, without apparent irony, the *Welcome*. He was never imprisoned. He was fêted in London by a public in an anti-Catholic temper. And in January 1674 Charles II knighted him and sent

him back to Jamaica as Lieutenant-Governor, where the man who had sacked Portobello and Panama spent the rest of his life fortifying Port Royal and suppressing the trade he had invented.

The framework should take two things from this. First: a leased floor is a stage, not a settlement. The lessee accumulates precisely the capacity that makes him a rival, and the moment the state can afford its own violence it must reclaim the monopoly, because a licensed rival is still a rival. Second, and more useful: **the state's preferred method of reclaiming a leased floor is absorption, not destruction, because absorption is cheaper.** Hanging Morgan would have cost a war with his men. Knighting him cost a ribbon. He was not defeated; he was *hired* — the same manoeuvre the English had already performed on Juan de Bolas in 1660, and would perform on the Maroons in 1739. The buccaneer, the Maroon captain, the rebel: in each case the order met a force it could not beat, and in each case it did not beat it. It put it on the payroll.

The law they wrote because England had none

While the buccaneers held the sea, the planters were building the floor that mattered — not against Spain, but against the people they were importing to work the cane.

The instrument was the slave code, and Jamaica's first, "An Act for the better ordering & Governing of Negro Slaves," passed the Council on 2 November 1664 and was consented to by Thomas Modyford, who had brought the model with him from Barbados. Its preamble is the founding document of the Jamaican floor and it is candid in a way that later, more polished legislation never is. Having described the enslaved as "an heathenish brutish & an uncertaine & dangerous kind of people," it comes to the difficulty:

> *"...there being in all the Body of that Law noe perfect track to guide us where to walke Nor any exect rule sett us how to governe such Slaves as wee have..."*

That is the Act admitting, in its own opening sentence, that English law had nothing to say about this. There was no statute, no precedent, no rule. The condition the planters were creating did not exist in the law of England, and so they wrote it themselves, in a colonial council, in a legal vacuum, and had it, by its final clause, "read & published in all respective parish Churches in this Island" twice every year — the first Sunday in March and the first Sunday in September — so that no person might plead ignorance. The

church was conscripted as the publication organ of the floor before it was ever asked to perform a formation. Hold that; Module 4 will need it.

What the Act then does is best read as an engineering document, because that is what it is. It disarms:

> *"...every Overseer of a Ffamily in this Island shall cause all his Negro Slaves houses to bee Searched dilligently & effectually once every fourteen dayes for clubbs wooden swords, & mischevious weapons & finding any to take them away & cause them to bee burned."*

A fortnightly search of every dwelling on the island, in perpetuity, for wooden swords. The framework's Module 1 question — *who was disarmed, and how?* — has rarely been answered so completely. It immobilises: no enslaved person may leave the plantation without a written ticket specifying the hour of departure and the hour of return, and any white person finding one abroad without a ticket who fails to whip him is himself fined. It mutilates: a second offence of striking a Christian is punished by severe whipping, and then — the Act is precise — "his nose slitt & hee burned in some part of his face." It excludes from law:

> *"...being brutish Slaves deserve not for the basenes of their condicons to bee tryed by the legall tryall of twelve of their peeres or Neighborhood... as the freemen of England are..."*

The freemen of England get twelve peers. These get two justices and three freeholders, and sentence of death, and execution "forthwith." The distinction is not incidental; it is the caste line being cut into the constitution of the island, and it is cut by reference to England, which is the audience the whole thing is really addressed to.

And it prices life. If an enslaved person dies under punishment by his master, "noe person whatsoever shall bee accomptable to any Law therefore." If a master kills his own out of wantonness or "bloody minded & cruel intencon," he pays thirty pounds sterling — to the King. If he kills another man's, he pays the owner double the value and the King fifty. And if a poor freeholder kills a man by night off the common path, or in the act of taking a hog, "hee shall not bee accomptable for it, Any Law Statute or ordinance to the contrary Notwithstanding."

Set against these clauses the Act's single provision for the welfare of the people it governs, which is this, entire: that they shall have clothing once a year, "drawers & capps for men & petticoats for women." The whole moral universe of the order is in the gap between those two sentences, and the framework's instruction here is not to preach the gap but to lay it out and let the reader do the sum.

Who mans it

The last and strangest feature of the Jamaican floor is that the men it protected would not man it.

The 1664 Act had made every free man an officer of the floor by statute. Overseers search the houses. Freeholders sit as judges. Any justice, constable or militia captain who hears of a runaway's hiding place may "rise & Arme any number of men, not exceeding twenty, to apprehend & take them either live or dead," collecting five pounds from the owner if the man is brought in alive — and five pounds *from the public treasury* if he is brought in dead. And when rebellion is suspected, martial law follows automatically, with a field officer and his commissioned officers proceeding "by Marshall Law against the Actors contrivers Raisers fomenters," punishing "by Death or some other paines"; and lest any master hesitate to inform on his own property for fear of losing the value of it, the Act provides that "the losse of Slaves executed shall bee borne by the publique."

Read that last provision slowly, because it is the cost column being *engineered*. The order anticipated that a master's private ledger might argue against denouncing his own slaves, and it removed the entry: the public would buy the corpse. The framework says an order holds when, for each subject, the sum comes out against defection. Jamaica's assembly did the arithmetic for its own beneficiaries and adjusted the numbers until the sum came out right.

And still they would not man it. Because the great planters were absentees — only about a third of Jamaica's proprietors resided on the island, against something like two-thirds in Barbados — the free population that was supposed to constitute the floor kept failing to exist. So the Assembly legislated the floor's manpower directly, in the deficiency laws: a statute of 1703 required one white person for each ten enslaved up to the first twenty, and one for each twenty thereafter. The planters found it cheaper to pay the fine. By 1763 the required ratio had been relaxed to one white for every thirty — or, revealingly, one white per hundred and fifty head of cattle — and still it was not met, so that the "fines" became simply a line of anticipated revenue in the Assembly's budget. In 1780 the parish of Westmoreland collected £1,722 in deficiency tax from estates that were short; on forty-nine of them, two hundred and thirty-seven white men were supervising seven thousand eight hundred and thirty-nine enslaved people — a ratio of one to thirty-three. Across the island in 1768 the count stood at some seventeen thousand whites, one hundred and sixty-six thousand nine hundred and fourteen enslaved, and one hundred and thirty-five thousand seven hundred and seventy-three head of cattle, the three enumerated in a single breath.

That is the Jamaican floor at its full extension: about one armed enforcer for every ten people he was enforcing upon, in a colony whose own beneficiaries had priced the requirement, declined to meet it, and elected to pay a tax instead. The framework has a name for what fills a gap like that. It is the outside force — the imperial regiments and the Royal Navy, paid for by the metropole, arriving when the militia could not cope — and it is the purchased native auxiliary, which in Jamaica meant the Maroons, whom the order had been unable to defeat since the day it landed, and whom it would finally, in 1739, hire.

Because the last thing to say about this floor is that it had a hole in it, and the hole was the size of a mountain range. For eighty-four years there was territory in Jamaica that the order could not enter. The Act of 1664 already knew it: "divers Slaves at this present are & long time have bin runn away into the woods & other fastnes of the Island doeing continually much mischeife." The floor was laid across the plains and the cane pieces and the ports, and above it, in the cockpits and the Blue Mountains, sat a population that had beaten it and would go on beating it, and to whom the order would eventually have to go, hat in hand, with a treaty. That is Module 8's business. Module 1's business is only to record that the floor of British Jamaica was never complete, and that everybody on the island knew it.

Reading the Jamaican floor against the framework

Four contributions, and each of them a revision.

First, the leased floor. The framework defines the floor as the monopoly of organised violence on which an order rests. Jamaica shows a colonial order that began by *renting* it: a private army licensed by letter of marque, paid entirely in the plunder of third parties, with the governor drawing a ten per cent commission on the licence. This is not an aberration to be filed under piracy. It is what an order does when it has taken a position it cannot afford to hold, and it should be added to the framework as a recognised early stage: **the leased floor, cheap to the lessor precisely because its costs are externalised onto people who were never asked to pay them.** And it carries its own termination clause, because a lessee accumulates the very capacity that makes him a rival — which yields the second half of the finding: *the state ends the lease by absorbing the lessee, not by destroying him, because absorption is cheaper.* Morgan was knighted. Juan de Bolas was commissioned. The Maroons would be treated with. In Jamaica the order never once beat a force it could not beat; it bought it.

Second, the floor as caste rather than garrison. The framework tends to picture the floor as a standing armed body distinct from the population — the legion, the *gendarmerie*, the King's African Rifles. Jamaica had almost no such body for most of its history. Instead the 1664 Act distributed the floor across the entire free population by statute: the overseer as searcher, the freeholder as judge, the constable as raiser of armed parties, the whole white population as militia. The caste line is therefore not a by-product of the settlement but the floor's own roster. This has a consequence the study must carry forward: **where the floor is a caste, admitting anyone to the caste weakens the floor** — which predicts, more sharply than any doctrine of race could, that the order will fight ferociously against any enlargement of the free population, and will do so for reasons of security before reasons of prejudice. Module 9 will test that.

Third, the beneficiaries free-rode on their own floor. The framework's *default* holds that each beneficiary defends the whole arrangement merely by defending his own position. Jamaica shows the default's dark side, and it is a real refinement: **the same position logic that makes a beneficiary defend the order can make him starve it.** Every planter wanted the floor to exist; no planter wanted to pay for the white men who would constitute it, since white men cost wages and land and ate into the sugar. So they paid the fine, went absentee, and let the ratio slide to one in thirty — and the shortfall was made up by the metropole's regiments and by a treaty with the very people the floor was meant to contain. An order can be undermined by the ordinary self-interest of the men it was built for, without a single defector and without anyone intending it.

Fourth, the law written in the blank. The 1664 preamble concedes that in the whole body of English law there was "noe perfect track to guide us where to walke." The floor did not operate in defiance of the metropole's law; it operated in the space the metropole's law had left empty, wrote what it needed there, and had the result read aloud from the parish pulpits twice a year. The framework says the robe is laid over the floor to make it cheap. Jamaica adds that where the metropole has left a legal vacuum, the floor writes its own law first and the robe comes later — and that the church may be conscripted as the floor's herald long before it is trusted as the robe's tailor.

And legibility is not pardon. To explain why an under-capitalised colony leased its violence to pirates, why it knighted the pirate rather than hang him, and why it wrote a statute requiring the fortnightly burning of wooden swords, is to make the order intelligible, not to excuse it. The men who searched those houses every fourteen days for a hundred and seventy years were doing something the framework can account for. That the account exists does not make the search any less what it was.

A note on sources. The primary quotations from the Jamaican slave code of 1664 are taken from the transcription of "An Act for the better Ordering and Governing of Negro Slaves," The National Archives (UK), CO 1/139, published by the Slavery, Law & Power project (transcribed by Jamie Gemmell, Lauren Michalak, Michael Becker and Dylan Bails). The Act itself is a public-domain colonial statute and its precise wording is the evidence; the transcription, however, is expressly marked as under editorial review and containing possible errors, and its spellings and lacunae should be verified against the manuscript before publication. Its later re-enactments — most importantly the Act of 1696 — hardened rather than softened these provisions, and are left for a later module rather than asserted here from memory. The Treaty of Madrid is quoted exactly from the 1670 printed text. Modyford's commissions to Morgan are quoted as they appear in the standard scholarly accounts drawing on the colonial record, and are flagged as requiring confirmation against the archival original if they are to bear more weight than they do here. The deficiency-law provisions of 1703 and 1763, the Westmoreland figures of 1780, the census of 1768, and the census of 1662 are given from the standard secondary literature and should be treated as the best available figures rather than as exact ones; contested numbers are given as ranges throughout — the English landing force at Hispaniola (about seven to nine thousand), the Portobello plunder (£70,000–£100,000), and the enslaved population at the century's turn (rising from under fifty thousand in 1700 to over three hundred thousand by 1800). The account of the buccaneers, of Morgan's career and arrest, of Modyford's imprisonment, and of white mortality in early Jamaica rests on modern scholarship — Zahedieh, Pestana, and Burnard above all — and is paraphrased and credited rather than quoted.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH JAMAICA — MODULE 2

HIMSELF, HIS SERVANTS AND SLAVES

> *Module 2 · The Settlement — how an order with no conquered world to divide paid its victors in thirty acres a head, made whiteness a property qualification, and priced admission at whatever a force it could not beat would take*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

A settlement with nothing to settle

The framework's second module asks who got what: how the conquered world was divided among the victors, and by what law and inheritance the division was carried forward. Every other case in this collection can answer that question by naming an expropriation. The Norman took the Saxon's manor. The *pied-noir* took the Algerian's tribal land, and the *sénatus-consulte* wrote the taking into law. The Ganda chief took his eight square miles out of the clan's *bibanja*. In each, a settlement is a transfer: something belonged to somebody, and afterwards it belonged to somebody else.

Jamaica had nobody to take anything from.

Look at what Cromwell's regime actually said when it advertised the place. The Protector's proclamation described the island as *"spacious in extent, commodious in its harbours and rivers within itself, healthful by its situation, well stored with horses and other cattle, and generally fit and worthy to be planted and improved to the advantage, honour, and interest of this nation."* Read it twice and notice what is missing. It is a description of furniture. There are harbours and rivers and cattle and a healthful situation — and no people. Not a word about inhabitants to be governed, converted, taxed, or displaced, because the Spanish had spent the Taíno a century and a half before and the surviving Spaniards were leaving. An advertisement for a conquest that has nothing to say about the conquered is a rare document, and it tells you at once what kind of settlement is coming.

The first English count of the island, taken in 1661, reads like the inventory of a warehouse: two thousand four hundred and fifty-eight men, four hundred and fifty-four women, forty-four children, five hundred and eighty-four negroes, six hundred and eighteen arms, and two thousand five hundred and eighty-eight planted acres. Set the categories in that order beside one another. The colony counted its guns in the same list as its people, and its people in the same list as its acreage, and it had rather more grown men than it had weapons to give them — which is Module 1's floor, arriving in a census.

So the question this module has to answer is not *how was the conquered world divided* but something the framework has not yet had to ask: **what does a settlement distribute when there is nothing on the ground to distribute?**

Thirty acres a head

The answer arrived from Whitehall on 14 December 1661, in a royal proclamation for the encouraging of planters in His Majesty's island of Jamaica. It offered a free grant of thirty acres of land to every person above twelve years of age then residing on the island or removing to it within two years. And it closed with a promise that is the founding constitutional sentence of British Jamaica:

> *"And we doe further publish and declare that all the children of our naturall borne subjects of England, to bee borne in Jamaica, shall from their respective births, bee reputed to bee free denizens of England; and shall have the same privileges, to all intents and purposes, as our free borne subjects of England."*

Read the clause slowly, because it does not say what a modern eye assumes it says. It does not confer anything on children born in Jamaica. It confers on *"the children of our naturall borne subjects of England, to bee borne in Jamaica."* The soil grants nothing. The parentage grants everything. In a single sentence, before the island contained more than a few thousand souls of any description, the Restoration drew a hereditary line through a population that did not yet exist — and it drew it, in the most literal sense, by blood.

Then there is the arithmetic of the thirty acres, and the arithmetic is the whole settlement.

Thirty acres *a head* means thirty acres for every head you bring. A man who came alone got thirty acres. A man who landed with a hundred servants and enslaved Africans got three thousand. The headright, which sounds in its statement like a homesteader's charter — land for anyone willing to come — is in operation a machine for converting capital into

land, and in Jamaica the capital was people. Thomas Modyford understood this perfectly and came from Barbados in 1664 with several hundred planters and their workforces behind him. The result was visible within a year of the proclamation: patents were issued in free socage on a scale that makes nonsense of the thirty-acre figure, several men obtaining six, eight, ten and twenty thousand acres apiece; Sir Thomas Lynch acquired very extensive domains; and Major Hope with Colonels Archbould and Beeston held the entire district of Liguanea between the three of them.

And the formula did not lapse. It was still running, unaltered, in the reign of George II. Here is a Jamaican land patent of 1755, and it is the plainest statement of the settlement in the whole record:

> *"...for and in consideration that Jonathan James hath transported himself his servants and slaves into our said Island in Pursuance of a Proclamation made in the Reign of His late Majesty King Charles the Second of blessed memory and for his better Encouragement to become one of our Planters there... Do give and grant unto the said Jonathan James his Heirs and assigns one hundred acres of land..."*

Himself, his servants and slaves. Three tiers of the order in a single clause of conveyancing, and the third one is not a party to the transaction but the price of it. The land was the consideration; the human beings were what was tendered. Ninety-four years after Charles II's proclamation, the Crown was still handing out Jamaica by the head, and the head was the unit of account.

Who supplied the heads

If land was granted in proportion to the people you imported, then the settlement had a supply chain, and it is worth being exact about who owned it.

On 18 December 1660 — three weeks after the Restoration Parliament had settled the King's revenue, and a year before the Jamaica proclamation — Charles II chartered the Company of Royal Adventurers Trading into Africa, and in 1663 a fresh charter named the trade in enslaved Africans explicitly among its objects. The company failed in the Dutch war and was re-founded in 1672, recapitalised and merchant-run, as the Royal African Company, with a charter to raise forts, keep troops, and exercise martial law on the African coast. Its Governor, from the founding of the first company to the year he lost his throne, was James, Duke of York, the King's brother and heir, who continued as its chief stockholder after he became James II.

Many of the people the company shipped were branded on the chest with the letters of its initials. Many others were branded *DY*.

That is the fact this module exists to place, and it should be placed without commentary because it does not need any. The supply chain of the Jamaican settlement was a royal monopoly, chartered by the King, governed by the King's brother, and its cargo was marked with the heir's initials. In the 1680s the company was moving something on the order of five thousand people a year. Across its slaving decades from 1672 the totals are large and the estimates differ — the ships it invested in carried somewhere between roughly 190,000 and 210,000 people to the Americas, of whom between sixteen thousand and forty-odd thousand died in the passage, depending on which reckoning is used, and the honest statement is the range rather than a figure.

And then the monopoly broke, and how it broke is the most important sentence in this module.

It broke because of the Glorious Revolution. When James II was driven out in 1688, the independent merchants of England argued that a monopoly granted by royal prerogative had no standing — that it was an offence against the liberty and property of Englishmen for the Crown to close a trade to its own subjects. They won. The company acknowledged the loss of its monopoly, and Parliament confirmed it in the Trade with Africa Act of 1697, which opened the African trade to any English merchant on payment of a ten per cent levy. Bristol came in. Liverpool came in. The volume of English slaving multiplied.

Jamaica was the direct beneficiary. Across the whole period of the trade, something on the order of a million African captives were landed on the island — more than any other British colony, more than four times the number disembarked in Barbados — and the great acceleration came *after* the royal monopoly was destroyed in the name of English liberty.

This module will not draw the conclusion. It will only lay the two facts side by side and hand them, as an unpaid debt, to Module 3: the Crown's slave-trading monopoly was abolished by the constitutional revolution that made liberty and property the governing language of English public life, and the immediate consequence was that far more people were enslaved. Whatever a robe is, it is not a decoration, and Module 3 must meet that fact rather than walk around it.

The three tiers, and the one that was not a tier

By 1768 the island's official count stood at some seventeen thousand whites, one hundred and sixty-six thousand nine hundred and fourteen enslaved people, and one hundred and thirty-five thousand seven hundred and seventy-three head of cattle. The settlement those numbers describe had three tiers and one absence.

The great planters. These were the men the thirty-acre formula had made, and their trajectory is the framework's *Architect and the Inheritor* running at unusual speed. Samuel Long came ashore in 1655 as a lieutenant in the army of conquest — one of the soldiers of the failed Western Design, one of the men who walked into the empty capital. He took land. His descendants took more, and the estate at Longville became a dynasty, and his great-grandson Edward Long became a judge of the island's Vice-Admiralty court and the author of the *History of Jamaica*, the most systematic apology the planter class ever produced for itself. Four generations: the sword, the patent, the estate, the historian. In Algeria that arc took a century and a half. In Jamaica, because there was no incumbent order to overcome and no conquered population to absorb, it took about a hundred years, and by the end of it the arrangement was, for the men inside it, simply the way the world was.

The small whites. Overseers, bookkeepers, tradesmen, tavern-keepers, the surviving remnant of the transported Irish and Scots, the men who took their thirty acres and mostly lost them or died of fever. The framework should not pass over these people quickly, because what they received is the settlement's most interesting payment. Materially, most of them received very little. What they received instead was the *caste* — and Module 1 has already shown what the caste was in practice. It was the right to bear arms in a colony where possession of a wooden sword by the wrong person was punished by burning. It was the right to sit, as one of three freeholders, in judgement on a capital charge from which the accused was excluded by statute from the trial by twelve peers that an Englishman would have had. It was the right to demand a ticket, to administer a moderate whipping, to be paid five pounds out of the public treasury for a corpse. It was immunity: no white man in Jamaica need fear the law for what he did to a black one, and the law said so in terms.

That is not nothing. That is, in fact, a very substantial asset, and it is one the apex could mint at no cost to itself, since it was made entirely out of other people's degradation. The great planters did not have to share the land; they shared the *standing*. And the small white man, who owned nothing and would die young, was thereby given a stake in the

settlement as real as any acre — and a reason, which Module 8 will need, to defend the whole arrangement while defending only himself.

The anomalies. Between the tiers sat two populations who show that the line was legal rather than merely customary. The Sephardic Jews of Port Royal and Spanish Town were essential to the colony's commerce and were denizened by the King directly, over the head of an Assembly that did not want them; they could trade, and they could be taxed separately, and they could not vote. The free people of colour — a population the planters were themselves generating — would be walled into a narrow legal box by a succession of Assembly acts across the eighteenth century, which is Module 9's subject and will be taken up there. Both groups prove the same point: the boundary of the Jamaican settlement was not a prejudice but a **property qualification**, written into statute, and the statute knew exactly what it was doing.

And the absence. The enslaved were not the lowest tier of the settlement. They were not a tier at all. They were the consideration in the deed — the thing tendered for the land, counted in the census between the women and the arms, and named in the patent between the servants and the acreage.

The price of admission

One last document, and it undoes any temptation to read the caste line as a matter of conviction.

In February 1663, less than two years after the proclamation that promised thirty acres to every English settler, the Jamaican government issued another proclamation. It offered freedom, and thirty acres of land — the same thirty acres — to those of the Spanish-freed Africans in the mountains who would come in and submit under the command of Juan de Bolas, their former captain, who had already come over. The offer was not made because anyone in Spanish Town had revised his views on the capacities of Africans. It was made because those men in the hills could not be beaten, and Module 1 has already established what this order did with a force it could not beat.

Seventy-six years later, in 1739, the same offer would be made again on a larger scale, and the Maroons would take it. That is Module 8's business. Module 2's business is to note that the settlement's boundary — the line between those who received the world and those who *were* the world received — was never a principle. It was a price. The order would sell entry to anyone whose violence it could not defeat, and it would sell it to no

one else. Every other person on the wrong side of the line stayed there not because the line was sacred but because they had not made themselves expensive enough.

Reading the Jamaican settlement against the framework

Four contributions.

First, the settlement of cargo. The framework defines the settlement as the division of the conquered world among the victors, carried forward by inheritance and law. Jamaica had no conquered world, and so it divided something else: *entitlements to import.* Thirty acres for every human being you transported. This is the emptied field of Landscape I turning up in a land patent, and it should be written back into the framework in exactly these terms: **where the conqueror finds no population, the settlement's unit of account becomes the human being — the settlers are not paid in what was taken from the conquered, they are paid in proportion to the conquered they bring.** The ordinary sequence of conquest and division is not merely inverted; it is closed into a loop, since the land is the reward for supplying the labour that makes the land worth having.

Second, the caste is the small man's share. The great planters took the acres. The mass of white Jamaicans took the caste — legal standing, the right to arms, the right to judge, immunity before the law — and the caste was a genuine asset, minted by the apex at zero cost because it was made wholly of other people's subjection. The framework should carry this forward as a distinct mechanism: **a settlement can pay most of its beneficiaries in a currency the apex does not have to give up any of its own wealth to issue, namely the standing of not being the people at the bottom.** It explains why the settlement was defended most fiercely by the men who had gained least from it, and it is Morgan's Virginia finding met again, in a different colony, with the mechanism visible in statute rather than inferred from rhetoric.

Third, the boundary is a price. Twice — with Juan de Bolas in 1663, with the Maroons in 1739 — the order offered land, freedom and standing across its own absolute racial line, and both times it did so for the same reason: it could not beat the people it was offering to. This confirms Module 1's finding on absorption and extends it into the settlement: **the settlement's boundary is drawn exactly where the floor's competence ends.** The line was not held by belief. It was held by the fact that almost nobody on the wrong side of it could make it worth the order's while to move.

Fourth, and hardest: the robe of liberty was the settlement's supply chain. The royal monopoly on the trade in human beings was destroyed by the constitutional

revolution of 1688 and by an Act of Parliament passed in the language of the liberty and property of Englishmen — and the effect was to multiply the trade several times over. The framework holds that the robe is laid over the floor to make it cheap. Jamaica presents the harder case, and Module 3 must take it head-on: **a robe can be sincerely believed, genuinely liberating for its own audience, and by that very fact the most efficient instrument the settlement ever had.** Not a hypocrisy to be exposed. A mechanism to be described.

And legibility is not pardon. To explain that the thirty-acre headright was an elegant device for converting capital into land, that the caste line was a costless dividend paid to poor men, and that the boundary of the settlement was a price rather than a creed, is to make the arrangement intelligible. It does not soften the clause in the deed. Somewhere in the Secretary's office at Spanish Town there is a piece of parchment in which a man is granted a hundred acres because he transported himself, his servants and his slaves — and the third of those words is doing all the work, and every person it names is missing from the document that disposed of them.

A note on sources. The primary quotations are as follows. Cromwell's proclamation on Jamaica and the closing declaration of Charles II's proclamation of 14 December 1661 are quoted from E. A. Cruikshank's *The Life of Sir Henry Morgan* (1935), which reproduces them from the record; the proclamation itself survives in the Early English Books collection as *A proclamation for the encouraging of planters in His Majesties island of Jamaica in the West-Indies*, and the wording given here should be collated against that text before publication. The 1755 land patent to Jonathan James is quoted from a transcription of the original deed and patent made by Harry and Jacqueline Christensen; the archival original should be confirmed if the passage is to bear more weight than it does here. The census figures of 1661 and 1662, the scale of the early land patents, and the February 1663 offer to Juan de Bolas's men are given from the standard chronologies of the island and from the same source, and are the best available rather than the certain. Figures are contested and are given as ranges: the numbers carried by the Royal African Company (roughly 190,000–210,000 between 1672 and 1731, with deaths in passage variously estimated between about 16,000 and 44,000) and the total African captives landed in Jamaica across the whole trade (on the order of a million). The 1768 island count and the deficiency figures are from the standard secondary literature. Edward Long's *Candid Reflections* (1772) and *History of Jamaica* (1774) are the central planter primaries for this study and are deliberately not quoted here: a striking passage attributed to *Candid Reflections* on the enslaved as money in a debtor's hands could not be verified against a reliable reproduction of the text, and has therefore been left out rather than guessed at. Long will be worked properly, from the text, in Module 3. The account of the Royal African Company, of the Barbadian migration under Modyford, and of the Long family's rise rests on modern scholarship — Pettigrew, Dunn, Zahedieh, Burnard — and is paraphrased and credited rather than quoted.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH JAMAICA — MODULE 3

THE LIBERTIES OF OUR NATIVE COUNTRY

> *Module 3 · The Robe — how the metropole changed its story three times in forty years without the machine breaking stride, why the robe of English liberty fitted slavery better than any other, and what a universal creed does to the boundary of the human*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

Three robes, one machine

Between the conquest of Jamaica and the end of the seventeenth century, England changed its account of why it was entitled to govern the world three separate times, and each change was total.

In 1655 the island was taken by a regicide republic that had abolished the monarchy as *"unnecessary, burthensom and dangerous,"* and it was taken in the name of a providential God who had declared war on Antichrist through the person of the King of Spain. In 1660 that republic was dissolved, its Protector's corpse was later dug up and hanged, and the island was retained — not returned, *retained* — by the son of the king the republic had beheaded, who held it now as a possession of a restored and divinely sanctioned Crown. And in 1688 that Crown was itself overthrown, and the island passed under a constitutional settlement whose governing language was liberty, property, and the consent of the governed, and whose philosopher was John Locke.

Providence, prerogative, liberty. Three creeds with almost nothing in common, each replacing its predecessor by force or the threat of it, inside forty years.

The machine in Jamaica did not break stride. It did not slow. It accelerated.

That is the fact this module exists to explain, and the explanation is the framework's, stated in its plainest form: **a robe is cut for the audience whose belief the order actually needs, and the colony was never that audience.** What England needed from its own

people was money, ships, soldiers, migrants, and legal cover. What it needed from the enslaved of Jamaica was work, and work can be had at the point of a whip. So the robe faced east across the Atlantic, and when the audience on that side changed its mind about what legitimacy looked like, the robe was re-cut to suit — and the thing it covered, being no part of the conversation, was untouched by the alteration.

You can watch the re-cutting happen in a single sentence. Here is the preamble of the Rump Parliament's Navigation Act of 9 October 1651, the founding statute of English empire, passed by the men who had killed the King:

> *"For the Increase of the Shipping and the Encouragement of the Navigation of this Nation, which under the good Providence and Protection of God, is so great a means of the Welfare and Safety of this Common wealth..."*

And here is the preamble of the Navigation Act of 1660, re-enacted by the restored monarchy that had hunted those men down:

> *"For the increase of shipping and encouragement of the navigation of this nation wherein, under the good providence and protection of God, the wealth, safety, and strength of this kingdom is so much concerned..."*

The same sentence. The same God. One word altered — *commonwealth* becomes *kingdom* — and the empire's economic constitution passes intact from the regicides to the regicides' executioners. Three years later, the Staple Act of 1663 dropped even the theology and said what the arrangement was for: the plantations exist for *"the maintaining a greater correspondence and kindness between them, and keeping them in a firmer dependence upon it, and rendering them yet more beneficial and advantageous unto it."* The dependence is the point; the kindness is the decoration; and no one in Whitehall thought there was any tension between the two, because the sentence was written for an audience that would not be reading it in a cane field.

The robe of liberty, and why it fitted best

Now to the third robe, which is the one that matters, and which presents the framework with its hardest case.

Received intuition says that a creed of liberty must strain against an order of slavery — that the Glorious Revolution and the Two Treatises were, however slowly, the acid that would eventually dissolve the plantation. Jamaica says otherwise. The robe of English

liberty was not the enemy of the Jamaican settlement. It was the best robe that settlement ever wore, and it was best precisely because it was followed *strictly*, not because it was betrayed.

Follow the logic and see how little cheating it requires. Government exists to secure life, liberty, and property. The enslaved are property — the 1664 Act says so, the land patents say so, the census counts them between the women and the arms. Therefore the state that secures a planter's slaves against seizure is not violating the creed of liberty; it is *discharging* it. And therefore a planter resisting a governor who would take his property without consent is not a hypocrite invoking liberty for cover. He is a free Englishman defending the constitution.

The man who wrote the syllogism down was John Locke. In 1669, as secretary to the Earl of Shaftesbury, he drafted the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, and its provisions on this point stand consecutively, in the same hand, under two adjacent numbers:

> *"One hundred and ten. Every freeman of Carolina shall have absolute power and authority over his negro slaves, of what opinion or religion soever.*
>
> *One hundred and eleven. No cause, whether civil or criminal, of any freeman, shall be tried in any court of judicature, without a jury of his peers."*

Absolute dominion, then trial by jury. Article 110, then Article 111. Not in tension; in sequence — the second article is what the first article is *for*. And the clause that closes Article 110, *"of what opinion or religion soever,"* is the reversed robe stated in a philosopher's own hand: whatever this man comes to believe, it changes nothing. Locke's constitution makes the point twice, because a few lines earlier it has already provided that if a slave joins a church, *"no slave shall hereby be exempted from that civil dominion his master hath over him, but be in all things in the same state and condition he was In before."* The robe is not addressed to him. It cannot be put on by him. His belief is legally inert.

Locke, it should be recorded without editorial, held stock in the Royal African Company — the company whose cargo, branded *DY* on the chest, was building the Jamaica this study is describing.

And here is the finding that makes this more than an exposure of a great man's private accounts. **The Jamaican Assembly had already written the same clause, five years before Locke, without knowing him.** Module 1 quoted it: the enslaved, said the Act of 1664, *"being brutish Slaves deserve not for the basenes of their condicons to bee tryed by the legall tryall of twelve of their peeres or Neighborhood... as the freemen of England are."*

Absolute dominion of the master; jury trial for the free man; the two set side by side, with the second defined against the first. An obscure colonial council in Spanish Town, drafting in a hurry from a Barbadian model, and the greatest philosopher of consent in the English language, drafting in Shaftesbury's study — arriving independently at the identical architecture, because they occupied the identical position and it posed them the identical problem. That is *No Hidden Hand*, in two documents five years apart, and it should be logged as one of the corpus's cleanest examples of convergence without contact.

What the planters bought with English liberty

The Jamaican planters did not merely inherit this robe. They fought for it, they won, and the historical memory of what they won is one of the great sleights of the British Atlantic.

Between 1675 and 1680 the Crown attempted to bring Jamaica under a version of Poynings' Law — the Irish arrangement, under which no colonial statute could even be introduced without prior approval from London. It was the most centralising move Whitehall ever made toward the island. The Assembly refused, and it refused in exactly the register you would expect, having declared in 1677 that Jamaicans were entitled to all those *"laws and statutes heretofore made and used in our native country, the Kingdom of England, for the public weal of the same, and all the liberties immunities and privileges contained therein."* The Crown's law officers could find no ground to compel them. In 1680 the Lords of Trade gave up.

That episode is, in the island's own telling, the founding of Jamaican liberty: a representative assembly standing against royal absolutism, invoking Magna Carta and the Petition of Right, and winning. Every word of that description is true. And what the Assembly secured by winning was the exclusive right to legislate the slave code — to write, without London's prior consent, the statute that ordered the fortnightly burning of wooden swords and paid five pounds from the public purse for a runaway's corpse.

The pattern holds through 1688. James II's governor, the Duke of Albemarle, had tried to break the planter oligarchy's grip on the island's offices; after his death the excluded planters lobbied in London, and the Revolution that put William and Mary on the throne confirmed the Assembly's local control for good. And in the same decade the Revolution destroyed the Royal African Company's monopoly — on the argument, unanswerable within its own terms, that it was a *manifest violation of the rights of Englishmen* for the Crown to close a trade to its own subjects by prerogative. Parliament confirmed the opening in 1697. Bristol came in, and Liverpool, and the volume of English slaving

multiplied several times over, and Jamaica became the largest market in the British Atlantic.

This is Module 2's unpaid debt, and it is now paid, and the payment is uncomfortable. The liberty of Englishmen, honestly asserted and honourably won against a Crown that really was reaching for arbitrary power, produced as its direct and immediate consequence a great enlargement of the trade in human beings. Not because the creed was a lie. Because the creed was applied.

The boundary of the human

Which leaves the last problem, and the deepest, and the one on which the eighteenth century broke its teeth.

A creed of *property* can accommodate slavery indefinitely. A creed of *universal human right* cannot. And through the eighteenth century the metropolitan robe drifted, slowly and unevenly, from the first toward the second — through the Enlightenment, through Somerset's case in 1772, through the language of humanity that would eventually become the language of abolition. When a robe universalises, an order built on exclusion has only two moves available. Either the creed contracts, or the class of persons contracts.

The metropole would not let the creed contract. So the colony contracted the person.

Watch the drift in the colony's own language. In 1664 the Assembly described the enslaved as *"an heathenish brutish & an uncertaine & dangerous kind of people"* — and every word of that is a *cultural* and *religious* judgement. Heathenish can be baptised. Brutish can be tamed. It is a description of a condition, and conditions can change; which is exactly why Locke had to write explicitly that baptism would alter nothing, and exactly why in 1680 the clergyman Morgan Godwyn could publish an argument that the enslaved of the plantations ought to be admitted to the Church, and be answered, and be ignored. The seventeenth-century robe left a door ajar, and the planters spent a century nailing it shut.

By 1774 the door was gone, and the man who removed it was Edward Long. In the *History of Jamaica* — the most systematic self-portrait the planter class ever produced, written by a judge of the island's Vice-Admiralty court — Long surveyed what he took to be the character of Africans and drew the conclusion the age required:

> *"When we reflect on the nature of these men, and their dissimilarity to the rest of mankind, must we not conclude, that they are a different species of the same genus?"*

Species. Not condition, not culture, not religion — kind. And he went further, into the passages the *History* is now chiefly remembered for, comparing the African to the orangutan and declaring that he did not think an orangutan husband *"would be any dishonour to an Hottentot female."* His practical maxim followed from the taxonomy: such men, he wrote, must be managed at first as if they were beasts, and must be tamed before they can be treated like men.

The temptation is to file Long as a barbarian, a survival from a darker time, an embarrassment the Enlightenment would soon sweep away. That reading is exactly wrong, and the framework should say so. Long was a *modern*. He was a lawyer and a judge, a systematiser working with Linnaeus's taxonomy and Buffon's natural history, a man of the Royal Society's world who spent the rest of his life drawing diagrams to fix the place of the African on a chain of being. His racial theory is not a residue of the seventeenth century. It is a *product* of the eighteenth — and it exists because the eighteenth century's robe had become universal, and a universal robe leaves an order of chattel slavery exactly one exit: to argue that the people it holds are not the sort of beings the creed is about.

That is the hinge, and it should be written into the framework in these terms. **Race science is not liberalism's opposite. It is liberalism's colonial prosthetic** — the device that permits a man to hold a creed of universal liberty sincerely, publicly, and without discomfort, while owning six hundred human beings, because he has been supplied with a reason to believe that the creed's universe does not include them. The doctrine hardens in exact proportion as the creed universalises. Heathenish, in 1664, was a claim you could argue with. A different species of the same genus, in 1774, was a claim built to be unarguable.

And note whose great-grandson wrote it. Samuel Long came ashore in 1655 as a lieutenant in the beaten army of the Western Design. He took his patent. The family took Longville. And four generations on, Edward Long sat down to explain, in the language of natural history, why the world his great-grandfather's sword had made was the way the world simply *was*. That is *The Architect and the Inheritor* running its whole course inside a single family tree — and it is worth holding, against every temptation to call Long a cynic, that a man who spends his retirement drawing taxonomic diagrams to prove a thing he could have simply asserted is not a man performing a belief. He is a man who has one.

Reading the Jamaican robe against the framework

Four contributions.

First, the swappable robe. Three complete metropolitan robes in forty years — providential republic, restored Crown, constitutional liberty — and one uninterrupted machine. The framework's claim that the robe is cut for the audience whose belief is needed is confirmed here in its strongest form, and it yields a corollary the corpus should carry: **the seam's length is what makes the robe swappable.** Because what is said in the metropole and what is done in the colony are separated by six weeks of ocean and by an audience that will never meet, the metropole can revolutionise its account of why it deserves the world without the colony feeling a tremor — and the colony can go on doing what it does without the metropole having to look. A colonial robe is not merely *not addressed* to the conquered; the conquered's total absence from the conversation is what allows the robe to be replaced at will.

Second, the content of a robe does not determine what it can hold up. The intuition that a liberal robe strains against an illiberal floor is refuted here, and refuted by the strict application of the creed rather than by its betrayal. Liberty-as-property makes the planter's slaves the very thing government exists to defend. The Jamaican Assembly's finest constitutional hour secured its right to write the slave code. The rights of Englishmen broke the Crown's slaving monopoly and multiplied the trade. The framework should therefore state it flatly: **a robe's audience, not its content, determines what it is capable of legitimating.** A creed of freedom, sincerely held by the men who need it, is not a weaker instrument of an unfree order than a creed of divine right. On this evidence it is a stronger one, because it recruits the beneficiary's self-respect rather than merely his obedience.

Third, the universalising creed forces the boundary of the human. As the metropolitan robe drifts from property toward universal right, the colony's exclusion must migrate from the *dissolvable* categories — heathen, brutish, uncivilised, all of which conversion or education could in principle undo — to the *undissolvable* one: species. This is a general prediction and the corpus should test it: **the more universal the metropole's creed, the more biological the colony's exclusion has to become.** Algeria's Republic of the Rights of Man produced the *indigénat*; Britain's civilising mission produced the colour bar. The hardening is not a lag in the spread of enlightenment. It is enlightenment's shadow, cast by the same light.

Fourth, convergence without contact. Spanish Town in 1664 and John Locke in 1669 wrote the same clause — the master's absolute dominion, the freeman's jury, and the express provision that the slave's belief alters nothing — with no communication and no common draft, because the position they occupied posed them the same problem and

only a few answers work. That is the corpus's central thesis arriving unbidden in two legal documents five years apart, and it is worth more than a dozen assertions of it.

And legibility is not pardon. To show that Edward Long's racial theory was a rational solution to a real problem — how to hold a universal creed and six hundred human beings at the same time — is to explain it, and explaining it makes it worse rather than better, because it removes the last comfort available to us, which is that he did not know what he was doing. He knew. He built the reason not to care, and he built it out of the best materials his century had, and his century supplied them.

A note on sources. The primary quotations here are exact. The preambles of the Navigation Acts of 1651 and 1660 and the Staple Act of 1663 are quoted from the printed statutes (Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum*, and the *Statutes of the Realm*). Articles 107, 110 and 111 of the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina (1 March 1669) are quoted from the text as printed by the Avalon Project at Yale Law School. The Jamaican slave code of 1664 is quoted as in Module 1, with the same caveat about the transcription's early-access status. The Jamaican Assembly's declaration of 1677 on the liberties of England is quoted as it appears in Jack P. Greene's *Peripheries and Center*, which reproduces it from the record; the archival wording should be collated before publication. Edward Long's *"a different species of the same genus"* and the passage on the orangutan are from the *History of Jamaica* (1774), volume II, and are quoted here from scholarly reproductions of that text rather than from the original pagination, which should be checked; his maxim on managing men as beasts is quoted as it appears in the recent scholarship on his papers and is likewise flagged. Locke's shareholding in the Royal African Company, the Poynings' Law crisis of 1675–80, the Albemarle affair, the escheat controversy in which the phrase *"manifest violation of the rights of Englishmen"* was deployed in Jamaican property litigation, and Morgan Godwyn's 1680 argument for baptising the enslaved are all given from modern scholarship — Greene, Wilson, Armitage, Pettigrew, Burnard — and are paraphrased and credited rather than quoted. No claim is made here about Locke's private convictions, which are contested and are not the framework's business; what is quoted is what he wrote.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH JAMAICA — MODULE 4

THE BAPTIST TICKET

> *Module 4 · Formation — how an order that could not admit refused to form, why the excuse was never the reason, and what the conquered built when the only fully-made creed lying about was the coloniser's own*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The church that formed nobody

Jamaica had an established church from almost the first year. The parishes were laid out, the vestries were constituted, the rectors were paid, and the Church of England stood in the island for a hundred and eighty years as the spiritual establishment of a slave society. What it did in that time can be measured by what its own beneficiaries said about it. Edward Long — the planter, the judge, the author of the *History of Jamaica*, a man with no motive whatever to disparage the establishment of his own class — observed in 1774 that a number of the island's clergy seemed better qualified to retail salt fish, or to serve as boatswains aboard privateers, than to perform the offices of religion.

That is the establishment's own historian, and he is being accurate rather than cruel. The Anglican Church in Jamaica was not a formation. It was an amenity. Its congregations were white; its business was baptism, marriage and burial for the caste; and its one indispensable function, as Module 1 established, was executed twice a year, when the parish clergy read the slave code aloud from their pulpits — the first Sunday in March and the first Sunday in September — so that no person might plead ignorance of the fortnightly search for wooden swords. The Church was the floor's herald long before anyone proposed that it be the robe's tailor.

And the withholding ran further than anyone expects, because it ran in both directions. The colony had no university, no seminary, no serious press, no learned society. Its rich sent their sons to Eton and Westminster and Oxford, and its poor sent theirs nowhere. Jamaica, the wealthiest colony in the British Empire, produced no institution capable of forming a Jamaican — not a black one, and not a white one either. Hold that; it becomes

the second finding of this module, and it explains something about the eighteenth century that the sugar and the whippings do not.

The excuse, and why it was never the reason

The received account of why the enslaved were not Christianised is a legal one, and it is worth taking seriously so that it can be dismissed properly.

The anxiety was real. English tradition had long held, loosely and without much doctrinal precision, that a Christian could not be held as a slave by another Christian — which raised the possibility that a baptised African would walk out of the font a free man. The colonies dealt with it. Virginia dealt with it in September 1667, in an act whose title states the problem and whose text states the solution:

> *"WHEREAS some doubts have risen whether children that are slaves by birth, and by the charity and piety of their owners made pertakers of the blessed sacrament of baptisme, should by vertue of their baptisme be made ffree; It is enacted and declared by this grand assembly, and the authority thereof, that the conferring of baptisme doth not alter the condition of the person as to his bondage or ffreedome; that diverse masters, ffreed from this doubt, may more carefully endeavour the propagation of christianity by permitting children, though slaves, or those of greater growth if capable to be admitted to that sacrament."*

Read the second half. The Act does not merely permit the withholding; it *removes the obstacle in order to encourage conversion.* Masters, freed from this doubt, may now more carefully endeavour the propagation of Christianity. The law is not the barrier. The law is holding the door.

Two years later John Locke wrote the same insulation into the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, providing that a slave who joined a church should nonetheless *"in all things"* remain *"in the same state and condition he was In before"* — and that the master's authority stood *"of what opinion or religion soever."* In 1680 the clergyman Morgan Godwyn published a full-dress argument that the enslaved of the plantations were rational souls entitled to the sacraments, and he was answered by silence. And in 1793 the Jamaican Assembly itself, in the Consolidated Slave Act, actually *required* owners to have their slaves instructed in religion and baptised. It was a dead letter from the day it was passed.

So the sequence is this: the legal obstacle was cleared in 1667; the colonies were positively encouraged to convert; the Jamaican Assembly eventually *commanded*

conversion by statute; and for a hundred and thirty years after the impediment was removed, and for forty years after the command was issued, the planters of Jamaica did essentially nothing. This is as close to a controlled experiment as the framework is ever likely to get, and its result is unambiguous. **The legal excuse was never the reason.**

The reason is structural, and the planters understood it far better than their critics did. **Formation is admission.** To form a man is to concede that he has an interior which can be formed — that there is something inside him that instruction reaches, that a text can address, that a promise can bind. And the entire Jamaican settlement rested on the proposition, written into a land patent, that he was the *consideration* in a deed: the thing tendered for the hundred acres, counted in the census between the women and the arms. A being who can be catechised cannot be conveyed. So the order did not merely fail to form the enslaved. It declined to, deliberately, against the express encouragement of English law and eventually against its own statute — because forming them would have meant admitting them, and Module 2 has already shown what admission cost.

What it did instead was legislate against assembly. The Act of 1696 forbade Sunday gatherings and forbade drumming; and note what those two prohibitions have in common, which is that neither has any content. It is not what the enslaved might *say* that is banned. It is their being together, and their being audible, and their being audible in a language the order could not read. An order that will not form its subjects must, in the end, prohibit them from forming themselves, and it must do so blindly — banning the drum without knowing what the drum is saying.

What grew in the space

They formed themselves anyway, and Landscape I predicted it: where the field is empty, a substrate is not absent, it is *manufactured under the floor*.

What the enslaved of Jamaica carried across the water was not a system but fragments — Akan, Igbo, Kongo, a hundred polities' worth of ritual, medicine, law, and cosmology, broken up by the Middle Passage and by the deliberate mixing of the cargoes, and reassembled on the plantations into something new. It went by two names. Obeah was the practice of spiritual power — divination, healing, harming, oath-binding — and Myal was the collective, possessed, ecstatic form that answered it. Neither had a scripture, a hierarchy, or a canon. Both had teeth. When Tacky's Revolt broke out in 1760 and the rebels swore their oaths, the order finally saw what it had been ignoring, and it responded in the only way it knew: it made the practice of Obeah a capital offence. A hundred years

after refusing to supply a formation, the Assembly criminalised the one that had grown in its absence — which is, in the framework's terms, a very expensive way to discover that the field was never empty.

And there were the dead. The funeral was the one assembly the order could not entirely forbid, and it became the place where the enslaved conducted the business the order denied them — memory, judgement, standing, and the reckoning of accounts that could not be settled among the living. An order that governs by terror of the body finds, eventually, that the body's disposal is not in its gift.

But Obeah had a limit, and the limit is the hinge of this module. Obeah could bind a conspiracy, and it did. It could raise a rising, and in 1760 it did, and the rising was crushed and its leaders were burned and hung in irons at the crossroads. What Obeah could not do — what it had no means whatever of doing — was *speak to England*. It could not be explained at Exeter Hall. It could not be argued in the Commons. It was, from the metropole's side of the seam, precisely the barbarity the planters said it was, and every time it surfaced it confirmed the robe rather than embarrassing it.

The counter-formation that would eventually break Jamaica had to be one that could cross the seam. And there was only one lying about.

The stolen robe

In January 1783 a ship out of Savannah put in at Kingston, carrying the beaten remnant of British Georgia — Loyalist officers, their households, and the Black Loyalists who had chosen the King over their masters. Among them, indentured to a Colonel Kirkland for the price of his own passage, was a freed Virginian named George Liele, who had been licensed to preach by the Baptists of Georgia in 1775 and had founded the first Black Baptist congregation in North America.

He was thirty-odd years old, penniless, and legally a servant. He took two years to work off his fare. Then he began preaching at the Kingston racecourse, and afterwards in a private house, and afterwards in a chapel he bought land for and built by subscription, and he founded free schools for enslaved and free black children, and he wrote a church covenant, and he baptised, by his own account and by every account since, hundreds and then thousands of people. He never took payment; he farmed and carted goods to feed his family. By 1814 there were something like eight thousand Baptists in Jamaica, most of them enslaved.

Now hold the whole shape of that. **The formation that would destroy Jamaican slavery arrived on the island as the war refuse of the American Revolution, in the hold of a Loyalist evacuation ship, in the person of an indentured ex-slave who had backed the losing side.** No colonial administrator planned it. No missionary society sent it. It came in through the crack that the Empire's own defeat had opened, and the planters did not see it because they were not looking at the hold.

And look at how carefully Liele trod. He admitted to his congregation only those enslaved people whose masters had given permission. He rang a bell at the beginning and end of the service, so that the owners would know exactly when to expect their people back. He operated, in other words, entirely inside the ticket system that Module 1 described — the written pass, the specified hour of return, the whole apparatus of a floor that governed by controlling movement — and he did so scrupulously, because he understood that his enterprise survived only at the order's sufferance.

It did him no good at all. In 1797 he was charged with preaching sedition, thrown into gaol in irons, kept from his wife and children, and tried for his life. He was acquitted; no evidence could be found. He was then immediately imprisoned again for the debt owed on his chapel, refused the relief of the Insolvent Debtors' Act, and remained inside until it was paid — three years, five months and ten days. And in 1805 the Jamaican Assembly settled the matter properly and passed an act forbidding preaching to the enslaved at all.

They banned it because they could not answer it. That is the whole of it, and it deserves to be stated without ornament. When the Baptist missionaries of the next generation arrived — Thomas Burchell, William Knibb, James Phillippo, sent by the Baptist Missionary Society from 1814 — and when the Jamaican congregations they served swelled from eight thousand toward twenty thousand, what was being preached in those chapels was not Obeah and not sedition. It was the coloniser's own book. And a man who stands in a Jamaican chapel and says that Christ died for all men, and that therefore no man can be the property of another, cannot be refuted by a planter *in the planter's own terms*, because the planter is a Christian and the book is his. He can only be silenced. And silencing him is a confession.

The ticket

The congregations governed themselves, and the instrument they used is the reason this module carries the title it does.

The Baptist churches of Jamaica issued their members a **ticket** — a small printed card, renewed monthly, on which the member's attendance and offering were recorded, and which served as the member's pass to the church meeting. A pass. A written slip of paper, authorising a black person to be in a particular place at a particular time, issued by an authority whose right to issue it no white man recognised.

Set that beside the Act of 1664, in which no enslaved person might leave the plantation without a written ticket from his master specifying the hour of his going and the hour of his return, and any white man who met him without one and failed to whip him was himself fined. The order ruled by paper. The counter-order answered in paper. And the leaders of the congregations — the class leaders, the deacons, the men the members called *daddy* — were the men who signed them.

One of those deacons, in the parish of St James, was named Samuel Sharpe. What he did with his congregation at Christmas in 1831 is Module 10's business. What matters here is only that the machinery he used was built inside a chapel, out of a creed the planters had spent a century and a half refusing to teach, and issued its own passes.

Reading Jamaican formation against the framework

Four contributions.

First, formation is admission, and an order that cannot admit will not form — and Jamaica proves it with a control group. The framework has held that colonial orders withhold formation because forming the conquered would mean admitting them. Jamaica gives that claim something it has never had: a test in which the stated obstacle was removed. English law cleared the baptism question in 1667 and positively urged conversion; Locke insulated the master's title in 1669; the Assembly itself commanded religious instruction by statute in 1793. And the planters did nothing, for a hundred and thirty years, because the impediment was never legal. To catechise a man is to concede he has an interior. A being who can be catechised cannot be conveyed. The settlement was written in the language of conveyance, and it could not afford a soul.

Second — and this is new — the order withheld formation from its own caste too, and that is why it never became a nation. Jamaica formed no one. The white elite was educated in England, remained English, and largely lived there; the colony produced no university, no creole intelligentsia, no local patriotism, no capacity to imagine itself as anything but a place one extracted a fortune from and left. Set this beside Virginia, which founded William and Mary in 1693, formed a creole gentry in place, and within eighty

years produced a revolution. The framework should carry the trade-off explicitly: **an order that forms nobody — not even its own beneficiaries — buys short-term security at the price of never acquiring a self.** Jamaica's planters were richer than Virginia's and less numerous, more frightened and more dependent, and they never once seriously contemplated independence, because there was no Jamaica to be independent *of England as*. The floor was never in danger from the settlers. It was also never theirs.

Third, where no substrate exists the conquered will build one — and if the only fully-made creed lying about is the coloniser's, they will take that. The corpus has watched counter-formation run on a naturalised former conquest: Islam in Algeria, the Confucian village in Vietnam, each a robe that had fully taken centuries before and simply held the field when the coloniser declined to fill it. Jamaica had no such robe, and the enslaved built one anyway, twice. The first — Obeah and Myal, assembled from carried fragments — could bind and rise, and was crushed, and was made a capital offence. The second was **stolen**: taken from the coloniser's own hand, in a form he had refused to give and could not disown. Write it into the framework in these terms: *a conquered population does not require an indigenous robe. It requires* a *robe, and it will take the coloniser's if that is the only one within reach — and a stolen robe cannot be refuted by the man it was stolen from.* He can ban the preaching, which the Assembly did in 1805. He can burn the chapels, which he did in 1832. Each of these is an admission that the argument has been lost in his own language.

Fourth, and consequentially: the stolen robe is the only counter-formation that can cross the seam. This is the finding that sets up the rest of the study. Obeah could raise a rebellion but could not be heard in England; on the contrary, every appearance it made in the metropolitan press *strengthened* the planters' robe by confirming the barbarity they alleged. A Baptist chapel could do something Obeah could never do: it could write a letter to London that London would read as its own. The counter-formation's decisive weapon was never that it could organise the enslaved — that had been demonstrated in 1760 and had ended in fire and iron cages. It was that it could **speak across the seam in the metropole's own voice, from the metropole's own book, to the metropole's own conscience.** Module 7 will show what the order did to keep the two ends of the seam from meeting. Module 10 will show what happened when they finally met — and it will show that they met inside a church.

And note, finally, what this does to Module 3. Edward Long's argument that the African is *"a different species of the same genus"* was not an eccentricity and not a mere cruelty. It was the only doctrinal answer available to a man facing a stolen robe. If they are not the same kind, then the book does not reach them; then Christ's death does not

include them; then the chapel is a fraud and the ticket is worthless. Race science and the Native Baptists are the same argument, running in opposite directions, and the eighteenth century ran them both at once.

Legibility is not pardon. To understand why the planters refused to teach a man to read is not to soften what it is to spend a lifetime forbidden a book, and then to be jailed for three years and five months for building the room in which it might be read aloud.

A note on sources. The primary quotations are exact. The Virginia act of September 1667, *"An act declaring that baptisme of slaves doth not exempt them from bondage,"* is quoted from Hening's *Statutes at Large*, volume II, page 260. Articles 107 and 110 of the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina are quoted as in Module 3, from the Avalon Project text. The Jamaican slave code of 1664 is quoted as in Module 1, with the same caveat regarding the transcription's early-access status. Edward Long's remark on the fitness of the island's clergy is reported from the *History of Jamaica* (1774) as it appears in the modern literature on the Jamaican church, and is given here in paraphrase rather than as an exact quotation because the original wording has not been collated against the text; it should be checked before publication. The provisions of the 1696 Slave Act on Sunday assembly and drumming, the criminalisation of Obeah as a capital offence following Tacky's Revolt of 1760, the Consolidated Slave Act of 1793 and its non-enforcement, and the Jamaican Assembly's act forbidding preaching to the enslaved are given from modern scholarship — Rugemer, Paton, Brown, and the standard histories of the Jamaican church — and are paraphrased and credited. Dates in this area are contested and should be handled as such: the act against preaching is variously dated 1802 and 1805 in the literature, and the later date is used here with that uncertainty acknowledged. George Liele's life is likewise given from the standard accounts, with his year of death variously reported between about 1820 and 1828; his imprisonment for seditious preaching, his acquittal, his subsequent imprisonment for the chapel debt of three years, five months and ten days, his practice of admitting only those with their owners' permission, and his use of a bell to mark the service's end are all drawn from those accounts and from the reproduction of his own letters, and are credited rather than quoted. The Baptist ticket system is described from the same literature. Figures are given as ranges: the Baptist membership of Jamaica (some eight thousand by 1814, rising toward twenty thousand by 1832).

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH JAMAICA — MODULE 5

TEN SHILLINGS A HEAD

> *Module 5 · The Cost Column — how an order that could not seal its last exit bought it instead, what compliance cost the people who paid it, and why the saving on a meal built the road to a rebellion*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The ledger

The framework's proposition is austere: an order holds when, for each person inside it, the sum comes out against defection. Not because they believe in it, and not because they are watched every hour, but because at the moment of decision the arithmetic of running is worse than the arithmetic of staying.

Most orders do this arithmetic implicitly. Jamaica wrote it down.

Module 1 has already read the entries. Five pounds to the man who brings in a runaway alive, paid by the owner. Five pounds from the public treasury if he brings him in dead, so that the hunter is indifferent between the two outcomes and the runaway knows it. The public purse to buy the corpse of any slave executed for rebellion, so that no master's private ledger argues against denouncing his own property. A ticket specifying the hour of departure and the hour of return, and a fine on any white man who meets an unticketed African and neglects to whip him. The Jamaican Assembly did not merely hope the sums would come out right. It sat down and adjusted the numbers until they did.

But every cost column has one line that dominates all the others, and it is not the price of punishment. It is the price of the exit. Punishments only bite if there is nowhere to go.

The wall of water

Jamaica is an island a hundred and forty-six miles long. There is no border to slip across, no neighbouring emirate, no French province three days' march away. The Algerian could

go into the Kabylie or across into Morocco. The Vietnamese peasant could vanish into a village whose registers the *résident* would never audit. The African in Jamaica had the sea on every side, and the sea belonged to the Royal Navy.

So there was exactly one direction to run, and it was up.

The interior of western Jamaica is a limestone country of sinkholes and conical hills and blind valleys, forested, waterless on the surface and riddled with water beneath, unmapped and very nearly unmappable — the Cockpit Country, some seventy-four thousand hectares of ground on which no column can deploy, no cannon can be dragged, and no line of supply can be kept. And in that country, from the day the English landed, there were people. Landscape I recorded them: the Africans the Spanish had freed and armed as they fled, who did not leave with them, and who were joined, year upon year, by every man and woman who got away from the cane.

For eighty-four years, therefore, the Jamaican cost column had a hole in it. Running was not futile. Running had a destination.

Two hundred and thirty-one men

The order tried to close the hole by force for two generations and failed.

Across some forty years of intermittent war the Assembly passed, by one standard reckoning, forty-four separate acts against the Maroons and spent in the order of £240,000 in the attempt to destroy them — a figure that should be treated as an estimate rather than an audit, but whose order of magnitude is not in doubt. It sent militia. It sent regulars. It raised companies of free black and mulatto rangers. It imported dogs. It burned the towns it could reach and found them rebuilt. The richest colony in the British Empire, with the Royal Navy at its back and the finest army in Europe available to it, could not clear the hills.

At the treaty of 1739, Captain Cudjoe gave the number of his fighting men as **two hundred and thirty-one**, not counting women and children.

A contemporary British military observer — Philip Thicknesse, who had served against them — judged afterwards that all the regular troops in Europe could not have conquered the Maroons, and that had they not been granted their liberty they would in all probability have become masters of the whole country. Whether or not that is the correct military assessment, it was the assessment that was made, by the men who had to make it.

So the order did what Module 1 has already established it always does with a force it cannot beat. It did not destroy them. It bought them.

The price

The *Articles of Pacification with the Maroons of Trelawney Town* were concluded on 1 March 1739 beneath a cotton tree, and enacted by the Jamaican Assembly on 12 May. They open in the language of a peace between sovereigns — *"In the name of God, Amen"* — and their fifteen clauses should be read in the order they stand, because the sequence is the argument.

> **First**, *"That all hostilities shall cease on both sides for ever."*
>
> **Second**, *"That the said Captain Cudjoe, the rest of his captains, adherents, and men, shall for ever hereafter [be] in a perfect state of freedom and liberty…"*
>
> **Third**, *"That they shall enjoy and possess, for themselves and posterity for ever, all the lands situate and lying between Trelawney Town and the Cockpits, to the amount of fifteen hundred acres…"*

Freedom for ever; fifteen hundred acres in perpetuity; the right to hunt where they please, save within three miles of any settlement, and where their hunters meet a planter's the hogs are to be divided equally between them. It is, on its face, a treaty of peace between two powers, and the Maroons have always held it as such, and sealed it — by their own tradition — with a blood oath drunk from a calabash.

Now read the sixth article, and the ninth.

> **Sixth**, that Captain Cudjoe and his successors *"do use their best endeavours to take, kill, suppress, or destroy"* rebels, either alone or jointly with such forces as the Governor shall command.
>
> **Ninth**, *"If any Negroes shall hereafter run away from their masters or owners, and shall fall into Captain Cudjoe's hands, they shall immediately be sent back…"*

And the Assembly's enabling Act of 12 May 1739 sets the tariff:

> *"That all runaway slaves to be taken by Cudjoe, or any of the negroes at Trelawney Town, under his command, shall be by him or them delivered to the next magistrate, who is hereby directed and obliged to pay the said Cudjoe, or the said negroes bringing such runaways to him, the sum of ten shillings, under the penalty of five pounds, for every neglect or refusal of such magistrate to pay the same…"*

Ten shillings. Written into a statute, with a penalty on any magistrate who fails to hand it over, so that the rate could not be haggled and the service could not be interrupted by a parish official's parsimony.

Hold Article II and Article IX in the same hand and look at what has been done. In a single document, the order grants perpetual freedom to two hundred and thirty-one men — and, in the same breath, deputises them to deny it to three hundred thousand. It concedes that a black man in Jamaica may be free, and simultaneously employs the only free black men in Jamaica as the guarantors that no one else will be.

That is the cost column rewritten with one signature. Before 1739, running had a destination. After 1739, the destination was a bounty station. The order had not sealed the last exit in Jamaica; it had **hired** it, at ten shillings a head, and it wrote a penalty clause into the statute to make sure the wages were always paid on time. The fourteenth article completed the arrangement: two white men were to *"constantly live and reside"* at Trelawney Town — nominally to keep up correspondence, in practice to keep an eye. And the fifteenth named Cudjoe's successors down to the last of his captains, and then provided that thereafter the Governor should appoint whomever he thought fit.

Freedom for ever, in a town with a resident supervisor and a governor-appointed chief.

The strike

Twenty-one years later the arrangement was tested, and what happened tells the framework more than the treaty does.

Tacky's Revolt broke out at Easter 1760 — the largest rising the island had yet seen — and under the sixth article the Maroons of Scott's Hall were called out to help suppress it. They declined to march. They had not been paid the arrears owed to them for runaways previously captured and delivered, and they would not move until they were. The planters standing there in the middle of a slave rebellion took up a collection among themselves on the spot, and the money was found, and the Maroons went.

Read that scene coldly, because it is the cost column with its clothes off. The order's auxiliary force went on strike, in the middle of a general rising, over unpaid invoices, and was satisfied with cash. Not with an appeal to loyalty, not with a threat, not with an argument about the common good — with cash, immediately, counted out by frightened men.

And hold the discipline. The Maroons of Scott's Hall were not traitors, and they were not villains, and this study will not enjoy their humiliation. They were a people who had

fought a generation-long war and won from it the one thing nobody else on that island possessed, and Article IX was the price the winners set. They defended what they had by the only means the treaty left them, and the men who wrote Article IX are the men on whom the moral weight belongs. But what they had become, structurally, is exactly what the framework says a purchased auxiliary becomes: **not a subject, and not an ally, but a creditor.** The order had converted a people into a line item, and a line item behaves like a line item. It presents its bill.

The other side of the ledger

So much for what defection cost. Now the harder column, which is what compliance cost, and here the arithmetic requires no commentary at all.

Somewhere between about seven hundred and fifty thousand and nine hundred and thirty thousand African captives were disembarked in Jamaica between the conquest and the abolition of the British slave trade in 1807 — the estimates differ and the honest form is the range. In 1808, when the importing stopped, the enslaved population of the island stood at roughly three hundred and fifty-four thousand. At the abolition of slavery itself, in 1834, it stood at **311,070**.

Deaths exceeded births, year upon year, by something in the region of three per cent per annum across the eighteenth century. Between 1807 and 1834 — a period in which nobody arrived and almost nobody left — the enslaved population of Jamaica *fell* by some forty-three thousand, a decline of about twelve per cent.

Set that beside North America, which imported perhaps four hundred thousand people and had something like four million enslaved by 1865. Jamaica imported roughly twice as many and ended with less than a tenth as many. The comparison is not incidental; it is the fact that defines the island. The Jamaican order did not merely exploit a population. It consumed one, and bought more.

And the most exact figure available comes, as so often in this study, from Edward Long, who supplied it himself and did not see what he was writing. On his own family's estate at Lucky Valley, in a letter to William Pitt in 1788, he recorded that between 1779 and 1785 there had been **seventy-two deaths and thirty-seven births**. Two dead for every one born, on the estate of the man who had spent a lifetime explaining to England why the arrangement was benign. He attributed it to the diseases the Africans had brought with them.

There is nothing to add to that sum, and the framework's instruction is to lay it out and leave it. Compliance in Jamaica did not cost a man his liberty; he had none to spend. It cost him, on the ledger of his own apologist, roughly half his chance of being replaced by a child.

The provision ground

There is one credit entry, and it is the most interesting line in the column, because the order wrote it against itself.

Feeding a workforce of a hundred and fifty thousand people on imported salt fish and North American flour is ruinously expensive. Marginal mountain land is not. So the Jamaican planters, almost universally, did not feed their slaves. They allotted them plots of provision ground on the rocky uplands the cane could not use, gave them Sundays and the odd Saturday afternoon to work them, and left them to feed themselves.

They did more than feed themselves. They grew surpluses — yams, plantains, peppers, pigs, poultry — and carried them down to the Sunday markets and sold them, and haggled, and were paid in coin, and accumulated it; and by the last decades of slavery the internal marketing system of the enslaved was a substantial sector of the Jamaican economy, and a great deal of the island's small currency passed through the hands of people who were themselves, in law, property.

Now count what the order had handed over in order to save the price of a meal. **Land** — worked, improved, and regarded by the workers as theirs, whatever the law said. **A day** that was not the master's. **Roads**, walked lawfully, by people carrying goods to market. **Money**, in the hands of men who owned nothing else. And a **market**: a weekly, entirely legal, entirely unavoidable assembly of thousands of enslaved people in the open air, from a dozen estates, trading and talking, at which no overseer could plausibly demand to know what was being discussed.

The Act of 1696 had banned Sunday gatherings and banned the drum. The plantation economy then instituted, for reasons of pure parsimony, the largest weekly Sunday gathering of enslaved people in the British Empire, and licensed it.

A cost saved by offloading subsistence onto the subject is a cost converted into a network. The provision ground and the Sunday market gave the enslaved of Jamaica the three things a rising requires and the whip cannot supply — mobility, money, and a lawful reason to be in the same place at the same time. Module 10 will show what travelled those roads at Christmas in 1831.

The white ledger

One asymmetry remains, and it is the whole colonial bend in a sentence.

The white men of Jamaica also died. Trevor Burnard's work on the island's mortality has shown that it killed its colonists at rates that appalled contemporaries — that the small white population was, for most of its history, sustained by immigration rather than birth, exactly as the enslaved population was. Why, then, did the poor whites not defect? Two entries answered for them. The first is the **caste**, which Module 2 established as the currency the apex could mint at no cost to itself: legal standing, the right to arms, the right to sit in judgement, immunity before the law. The second is the exit.

The white man could leave. And he did. Absenteeism was not a vice of the Jamaican elite; it was its defining structure — the great planters in London, the middling ones planning their return, the whole caste regarding the island as a place where a fortune was made and not a place where a life was lived. The order left the exit standing wide open for the caste whose bodies it needed to man the floor, and sealed it with a treaty and ten shillings a head for the caste it held down. And it then discovered, in the deficiency laws of Module 1, that the men who could leave had left, and there was nobody to do the watching.

Reading the Jamaican cost column against the framework

Five contributions.

First, a refuge that cannot be destroyed can be converted, and conversion is the cheapest instrument in the whole apparatus of the floor. Forty years of war and something like a quarter of a million pounds failed against two hundred and thirty-one men in the Cockpits. Fifteen hundred acres and ten shillings a head succeeded absolutely. The framework should carry this as a general finding: **an order does not need to close the last exit; it needs only to buy whoever is standing in it.** After 1739 the Jamaican interior was no longer a destination but an outpost, and the change was accomplished by a document.

Second, pricing a people converts them into creditors. Once Maroon loyalty was a line in the Assembly's accounts, it behaved like one — and in 1760, in the middle of a general rising, it presented its bill and refused to move until it was paid. The satrap's bargain therefore carries a rider the corpus should record: **an auxiliary bought with**

money is loyal to the payment, not to the order. That makes him reliable, and it makes him a standing invoice, payable on demand, at the worst possible moment.

Third, an order whose subjects are replaceable by purchase has no incentive to keep them alive — and that is a different and worse thing than exploitation. This is the emptied field of Landscape I completing itself. Because Jamaica's population was *imported* rather than found, it could be consumed and re-bought, and the cost column had no floor beneath it: there was no point at which killing the workforce became irrational, because the workforce was a commodity with a market price and a supplier. Long's own estate ran at two deaths to one birth and the arrangement was not thought to be failing. The corollary is the study's most important structural point about 1807: **abolishing the trade twenty-seven years before abolishing slavery did not soften the order — it removed the supplier, and forced the ledger to be rewritten for the first time in a century and a half.** Everything in Module 10 begins there.

Fourth, cheapness has a price: an order that offloads subsistence onto its subjects thereby grants them the means of coordination. The provision ground was a saving. It was also land, a free day, a road, a purse and a weekly lawful assembly of thousands. The framework should state it as a rule: **every cost the order refuses to bear is transferred to the subject, and everything transferred to the subject becomes, eventually, a capacity the subject has and the order does not control.**

Fifth, the asymmetric exit. The order kept the door open for the caste whose belief and bodies it needed, and sealed it for the caste it held. The predictable result was that the first caste drained away and the floor went unmanned — which is precisely the deficiency-law failure of Module 1, arriving here as arithmetic rather than as anecdote. **A colonial order cannot seal one exit without opening the other, because the men it needs are the men who have somewhere else to be.**

And legibility is not pardon. To describe Article IX as an elegant solution to an insoluble military problem is to describe it correctly. It remains a clause in which a people who had won their freedom in the mountains were required, in writing, for ten shillings, to carry other people back down.

A note on sources. The primary quotations are exact. The *Articles of Pacification with the Maroons of Trelawney Town*, concluded 1 March 1739, are quoted from the text reproduced from the Kress Collection, Harvard Business School, and cross-checked against the transcription of the Jamaican Assembly's confirming Act of 12 May 1739; the Act's ten-shilling bounty is quoted from that Act directly. Other figures for the runaway bounty appear in the literature — thirty shillings plus expenses, and an initial rate of three pounds are both reported — and the discrepancy is left standing rather than resolved, since the statutory text is what is quoted here. The Jamaican slave code of 1664 is quoted as in Module 1, with the same caveat about the transcription. Cudjoe's count of 231 men is reported by Philip Wright

from the contemporary record; Philip Thicknesse's judgement on the impossibility of conquering the Maroons is quoted as it appears in Alvin Thompson's *Flight to Freedom* and is credited accordingly rather than taken from the original memoir. The figure of forty-four acts and roughly £240,000 spent on suppression is Carey Robinson's and should be treated as an estimate. The episode of the Scott's Hall Maroons refusing to march at Tacky's Revolt until their arrears were paid is reported in the Jamaican historical literature and is given here as scholarship. Demographic figures are contested throughout and are given as ranges: African captives disembarked in Jamaica (roughly 750,000–930,000 to 1807); the enslaved population in 1808 (about 354,000) and at abolition in 1834 (311,070, a figure given precisely in the registration returns and used as such); the annual excess of deaths over births (in the region of three per cent through the eighteenth century); and the decline of about 43,000, or twelve per cent, between 1807 and 1834. Edward Long's record of seventy-two deaths against thirty-seven births at Lucky Valley between 1779 and 1785 is reported from his 1788 letter to Pitt as given in the recent scholarship on his papers, and is credited rather than quoted. The account of provision grounds, the internal marketing system, and the Sunday markets rests on the work of Sidney Mintz and Barry Higman and is paraphrased and credited; the account of white mortality rests on Trevor Burnard's.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH JAMAICA — MODULE 6

THE AXE BESIDE THE ROLLERS

> *Module 6 · Extraction — how an order that owned its producers needed no machinery to take everything, why the planter who took it was himself being taken from, and how the whole arrangement came to rest on a tariff*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The mill

Sugar cane must be crushed within hours of being cut, and the juice boiled within hours of being crushed, or it will not crystallise. That single agronomic fact organises everything else. It means the mill and the boiling house cannot be run at the convenience of the workforce; they must run continuously, day and night, for the whole of crop season, at whatever cost to the people feeding them.

The cost is recorded, under oath, in the *Abstract of the Evidence* delivered before the Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1791 — the great inquiry into the slave trade, in which men who had served in the West Indies were examined at length and their testimony printed for the reading public of Britain. Mr Cook stated that in crop time the enslaved worked *"in general about eighteen hours out of the twenty-four, and are often hurt through mere fatigue and want of sleep."* He knew a girl who lost her hand to the mill while feeding it: *"being overcome by sleep, she dropped against the rollers."* Mr Dalrymple stated that they were obliged to work *"as long as they can keep awake or stand on their legs. Sometimes they fall asleep, through excess of fatigue, when their arms are caught in the mill and torn off."* He had seen several who had lost their arms that way.

And beside the rollers there was an axe.

It was kept there, on plantation after plantation across the Caribbean, for one purpose: when a hand went into the mill and the arm began to follow it, the arm was severed. Not because anyone wished to sever it, but because the rollers were heavy and geared to wind or

water or cattle and were not easily or quickly stopped, and stopping them meant losing the batch, and losing the batch meant losing the sugar, and an arm cost less than the sugar.

That is not sadism. It is arithmetic, and the arithmetic was correct, and everybody on the estate knew it had been done. There is no better single image of what extraction meant in Jamaica, and this module could almost end there.

Extraction with no mechanism

But the framework requires the structure, and the structure is where Jamaica breaks the pattern.

Look at what extraction has looked like everywhere else in this collection. In Algeria the state took *le quint* — the fifth — and built an apparatus of *bureaux arabes* to assess and collect it. In Vietnam it built monopolies in salt, alcohol and opium, so that the peasant was compelled to buy from the state the things he could not live without. In Uganda the ginners took their cut between the grower and the world price. In Kenya the hut tax forced a man into wage labour and the law forbade him the crop that would have made his own land pay.

Every one of these is a *device*. Each exists to solve a specific engineering problem: how to move value out of the hands of a person who currently possesses it, into the hands of a state or a settler class that wants it. The device costs something to run. It needs assessors, registers, collectors, courts. And it leaves a paper trail.

Jamaica had none of this, and needed none of it, because in Jamaica the value never arrived in the producer's hands in the first place.

The enslaved man did not sell his labour at an unfair price; he was not paid. He was not taxed at a punitive rate; he owned nothing that could be assessed. He was not forbidden to grow the profitable crop; he *was* the instrument by which the profitable crop was grown. There was no collector, because there was nothing to collect from. There was no assessment, because there was nothing to assess. There was no appeal, because there was no transaction.

Where the producer is owned, extraction requires no mechanism at all. It is not an operation performed upon the product; it is a property of the arrangement itself. This is the limiting case of the framework's extraction module, and it should be entered as such: **total extraction, at zero administrative cost.**

And note the last turn of the screw, which Module 5 established. The order did not even bear the cost of keeping the machine fed. The provision grounds meant that the

workforce's subsistence was a charge on the workforce. The planter took a hundred per cent of the product and paid nothing for the upkeep of the producer, and made up the wastage by purchase.

Extraction from the extractor

Now raise the eye, because the planter is not the top of the column. He only thinks he is.

Above him sat the metropolitan system, and it took from him with all the elaborate machinery he himself had no need of.

Sugar was an *enumerated* commodity under the Navigation Acts: it could be shipped only to England, only in English or colonial ships, and it could be sold only through the English market. The Jamaican planter could not sell to Amsterdam if the Dutch were paying better. He was a captive supplier to a single buyer, by statute — and Module 3 has already shown that this statute came down unbroken from the Rump Parliament through the Restoration to the Whigs, with one word changed.

Then the merchant took his share. Freight, commission, insurance, wharfage, brokerage, warehousing, the discount on the bill — every hogshead that left Kingston was shaved a dozen times before the proceeds reached the man who had grown it.

And then there was credit, which is the part that matters most.

The sugar estate was a capital-hungry machine: mills, coppers, stills, aqueducts, and above all people, bought at high prices and consumed at two deaths to one birth. The planter borrowed. He borrowed against next year's crop from his London factor, and then against the crop after that, and then he mortgaged the estate, and then he mortgaged the enslaved people on it, because the law had obligingly made them the sort of property that could be pledged. By the last decades of slavery a very large proportion of Jamaica's estates were encumbered — some of them mortgaged several times over — to merchant houses and annuitants in Britain.

The planter did not own his estate. His creditor did.

Hold that for Module 10, because it explains a fact that otherwise looks like a scandal and is actually a structure: when the twenty million pounds of compensation was paid out after 1833, a very great deal of it went not to men in Jamaica but to mortgagees, annuitants, widows, trustees and merchant houses in Britain — because the value of the estates had been drained into London long before the enslaved were freed. The compensation did not enrich the plantocracy. It settled the plantocracy's debts.

So the column runs: **from the enslaved, to the planter, to London.** And the framework should say plainly what follows from it. *In a colonial settlement the local elite is rarely the top of the extraction column. It is a middle link — and a middle link can be cut out.*

Extraction from the consumer

There is a third direction, and it is the one that killed them.

British West Indian sugar was **protected**. Foreign sugar — French, Cuban, Brazilian, and later East Indian — paid duties on entering Britain that made it uncompetitive. The British consumer therefore bought his sugar above the world price, and the difference between the price he paid and the price he would have paid in an open market was a transfer, in cash, every week, from British households to the Jamaican planter.

Read that again and see what it makes him. The Jamaican sugar planter was not a capitalist prevailing in a market. He was a **rentier of a legal privilege**. His whole position — the great house, the seat in Parliament, the estate at Harewood, the hundred and eighty years of it — rested on a schedule of duties in a British statute.

And from that, everything else follows.

The Jamaican order could be destroyed without a single enslaved person rebelling and without a single abolitionist winning a single argument, merely by amending the tariff. No moral awakening was required. No revolt was required. All that was required was that Parliament should one day decide that cheap sugar for the British workman mattered more than the incomes of a few hundred West Indian proprietors.

Which is precisely what Parliament decided. The Sugar Duties Acts of 1846 — passed in the same session, and by the same free-trade tide, as the repeal of the Corn Laws — equalised the duties on foreign and colonial sugar and phased the remaining protection down to nothing by 1851. In the Commons in 1850, with the protective duty already reduced to six shillings and sixpence a hundredweight and due to fall to one and six within weeks, the planters' spokesmen said flatly that the present protection was all that enabled them to keep their heads above water, and that the Act of 1846 had *"completed the ruin of their sugar-growing colonies."*

They were substantially right. And the men who did it to them were not Wilberforce's heirs. They were Cobden's. They were not thinking about Jamaica at all; they were thinking about the price of bread and sugar in Manchester. The order that had held three hundred thousand people in chattel slavery for a century and a half was finally undone, in

its economic foundations, by a change in the price of a household commodity — and, as Module 10 will insist, that is not a footnote to abolition. It is the load-bearing wall.

Where it went

Some of the money is easy to trace and some of it is not, and the framework's discipline requires that the two be kept apart.

What is easy to trace: individual fortunes, individual houses, individual seats. The Beckfords, whose Jamaican estates paid for William Beckford's Fonthill and for his father's mayoralty of London. The Lascelles, whose West Indian trade built Harewood. Merchant dynasties in Bristol, Liverpool and Glasgow whose counting-houses and warehouses still stand. Parliamentary seats bought outright, a bloc of members who could be relied upon, an interest with a name — *the West India interest* — that everyone in Westminster understood. None of this is contested and none of it needs a thesis to support it.

What is *not* easy to trace, and what this study will not pretend to settle, is the larger claim. Eric Williams argued in 1944 that the profits of Caribbean slavery financed the British Industrial Revolution, and that slavery was abolished when it ceased to pay. Seymour Drescher's *Econocide* (1977) contested the second half of that argument with force, showing that the British slave system was expanding, not declining, at the point of abolition. More recent quantitative work has swung partway back toward Williams on the first half, tracing slavery-derived capital into insurance, banking, and specific industrial ventures. The dispute is live, the estimates vary by an order of magnitude depending on what is counted, and any figure this study offered would be a choice of side dressed up as a fact. So: the fortunes are documented, the macro-economic proposition is contested, and the reader should be told which is which.

Reading Jamaican extraction against the framework

Four contributions.

First, total extraction requires no mechanism — and leaves no paper. Jamaica is the framework's limiting case: a hundred per cent of the product taken, at zero administrative cost, with no collector, no register, no assessment and no appeal, because the producer is not a party to any transaction. Enter this in the framework as the extreme end of the extraction spectrum, and enter with it a consequence that matters more than it first appears: **an extraction with no mechanism generates no documents.** The Kenyan

carries a *kipande*; the Ugandan grower can point to the ginner's price; the Algerian can name the fifth. The Jamaican has nothing to point at afterwards, because nothing was ever written down about what was taken from him — only about what he cost, and what he was worth, and what he was sold for. The order's very efficiency is what made it, later, so hard to itemise.

Second, the extractor is himself extracted, and that is what makes the settlement brittle. The planter was a captive supplier under the Navigation Acts, shaved by merchants at every stage, and mortgaged to London houses that in many cases owned his estate in all but name. The framework should carry this as a general finding about colonial elites: **the local settler elite is rarely the top of the extraction column; it is a middle link, and middle links get cut.** The Jamaican planter believed he was the master of the arrangement. He was its most heavily leveraged component.

Third, a protected extraction is a political asset, not an economic one, and political assets can be repealed. This is the study's most consequential structural claim and it should be stated without hedging. The planter's margin was a subsidy from the British consumer, secured by a schedule of duties. That subsidy could be withdrawn by a vote, and in 1846 it was — by free traders who were not thinking about slavery, in the same session as the Corn Laws, for reasons that had to do with the price of a British breakfast. **An order that rests on a statute in someone else's parliament does not need to be beaten. It needs only to be outvoted, by people who are thinking about something else.** Module 10 will build on this.

Fourth, the plantation was a factory before there were factories, and calling it backward is a way of letting it off. Clock-time, gang labour, an integrated field-and-works production system, eighteen-hour shifts through crop, continuous process, an industrial rate of industrial injury — and an axe kept beside the machine because the machine could not be stopped. The Jamaican sugar estate was not a survival of some older and cruder world that progress would eventually sweep away. It was one of the most advanced productive organisations on earth in its day, and its cruelty was not archaic but *modern*: rational, calculated, optimised, and documented in its own account books. The framework has argued from the start that an order's logic can be explained without excusing it. Here the logic is a calculation about the cost of stopping a mill, and the explanation makes it worse, not better.

Legibility is not pardon. The axe beside the rollers was placed there by someone who had thought carefully about the problem and arrived at the correct answer. That is the whole difficulty with this order, and with all the others: it was not stupid, and it was not mad, and the people who ran it were doing sums that came out right.

A note on sources. The testimony of Mr Cook and Mr Dalrymple is quoted from the printed *Abstract of the Evidence delivered before a Select Committee of the House of Commons in the years 1790 and 1791, on the part of the petitioners for the abolition of the slave trade* — a public document — as reproduced in the nineteenth-century compilations of that evidence; the wording should be collated against an original printing before publication, and is flagged accordingly. The practice of keeping an axe or hatchet beside the mill to sever a trapped limb is attested independently in accounts of the Danish, British and French sugar islands, including contemporary visitors' descriptions of the Church of England's own Codrington estate in Barbados, and is given here from that literature rather than from a single source. The enumeration of sugar under the Navigation Acts, the structure of the London commission trade, and the pervasiveness of estate mortgages are given from the standard economic histories and are paraphrased and credited. The Sugar Duties Acts of 1846 (9 & 10 Vict. cc. 41 and 63) are cited from the statute; the quoted phrase about the Act having "completed the ruin" of the sugar colonies, and the figures of six shillings and sixpence falling to one shilling and sixpence per hundredweight, are from the Commons debate on the Sugar Duties of 31 May 1850 as printed in Hansard. The Williams thesis and Drescher's *Econocide* are presented as a live and unresolved dispute and no figure is offered for the contribution of slavery to British industrialisation, because the available estimates differ by an order of magnitude according to what is counted; the individual fortunes named — Beckford, Lascelles — are documented and are not part of that dispute. The demographic figures underlying the phrase "two deaths to one birth" are those established in Module 5, with the same ranges and the same caveats.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH JAMAICA — MODULE 7

NO COUNTRY EXCELS JAMAICA

> *Module 7 · Information and Suppression — how an order that hid almost nothing survived a century on the metropole's indifference, and how it was destroyed not by a leak but by an audit it was made to file itself*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

Nothing was hidden

In 1740 a book called *A New History of Jamaica* was published in London by J. Hodges, price bound. Its author, Charles Leslie, had lived on the island. Somewhere in it he set down the following sentence:

> *"No Country excels [Jamaica] in a barbarous Treatment of Slaves, or in the cruel Methods they put them to Death."*

That is not a secret document. It is not a smuggled dispatch, or an abolitionist tract, or a slave's testimony recorded in a mission house. It is a commercial history of the colony, printed in London, on sale to any Englishman with a few shillings, ninety-four years before the Emancipation Act.

And nothing happened.

Hold that fact at the centre of this module, because it dismantles the ordinary expectation of what a Module 7 contains. Consider what else was in the public domain. Edward Long's *History of Jamaica* was published openly in 1774 and argued in print that Africans were a different species; the same man, in a letter to the Prime Minister, reported without embarrassment that his own estate had recorded seventy-two deaths against thirty-seven births. The Jamaican slave code was a public act, printed, and read aloud from every parish pulpit twice a year. And in 1791 the House of Commons printed the *Abstract of the Evidence* — sworn testimony that in crop time the enslaved worked eighteen hours in twenty-four, that they fell asleep at the mill and *"their arms are caught in the mill and*

torn off," that a girl lost her hand because *"being overcome by sleep, she dropped against the rollers."*

Britain read that in 1791. Slavery in the British colonies survived for another forty-three years.

So the question this module has to answer is not *how did they hide it.* They did not hide it. The question is: **why did it not matter that everyone could know?**

Inside the colony, visibility was the machinery

Begin by noticing that in Jamaica, concealment would have been counter-productive, because the floor worked by demonstration.

A floor of force holds not by punishing everyone but by making the punishment of anyone universally known. The 1664 Act ordered itself read in every parish church on the first Sunday in March and the first Sunday in September so that no one might plead ignorance. Executions were public. After Tacky's Revolt heads were set on poles and men were hung alive in iron cages at the crossroads to die of thirst in view of the road. The whole apparatus of Jamaican terror was a communications system, and its message was addressed to the three hundred thousand people who lived under it.

They were, therefore, the one population on earth who could not be deceived about the nature of the Jamaican order. They knew. They were the audience.

Which means the seam of this colony ran across the Atlantic, and only across the Atlantic. There was no gap between what the order said in Spanish Town and what it did in the cane pieces, because it said in Spanish Town exactly what it did and read it from the pulpit. The gap — the whole of it — lay between the island and the metropole. That is the colonial bend of the framework in its purest form, and the striking thing is how little the order had to do to maintain it.

The one real machine: the rules of evidence

Where suppression did operate, it operated not as a law of the press but as a law of evidence.

An enslaved person could not testify against a white person in a Jamaican court. Free people of colour — the growing population the planters were themselves generating — were legislated out of the witness box in the same movement: an act of 1711 barred them from public office; in 1733 they lost the vote, lost the right to give evidence against whites,

and were barred from serving on juries. Long recorded the doctrine flatly: the freed sons and daughters of slaves were deemed incompetent to testify in any case involving a freeborn person, whatever the colour of the parties.

Set that beside the demography. In a colony where the enslaved outnumbered the free whites by ten or more to one, the law had arranged that **the only people who had seen anything were legally incapable of saying it.**

That was a spectacular success in the courtroom and a catastrophe in the Empire, and the planters never understood the second half. Because if the victims cannot testify, and the intermediate caste cannot testify, then the only admissible witnesses in Jamaica are the men who own the plantations. And a sole source is a source that nobody is obliged to believe. The planter class had made itself the exclusive author of all evidence about its own conduct — and had thereby guaranteed that the moment any *other* admissible witness appeared on the island, his word would be the only unanswerable word in the British world.

They would meet that witness in due course, and they would burn his chapel.

(One small crack is worth recording, because of where it appeared. Around 1813 the Jamaican Assembly conceded to free people of colour the right to give evidence on oath and to inherit property beyond the old limit — grudgingly, after petitioning, and while refusing everything else. A contemporary observer noted in 1823 that they remained excluded from juries and from every civil, military and ecclesiastical office, and that these disqualifications *"are thought necessary for political purposes."* The caste line was breached in the witness box a full generation before it was breached anywhere else, which tells you what the planters thought the witness box was for.)

What actually held it: not ignorance, but indifference

Now the central revision.

If the facts were public in 1740, and sworn in 1791, and the order survived until 1834, then concealment cannot have been what held it. Something else was doing the work, and the framework has been slightly wrong about what.

A fact does not act on its own. A fact requires an audience with a reason to attend to it. And for a hundred and fifty years the British public had every reason not to attend. The island was six weeks away and almost nobody had ever seen it. The West India interest sat in Parliament and owned newspapers. Sugar was in the tea. And the robe — Module 3's

robe — had supplied an entire natural history explaining that these were not the kind of beings to whom the creed of liberty applied.

None of that is secrecy. All of it is *distraction*.

The seam is not primarily a barrier to information. It is a barrier to attention. A colonial order does not need the metropole to be ignorant; it needs the metropole to be uninterested. And it dies not when the facts come out — the facts were always out — but when some constituency in the metropole acquires a reason to look.

That reframes the whole of Module 10, and it reframes what follows here. The abolitionists did not, in the main, discover anything. They *manufactured attention*. And they did it with three instruments.

The first instrument: implication

In 1791, the same year as the *Abstract of the Evidence*, a Quaker printer named William Fox published a pamphlet urging the British public to abstain from West Indian sugar and rum — arguing, in terms that shocked and stuck, that the consumer of a slave-grown commodity was a participant in the crime, and that the family that took sugar in its tea was drinking blood. It ran through edition after edition. Somewhere upward of three hundred thousand households are said to have given up West Indian sugar, and grocers began advertising East India sugar as untainted, and the boycott became a national fashion.

Look at what that did structurally. It did not tell anyone a single new fact. What it did was convert a distant, abstract, uninteresting fact into a **decision that had to be made at every British breakfast table every morning**. It abolished the possibility of not attending.

Attention is manufactured by implication, not by information. The abolitionists' first great achievement was not to reveal the plantation; it was to place the reader inside it.

The second instrument: the audit

The second instrument is the one the framework should take most seriously, because it is the least dramatic and it was decisive.

Parliament abolished the slave trade in 1807 and immediately faced the obvious problem: how would anyone in London know whether the trade had actually stopped? The answer, legislated in 1815 and in force from June 1817, was **registration**. Every

enslaved person in the British colonies was to be entered in a colonial register — name, sex, age, colour, origin — with triennial returns thereafter: 1817, 1820, 1823, 1826, 1829, 1832. An Act of 1819 established a central Registry of Colonial Slaves in London to receive copies of every return, and provided that no enslaved person could thereafter be bought, sold, conveyed, imported, exported or inherited without first being registered.

The stated purpose was to police the trade. The actual effect was something else entirely, and nobody in Whitehall seems to have anticipated it.

For the first time in a hundred and sixty years, the metropole could *count*.

And the count said the population was falling. Not slowly, not ambiguously, not according to a missionary's impression — by tens of thousands, in returns filed by the planters themselves, in a standard form, parish by parish, triennium by triennium, with the increase and decrease of every estate itemised. Between 1807 and 1834 the enslaved population of Jamaica declined by some forty-three thousand souls, on an island from which nobody could leave and to which, since 1808, nobody had arrived.

The planter class had spent a century arguing that the enslaved were well treated, better fed and better housed than the English poor. They could dispute a Baptist. They could impeach a naval surgeon. They could not dispute a triennial return in their own hand, signed by their own attorney, deposited by law in London.

The decisive breach of a seam is usually not a leak but an audit. A fact volunteered by the accused, in a routine form, under a requirement he did not think dangerous, is worth a hundred atrocity narratives — because it cannot be dismissed as the enemy's testimony. Module 5's demographic finding, the one that says the Jamaican order consumed a population and bought more, is not the discovery of modern historians. It is a document the planters were made to file.

The third instrument: the admissible witness

And then, at last, the witness.

Module 4 built him. The Baptist and Methodist missionaries who came from 1814 — Thomas Burchell, James Phillippo, and above all William Knibb — possessed a combination of attributes that had not existed in Jamaica since 1655. They were white. They were English. They were literate, ordained and respectable. They were admissible in any court in the British Empire. They were resident on the island and saw what happened there daily. And they were loyal to a constituency three thousand miles away.

For the first time in a hundred and fifty years, there were people who were **inside the colony and outside the interest**.

The planters understood this perfectly, which is why they hated the missionaries with a passion out of all proportion to anything the missionaries did. And after the Christmas rising of 1831 — the Baptist War, Module 10's subject — they acted. An Anglican clergyman, G. W. Bridges, founded a body called the Colonial Church Union, and it went about the business of destroying the seam's crossing-point with fire. Something like a dozen Baptist chapels were burned. Knibb's chapel at Falmouth was burned. His house was stoned. There were plots to kill him. He was arrested on suspicion of complicity in the rising and released for want of any evidence, because there was none.

So the Baptists put him on a ship and sent him to England.

In five months William Knibb travelled some six thousand miles across England, Scotland and Ireland, addressed one hundred and fifty-four public meetings, and spoke — by the standard reckoning — to something on the order of two hundred thousand people. He gave evidence to the parliamentary committees investigating the state of the colonies. And on 15 August 1832, standing before three thousand Londoners, he held up a pair of iron slave shackles and threw them ringing onto the floor.

That is the whole of the Jamaican information war in a single gesture, and the planters had put the shackles in his hand. Their last act of suppression manufactured the exhibit. They had spent a century and a half ensuring that nobody in Jamaica who could see was permitted to speak; the moment a man appeared who could do both, they burned his church — and thereby gave him a martyrdom, a grievance, a reason to sail, and a story that needed no facts they had not already published themselves.

Within thirteen months, Parliament abolished slavery.

Reading the Jamaican seam against the framework

Four contributions.

First, inside a colony the floor does not conceal — it publishes. Terror is a communications system and must be seen to work: the code from the pulpit twice a year, the gibbet at the crossroads, the head on the pole. The classic apparatus of Module 7 — the censor, the suppressed report, the controlled press — is largely *absent* on the Jamaican side of the water, and its absence is not a gap in the order but a feature of it. **The colonial seam does not run between the order and its subjects. It runs between the order and the metropole, and that is the only seam there is.**

Second, and most importantly: the seam is a barrier to attention, not to information. Charles Leslie printed the truth in London in 1740. Parliament heard it on oath in 1791. Nothing followed for decades, and nothing followed because nothing *needed* to be hidden. The framework should be revised in these terms: **concealment is a minor instrument of colonial rule; the major instrument is the metropolitan audience's lack of any reason to look.** An order sustained by indifference is far more robust than one sustained by secrecy, because indifference cannot be exposed. There is no leak that reveals apathy.

Third, the decisive breach is an audit, not a leak. The Registry of Colonial Slaves was designed to police the slave trade and ended by destroying slavery, because it forced the planters to file, triennially, in a standard form, the one fact they could not survive: that their population was falling. **The document that ends an order is usually the document the order was required to produce about itself** — because it is the only evidence its defenders cannot attribute to their enemies. The corpus should look for this in every case: not the smuggled letter, but the routine return.

Fourth, an order that makes its victims inadmissible makes itself its own sole witness, and a sole witness is not believed. The Jamaican evidence bar was a courtroom masterpiece and a strategic disaster. Having ensured that nobody who could see could speak, the planters guaranteed that the first person who could do both would be listened to without qualification — and then, in 1832, they set fire to his chapel. **The suppression of the last witness is the act by which an order finally publishes itself.**

Legibility is not pardon. It should be said plainly, at the end of a module about how Britain came to know, that Britain had always known; that the information was on sale in London in 1740; and that what changed between 1740 and 1832 was not the facts but the willingness of a nation to look at what it had already been told. That is not a story about a curtain being drawn back. It is a story about a people who preferred, for ninety-four years, to be looking somewhere else.

A note on sources. Charles Leslie's sentence is quoted from *A New History of Jamaica* (London, 1740) as it appears in the standard literature; the original pagination has not been collated here and the wording should be checked before publication. The testimony of Mr Cook and Mr Dalrymple is quoted as in Module 6, from the printed *Abstract of the Evidence* laid before the Commons Select Committee of 1790–91, with the same caveat. The Jamaican evidence bar is given from the statutory record as reported in the modern scholarship: the act of 1711 excluding free people of colour from public office; the loss of the franchise, of the right to testify against whites, and of jury service in 1733; and the partial concession of the right to give evidence on oath around 1813. The observation that the remaining disqualifications *"are thought necessary for political purposes"* is quoted from a contemporary account of Jamaica published in 1823 and is credited as such. The Slave Registration Acts of 1815 and 1816–17, the triennial returns of

1817, 1820, 1823, 1826, 1829 and 1832, and the establishment of the central Registry of Colonial Slaves in London by the Act of 1819 are given from the surviving registers themselves, now inscribed on the UNESCO Memory of the World register, and from the National Archives' description of them. The figure of a decline of some 43,000 between 1807 and 1834 is as given in Module 5, with the same caveats. William Fox's abstention pamphlet of 1791 and the sugar boycott are given from the standard histories of the abolition movement, and the figure of upward of 300,000 abstaining households is a contemporary estimate that should be treated as such rather than as a count. The burning of the Baptist chapels by the Colonial Church Union, Knibb's mission to Britain, the figures of six thousand miles, 154 meetings and some two hundred thousand hearers, and the throwing down of the shackles before a London meeting on 15 August 1832 are given from the Baptist and Jamaican historical literature; the words attributed to Knibb on that occasion are quoted as they appear in that literature and are flagged as requiring collation against a contemporary printing of the speech. Thomas Thistlewood's diaries, the most granular surviving record of what was done to bodies on a Jamaican estate, are deliberately not quoted here; they are handled in the modern scholarship of Trevor Burnard, and this study cites that scholarship rather than reproducing the diaries' contents.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH JAMAICA — MODULE 8

DEPENDING AS THEY DO FOR THEIR DAILY EXISTENCE

> *Module 8 · Elite Coordination and the Default — why the richest and most aggrieved colonial elite in the British Empire could not rebel, how it dismantled itself without a single traitor, and why in 1833 it was not defeated but paid*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The open problem

This is the module the framework exists to worry about.

The floor explains why the governed comply. The robe explains why the metropole funds it. The cost column explains why the individual subject, at the moment of choice, does not run. But none of that explains the elite. The men at the top of a settlement are precisely the people for whom defection is most available and most profitable: they have money, arms, information, the ear of the metropole, and — usually — somewhere else to go. Each of them could, individually, cut a separate deal. And yet, overwhelmingly, they do not. Orders are very rarely destroyed by the men who run them.

The framework's answer has been the **default**: that no coordination is required, because each member of the elite, defending only his own position, thereby defends the whole arrangement, and the aggregate looks exactly like a conspiracy without anyone having conspired. *No Hidden Hand.*

Jamaica is the hardest test of that proposition in the corpus, and it is the hardest test because the Jamaican elite had, on paper, the strongest motive and the strongest means to defect that any colonial elite has ever possessed — and never once tried.

The defection that never happened

Consider what the Jamaican planter class had in 1774.

It had a constitutional doctrine older and more successful than any on the mainland: it had fought the Crown to a standstill over Poynings' Law between 1675 and 1680 and *won*, establishing that the Assembly of Jamaica alone made Jamaica's laws. It had declared, in 1677, its entitlement to all the liberties, immunities and privileges of *"our native country, the Kingdom of England."* It had wealth beyond anything Virginia or Massachusetts could show — the single richest colony in the British Empire. It had a standing quarrel with every governor sent to it. And in 1774 it had exactly the grievances the mainland colonies had, expressed in exactly the same language.

And on 28 December 1774 the Assembly of Jamaica voted a *Humble Petition and Memorial* to the King — a document sufficiently sympathetic to the American case that the Continental Congress took notice of it and had it reprinted in Philadelphia. It endorsed the colonists' constitutional claims. It also professed the most dutiful regard to the royal person and family, and asked, in the end, for nothing more than the continued enjoyment of the petitioners' personal rights and the security of their properties.

Then it did nothing. No congress. No association. No shot. Jamaica voted money for the war — on Britain's side — and sat still while thirteen colonies with a weaker case and a thinner purse tore the Empire in half.

Why?

The answer was written down in Whitehall, coldly, in a private memorandum of about 1817, when the Colonial Office was considering how seriously to take the Jamaica Assembly's constitutional fury over Parliament's abolition of the slave trade. The Assembly had resolved that Parliament had no authority to pass laws with internal operation in the island. The memorandum's advice was to soothe them and wait, and its reasoning is the whole of this module in a single clause:

> *"It can never be their wish, depending as they do for their daily existence upon the force voted for their protection by the British Parliament, to assume principles which seem incompatible with their receiving that assistance."*

Depending as they do for their daily existence. Three thousand regular troops, voted by the Parliament of Great Britain, standing between something under twenty thousand white Jamaicans and something over three hundred thousand enslaved ones — and, in the hills, a Maroon force bound to the order by a treaty the Crown had signed and could, at its discretion, decline to enforce.

The Jamaican elite could not secede because it could not man its own floor.

The floor is the leash

That sentence is the module's first contribution and it requires the framework to be amended, because the framework has treated the floor as the thing that holds the *governed* down. Jamaica shows that it also holds the *governors* down, and holds them far more tightly.

A settler elite that must import its coercion is not a partner of the metropole. It is a hostage of it. It may quarrel endlessly with the governor over supply bills and appointments — and the Jamaica Assembly quarrelled with every governor for a hundred and seventy years — but it can never take the quarrel to the point of rupture, because rupture means the regiments sail away, and when the regiments sail away the arithmetic of Module 5 reasserts itself in a single afternoon.

And now see the mechanism at its most exact, because it is very nearly a joke that the century played on itself. **The very brutality that made the Jamaican order rich and hated is what made it loyal.** The order needed the floor because it was extreme; it was hostage to Britain because it needed the floor; and so the most savage slaveholders in the British world were also the most reliably British colonists in it. Ferocity and obedience were not in tension. They were the same fact, seen from two sides.

Set the comparisons out and the law becomes visible:

- **Virginia** had a large white population, could man its own floor, and had formed a creole gentry in its own colleges (Module 4). It seceded.
- **Jamaica** had more money, an older constitutional victory, and a fiercer legislature — and could not man its floor. It never tried.
- **Saint-Domingue's** ***grands blancs*** flirted with autonomy in 1789 and were annihilated by the population they had assumed the metropole would always help them hold.
- **Algeria's settlers** could man their own floor by 1958 and duly turned on Paris; **Rhodesia's** could, and declared independence.

State it as a law and test it elsewhere: **the more an elite depends on external force to hold its own subjects, the less capable it is of defecting from the power that supplies that force — irrespective of how much it resents that power, how rich it is, or how**

good its constitutional case may be. Wealth does not buy an elite freedom of action. Only a floor it owns does.

The default, working exactly as advertised

Within that leash, the Jamaican elite required no conspiracy whatever, and this is the framework's core claim confirmed.

Each planter, defending his own estate, defended the institution of slavery. Each absentee, defending his remittances, defended the protective tariff. Each London merchant, defending his advances, defended the estates that owed him. Each poor white, defending the caste standing that was the only thing he owned (Module 2), defended the whole racial architecture from which that standing derived. Nobody had to meet. Nobody had to be told. The order was defended, hour by hour, by men who were thinking about nothing but themselves.

But there was a visible hand as well. In 1775 the Society of West India Planters and Merchants was formed in London, drawing together the British sugar merchants, the absentee proprietors and the colonial agents. It met, it minuted, it dined, it lobbied, it briefed ministers and it paid for pamphlets. And in Parliament there sat a bloc — the West India interest — variously estimated at between twenty and sixty members depending on how tightly one draws the definition, seated in good part on rotten boroughs bought for the purpose.

Does that refute *No Hidden Hand*? It does not. It **sharpens** it, and the sharpening is this module's second contribution. Look carefully at what the Society could and could not do.

It could coordinate **action**. It could get a sugar duty amended, a bill delayed, an agent instructed, a candidate financed.

It could not coordinate **interest**. And the interests were coming apart.

The fracture that nobody organised

The resident planter wanted defence and cheap credit. The absentee wanted remittances and a high price. The London merchant wanted his advances serviced; the planter wanted them forgiven. The sugar man wanted protection; the pen-keeper and the coffee grower had a different exposure. The Assembly wanted its constitutional autonomy; the absentee

in Parliament wanted a compliant colonial government that would not embarrass the interest in London.

And beneath all of these ran the deepest fracture of the lot, and Module 6 has already named it: **planter versus creditor.**

By the last decades of slavery a very large share of Jamaica's estates were mortgaged — some several times over — to merchant houses, annuitants, trustees and widows in Britain. The estate's nominal proprietor was frequently the servant of his own debt. Which means that the men who sat in London under the collective name of *the West India interest* were, in increasing proportion, **not slaveholders defending an institution but creditors defending a debt**.

And a creditor's interest is in being paid.

It is not, and never was, in the survival of the arrangement that generated the debt.

The buy-out

Now watch the end, and watch it without the usual lighting.

The Reform Act of 1832 destroyed the rotten boroughs on which the interest had seated its friends. The Agency Committee went out and bound candidates to pledges for immediate abolition, and something over two hundred pledged men were returned to the first reformed Commons. The West India interest was gutted. By 1833 the Society of West India Planters and Merchants had only eleven members of Parliament left holding seats, and of those eleven only seven still troubled to attend its meetings.

On the ordinary reading, that is elite defeat. It is nothing of the kind.

Because the Society, stripped of its boroughs, its bloc and its argument, held to exactly one demand — the demand George Canning had laid down for it as early as 1823, that emancipation must not come without indemnity — and on that one demand it won completely.

Twenty million pounds, raised by the house of Rothschild, paid to the owners of human beings for the loss of their property. Plus apprenticeship: the freed people bound to work for their former masters without wages for something over forty hours a week — more, if they were domestics — for a term originally set at six years.

The West India interest did not lose in 1833. **It was bought out**, at a price it had itself named a decade earlier, by a Parliament in which it held eleven seats.

And Module 6 tells us where the money went. It went, in very large part, not to men in Jamaica but to mortgagees, annuitants, trustees, widows and merchant houses in Britain

— because the value of the estates had been drained into London long before the people on them were freed. The compensation of 1833 did not enrich the plantocracy. It **liquidated** it, at par, and made its creditors whole.

The parties who were not made whole were the three hundred and eleven thousand people who had been the collateral. They received the apprenticeship.

The caste line moves

One last piece of evidence, and it is the cleanest possible confirmation of Module 2.

The white population of Jamaica was too small to man the floor and had been for a century. The deficiency laws had failed; the exits stood open; the absentees would not come home. And by 1830 the Assembly was looking at a rising tide of emancipationist pressure from London, a restive enslaved majority, and a militia it could not fill.

So it moved the line.

In 1830 the Assembly granted full civil rights to the free people of colour — the very population it had legislated out of the franchise, the jury box and the witness box in 1733, and had barred from public office in 1711. In 1831 it gave the Jews the vote. It did these things after a century and a half of insisting that the line was inviolable, and it did them **one year before the largest slave rising in the island's history** — and when that rising came, the free coloured militia and the Maroons turned out and fought for the order.

Module 2 established that the boundary of the settlement was a price and not a principle, and proved it by the offer made to Juan de Bolas in 1663 and to Cudjoe in 1739. Here is the same finding arrived at from the opposite end: **when the floor's roster runs short, the caste line moves — and it moves precisely as far as the shortfall requires, and no further.** Module 9 will show what happened to the men thus admitted, and how quickly the door was shut again.

The last coordination

In their final years the Jamaican elite did what elites do when the metropole turns: they complained magnificently.

Their addresses of 1832 and 1833 are worth reading for the tone alone. They protested that they had been *"represented as the outcasts of civilization — as the oppressors and persecutors of the miserable African"*; that the faction adverse to the colonies had *"in some measure succeeded in excluding us from the regard and commiseration of the English people"*;

that their misfortunes had been met by their fellow subjects *"with the triumph and ridicule of declared enemies."* They avowed an intention to resist the coming measures *"by all means within their power."*

And they resisted by all means within their power. Their power, it emerged, consisted of a demand for money. They took the twenty million.

There was no rebellion, no declaration, no secession, no burning of the King's stores at Kingston — and there was never going to be, because the memorandum of 1817 had already established, in a single subordinate clause, why there could not be. The garrison was in the town.

Reading Jamaican elite coordination against the framework

Five contributions.

First: the floor is the leash. The framework has read the floor as the instrument by which an order holds its subjects. Jamaica shows that where the elite cannot supply that instrument itself, the floor holds the *elite* far more tightly than it holds anybody else. A settler class that must import its coercion has no exit and no veto; it can quarrel forever and rupture never. And the mechanism has a cruel elegance: **the more extreme the order, the more force it needs; the more force it needs, the more it depends on the metropole; and the more it depends on the metropole, the less able it is to resist the metropole's eventual change of mind.** The Jamaican planters were the most ferocious slaveholders in the British world and the most obedient colonists in it, and those are not two facts but one. Enter it as a law and test it against Virginia, Saint-Domingue, Algeria and Rhodesia.

Second: *No Hidden Hand* cuts both ways. The corpus has used the default to explain why an order persists without conspirators. Jamaica requires it to explain why an order can *disintegrate* without traitors. Every ruinous feature of the late Jamaican settlement was the aggregate of individually rational decisions: each planter paid the deficiency fine rather than hire white men, and the floor went unmanned; each successful man went absentee, and the colony never acquired a self; each proprietor mortgaged his estate to keep it running, and the estates ended in the hands of men who did not care whether slavery survived so long as the debt was serviced. Nobody betrayed anybody. **The same position logic that makes an elite defend an order without coordinating can dismantle that order without coordinating, and it will do so whenever the individually rational**

move and the collectively necessary move come apart — which, in an order held by an imported floor and a protected market, they eventually must.

Third: an explicit lobby does not refute the default; it exposes the default's limit. The Society of West India Planters and Merchants was a real committee that really met, and its existence is not an embarrassment to the framework. It could coordinate action; it could not coordinate interest; and when the interests inside the room diverged — planter from creditor — the committee simply followed the heavier weight. **A lobby is not a conspiracy. It is a weighted average of the positions in the room, and when the weights shift, the lobby shifts with them, whatever its founding purpose was.** That is why the West India interest ended by lobbying, with great skill and complete success, for the terms of its own dissolution.

Fourth: the elite that appears defeated is very often the elite that has been paid. In 1833 the West India interest held eleven seats in the Commons and extracted twenty million pounds. It surrendered the institution and kept the capital. Before the framework records an elite as having lost, it must ask a question it has not been asking: **not whether they lost the argument, but whether they were bought — and if so, at what price, and by whom, and out of whose pocket.** The pocket, in this case, was the British taxpayer's, and the loan was not finally discharged until the twenty-first century.

Fifth: when the floor's roster runs short, the caste line moves. The Assembly admitted the free coloureds in 1830 and the Jews in 1831, after a century of swearing it never would, because it needed the militia — and the men so admitted duly turned out and fought for the order in 1831. **A caste line is a staffing decision wearing a metaphysics.** It holds exactly as long as the floor can be manned without breaching it, and not one year longer.

Legibility is not pardon. It is worth being exact, at the end of a module about coordination, that nothing in it should be read as making the Jamaican planter class less culpable. They did not fail to rebel out of loyalty, and they did not consent to emancipation out of conscience. They stayed because they were afraid, and they consented because they were paid. Neither is a mitigation. Both are simply what the arithmetic required — and the arithmetic was one they had constructed themselves, entry by entry, over a hundred and seventy-eight years.

A note on sources. The Colonial Office memorandum quoted here — *"depending as they do for their daily existence upon the force voted for their protection by the British Parliament"* — is quoted from a transcription of the Colonial Office correspondence of 1808–17 concerning the Jamaica Assembly's resolutions on the abolition of the slave trade and the registry bill; the archival original (Colonial Office series, The National Archives) should be collated before publication and the date, given here as *circa* 1817, confirmed. The

Jamaica Assembly's *Humble Petition and Memorial* to the King, voted 28 December 1774, survives in the colonial record (C.O. 140/53) and in the pamphlet reprinted at Philadelphia in 1775, a copy of which is in the Library of Congress and was noted in the Journals of the Continental Congress; the phrases quoted from it are given as they appear in the modern scholarship on that document, and should be collated against the pamphlet. The Assembly's addresses of 1832–33 are quoted from a transcription of the colonial correspondence of those years and are likewise flagged for collation. The Assembly's declaration of 1677 on the liberties of England is quoted as in Module 3. The Society of West India Planters and Merchants (formed 1775) and the size of the West India interest in Parliament (estimated at between twenty and sixty members, with Higman's narrower estimate of twenty to forty for the period 1807–33) are given from the standard scholarship — O'Shaughnessy, Higman, Draper, Taylor — and are paraphrased and credited. The figures of eleven Society-affiliated MPs holding seats in 1833, of whom seven still attended meetings, and of over two hundred pledged abolitionist candidates returned at the 1832 general election, are from the recent work on the Society's minute books and on the parliamentary history of the interest, and are given as scholarship. The terms of the Slavery Abolition Act 1833 — the twenty million pounds, raised through the house of Rothschild, and the apprenticeship of some forty and a half hours a week for praedial apprentices and more for domestics, originally for six years and terminated in 1838 — are from the Act and from the standard accounts. The distribution of the compensation, and in particular the very large share that flowed to mortgagees, annuitants and merchant houses in Britain rather than to resident proprietors, rests on the work of Nicholas Draper and the Legacies of British Slavery project and is paraphrased and credited. The enfranchisement of the free people of colour in 1830 and of the Jews in 1831, and the earlier exclusions of 1711 and 1733, are given from the statutory record as reported in the modern literature and are taken up again in Module 9.

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH JAMAICA — MODULE 9

WITH CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS

> *Module 9 · Plurality or Foreclosure — how the most plural constitution in the British Empire produced its least free society, how an order forecloses most efficiently by granting rights one man at a time, and what a caste does when the constitution stops being its own*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The most plural constitution in the Empire

Set out, without comment, the institutional furniture of eighteenth-century Jamaica.

An elected House of Assembly, sitting since 1664, which had fought the Crown to a standstill over Poynings' Law and won, establishing that no law could be made for Jamaica except by Jamaicans. A Council. A Crown-appointed governor whom the Assembly could and routinely did paralyse by withholding supply. An independent bench. Trial by jury. Habeas corpus. A free press, several newspapers, and no licensing. Religious toleration, eventually extending to Jews and dissenters. Property secure against arbitrary seizure by the executive — the Assembly went to war with London over precisely that, more than once, and won. Petition, remonstrance, and a standing right to address the King.

There is not a guarantee on that list that an Englishman of 1750 would not have recognised, envied, and called the birthright of a free people.

And Jamaica was the least free society in the British world.

The framework's ninth question asks whether an order permits genuine rival centres of power, or forecloses them: whether liberty is *divided* or merely *declared*. Jamaica returns an answer the framework has not been prepared for. The power was genuinely divided. The plurality was real. And the plurality was **the engine of the foreclosure**.

Every victory was won against the only restraint

Look again at what the Assembly's great constitutional triumphs actually secured.

1675–80. The Crown attempts to impose Poynings' Law: no bill may even be introduced in the Jamaican Assembly without prior approval from London. The Assembly refuses, invoking Magna Carta and the liberties of *"our native country, the Kingdom of England."* The law officers can find no ground to compel them. The Lords of Trade give way. It is the founding legend of Jamaican liberty. And what it secured — the thing the planters had actually been fighting for, whether or not they framed it that way — was the exclusive right to write the slave code without London's veto. The Act of 1664 that Module 1 read, with its fortnightly search for wooden swords and its five pounds from the public purse for a runaway's corpse, was the property of that victory.

1807–17. Parliament abolishes the slave trade, and then requires the registration of the enslaved. The Assembly of Jamaica resolves that Parliament has no authority whatever to pass laws with internal operation in the island, and raises the objection, as Whitehall drily noted, *"upon what they term a constitutional principle."*

1823–33. The imperial government proposes amelioration — restrictions on flogging women, the admission of slave evidence, the abolition of the driver's whip in the field. The Assembly rejects the proposals, and rejects them on constitutional grounds: the internal government of Jamaica is Jamaica's business.

Three times, across a hundred and sixty years, the Jamaican elite invoked the rights of Englishmen against the metropole, and three times what it was defending with those rights was its unrestricted power over three hundred thousand human beings. And three times its constitutional case was **good**. That is what makes this module hard and what makes it necessary.

Colonial self-government was the enemy of the slave. The only authority on earth that could conceivably have restrained the Jamaican planter was the imperial authority — and every advance of Jamaican liberty was, by definition, a retreat of that authority.

The framework should state the general form of this without flinching, and without sliding into an argument against liberty as such, which would be both wrong and cheap. **Plurality inside a caste and foreclosure outside it are not in tension. They are complements.** The freedom of masters is funded by the unfreedom of the mastered — and, worse than funded, it is *sharpened* by it, because a caste that must defend its liberties against a distant Crown acquires an overwhelming interest in keeping the subject population beyond that Crown's reach. The more vigorous the Assembly, the more absolute the plantation.

The intermediate caste

Now the real test of the liberty variable, which is not the enslaved — their foreclosure was total and requires no analysis — but the people in between.

The numbers matter. On the eve of emancipation the island held roughly sixteen and a half thousand whites, something over thirty-one thousand free people of colour, about eleven thousand free black people, and three hundred and eleven thousand enslaved. **The free non-white population outnumbered the white population by more than two to one.**

There, in the middle of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, sat the plurality that might have been: a large, growing, literate, propertied, urban, often slaveholding class, mostly the children and grandchildren of white men, many of them educated, many of them Anglican, and legally almost nothing.

The exclusions were built in stages, and each one was a response to their growth. An Act of 1711 barred them from public office. In 1733 they lost the franchise, lost the right to give evidence against a white person, and lost the right to sit on a jury. And in 1761 the Assembly passed the instrument that mattered most, whose title is a small masterpiece of legislative candour:

> *"An Act to prevent the inconveniences arising from exorbitant grants and devises, made by white persons to negroes, and the issue of negroes; and to restrain and limit such grants and devises."*

The Devises Act. It capped at two thousand pounds the amount that a person of African descent could inherit from a white one. It was contrary to the settled principle of English common law, which allowed a man absolute discretion to dispose of his property, and the Privy Council in London confirmed it anyway.

And notice what it was for. It was passed because white Jamaican men were leaving their fortunes to their own mixed-race children — and it was passed by an Assembly a substantial number of whose members were doing exactly that. It is a statute in which a legislature of fathers legislated against its own sons.

Foreclosure by retail

And then the Assembly did the thing that makes Jamaica, for the purposes of this framework, the most instructive colony in the collection.

Having capped inheritance by general statute, it proceeded to exempt individuals from that statute — one at a time, by name, by **private Act**.

The register survives. Turn its pages. *CO 139/31 (293): Frances Clarke, Shirley Clarke, Ann Clarke, Robert Pawlett Clarke, Thomas Clarke and William Clarke, reputed children of Robert Clarke of the parish of St Catherines, gentleman, by Charlotte Pawlett, a free mulatto woman — 23 December 1774. CO 139/31 (318): Eleanor Clifford, Mary Clifford, Frances Clifford, Martha Clifford, John Clifford — 22 December 1775 — all given full rights but not allowed to be members of the Assembly or Council.* Dozens upon dozens of them, session after session, through the second half of the eighteenth century.

And the standard form of words, repeated so often that the clerks abbreviated it, is the title of this module. Each Act entitled the named persons

> *"to the same Rights and Privileges with English subjects, with certain restrictions."*

The restrictions were always, in substance, the same. You may inherit your father's money. You may hold property. You may sometimes testify — though frequently not against a white man, unless you have been assaulted or robbed. And you may **not sit in the Assembly or the Council**, and you may not hold most offices under the Crown.

Money, yes. Standing, yes. Political power: never.

Two further features complete the machine, and each is worse than the last. The petitioner generally had to show that he had been **baptised in the Church of England and educated** — which is to say that the order demanded, as the price of admission, documentary evidence of precisely the formation it had spent a century and a half refusing to supply to anybody (Module 4). And, until Richard Barrett's bill removed it in 1826, the petitioner had to **pay a fee**. Liberty was retailed, and it had a price list.

One last detail, and it is the tell. Enslaved people who were freed by name in the Acts of Assembly *for loyalty in a slave rebellion* — men who had betrayed a rising and been manumitted for it — are recorded in the same registers, and they never receive the rights and privileges. The currency of admission was money and paternity. It was not service, and it was certainly not merit.

Why retail enfranchisement is the most efficient foreclosure there is

This is the module's central contribution and it should be stated as a mechanism, because it will be found everywhere once it is named.

An order forecloses most effectively not by refusing rights but by granting them one at a time.

A right granted by private Act to a named individual is not a right. It is a **favour**. And consider what a favour does that a refusal cannot:

- It **creates a client, not a citizen.** The man who has been made free by a bill bearing his own name owes his standing to the men who voted it, and knows it, every day of his life.
- It **dissolves the class into a queue.** Each man's status is his own, negotiated separately, and his neighbour's grant is no precedent for his. There is no common condition to organise around, because there is no common condition. A blanket exclusion creates a class with a shared grievance; retail admission creates thirty thousand individual cases, each of which is somebody's private business.
- It **buys off precisely the leadership.** The men who could afford the fee and the lawyer, whose fathers were rich enough to be worth petitioning for, are exactly the men who would otherwise have led a movement. The order does not need to defeat them. It needs only to admit them, and it charges them for the privilege.
- It **remains revocable**, because what one Act granted another may qualify.
- It **costs the order almost nothing**, since what is being conceded is money and status, and the one thing that is never conceded — a seat in the legislature — is the only thing that would have mattered.
- And it **converts the legislature into an object of gratitude rather than of demand.** A man who has to ask does not get to insist.

Write it into the framework in these terms: **a right that must be petitioned for is a favour; a favour creates a client; a client cannot form a class; and a class that cannot form cannot demand.** Retail enfranchisement is not a halting step toward plurality. It is plurality's most efficient antidote, and the corpus should now go and look for it everywhere: in the Algerian who could acquire French citizenship only by renouncing his personal status and applying, one man at a time; in the Vietnamese *évolué*; in the assimilado, the advanced native, the exempted, the certificated. It is the same device in every colony, and Jamaica shows it working in its purest form, on parchment, with the fee receipted.

When retail failed

It failed, in the end, for a reason the framework should note: the class grew too large to be handled one at a time.

By the 1820s the free coloured population of Jamaica exceeded the white and was concentrated in the towns, where it read, met, and organised. Edward Jordon, Robert Osborn and Richard Hill built exactly the things the framework calls plurality: a newspaper — Jordon's *Watchman* — an association, a petition campaign, a leadership, and a public argument. In 1823 the Assembly deported one of their number, Louis Celeste Lecesne. In 1832 Jordon was tried for treason. He was acquitted.

And in 1830 they won. Full civil rights were conceded to the free people of colour; the following year the Jews were given the vote.

But Module 8 has already told us why they won, and it is not because the Assembly had been persuaded. The white population was too small to man the floor, the deficiency laws had failed, the exits stood open, and the militia could not be filled. The caste line moved because the roster was short. And it moved exactly as far as the shortfall required.

The proof came within a year. In the Christmas rising of 1831 the free coloured militia turned out, and fought, and fought for the order. They had been given something to lose, and they defended it, precisely as the cost column predicted they would. That is not gratitude, and it is not betrayal. It is arithmetic — and the Assembly had done the arithmetic before it moved the line.

What a caste does when the constitution stops being its own

Which brings the module to its end, and to the single most revealing act in the two hundred and eleven years of British Jamaica.

After emancipation the franchise was, in principle, colour-blind. In practice a steep property qualification and a poll tax kept the electorate of a colony of some four hundred thousand people down to a couple of thousand men. But it was moving. Black and mixed-race Jamaicans were acquiring freeholds, and paying the tax, and voting, and being elected. **George William Gordon** — landowner, merchant, Justice of the Peace, and member of the House of Assembly for St Thomas-in-the-East — was one of them, and he had said in public, of the governor: *"If we are to be governed by such a Governor much longer, the people will have to fly to arms and become self-governing."*

In October 1865, at Morant Bay, a Native Baptist deacon named Paul Bogle — a man standing in the direct line of descent from George Liele's chapel, Module 4's stolen robe, ninety years on — led a march to the courthouse over a trespass conviction and a long train of grievances that had already produced petitions to the Queen and been answered with an instruction to work harder. The militia fired. Seven died. The crowd burned the courthouse and killed the custos and a number of others. The parish rose.

Governor Edward John Eyre declared martial law and answered with a month of it. **Four hundred and thirty-nine black Jamaicans were killed**; something like three hundred and fifty-four of them were executed after summary courts martial, often within hours of capture. About six hundred people were flogged, including women. Over a thousand houses were burned. And the Maroons — under the sixth article of the treaty Cudjoe had signed in 1739, the article requiring them to *"take, kill, suppress, or destroy"* rebels — turned out with the troops, and it was the Maroons of Moore Town who took Paul Bogle and handed him over to be hanged.

One hundred and twenty-six years after Cudjoe put his mark on that paper, the clause was still being executed. Module 5's ten shillings a head was still being paid, in a different currency.

Gordon was arrested in Kingston, where martial law had **not** been declared. Eyre had him carried to Morant Bay so that he could be tried by a court martial with no jurisdiction over him, convicted of constructive treason on evidence a Royal Commission would later be unable to locate, and hanged on 23 October.

They hanged an elected member of the legislature.

And then, in the panic that followed, Eyre put it to the House of Assembly of Jamaica that it should dissolve itself.

And it did.

The Assembly that had beaten the Crown over Poynings' Law in 1680; that had defied the Parliament of Great Britain over the abolition of the slave trade; that had rejected amelioration on constitutional principle; that had invoked Magna Carta and the Petition of Right and the liberties, immunities and privileges of *"our native country"* for two centuries — voted itself out of existence, and asked London for direct rule by an appointed governor and a nominated council of six. Jordon and Osborn, the free coloured leaders who had won their own rights in 1830, opposed it. They were overruled.

The reason is not obscure and nobody troubled much to disguise it. The Assembly was becoming, slowly and by the operation of its own franchise, a body in which black and mixed-race Jamaicans would eventually hold a majority. The planters preferred an autocrat appointed in London to a legislature they could no longer own.

They surrendered the rights of Englishmen at the precise moment those rights threatened to become general.

That is the liberty variable's definitive reading, and it required two hundred years to produce. The plurality of colonial Jamaica was never about liberty. It was about who held the whip — and when the whip was in danger of changing hands, the plurality was voted away in an afternoon by the men who had spent two centuries insisting it was sacred.

The coda the framework must not flinch from

And now the uncomfortable part, which this study will state plainly rather than bury.

Crown Colony rule — an autocracy, with no elections, a governor appointed in London and a nominated council of six — was in several concrete respects **better for the black majority of Jamaica than the free Assembly had been.** Sir John Peter Grant reformed the courts and took local justice out of the hands of the planter magistrates. A constabulary was established. Public works were built; the first large irrigation scheme came in 1868; the Crown Lands Settlement Scheme of the 1890s let smallholders buy land on favourable terms.

Where the plural body is a caste, its abolition can increase the liberty of the excluded. That is a genuine finding and an inconvenient one, and it should be recorded without comfort.

But the trade must be stated in full, because a half-stated trade is a piece of advocacy. Jamaica bought less local tyranny at the price of **eighty years without self-determination**: direct political participation by black and mixed-race Jamaicans was effectively ended in 1866 and not restored until universal adult suffrage in 1944. The official who could not be voted out was also the official who could not be lobbied by the planter next door — and he was, in the end, accountable to nobody in Jamaica at all.

In Britain, meanwhile, the affair split the national intellect down the middle in a way that is worth recording for what it says about the metropole's robe. The Jamaica Committee — John Stuart Mill, John Bright, Charles Darwin, Thomas Huxley, Herbert Spencer — demanded that Eyre be tried for the murder of George William Gordon. The Eyre Defence Committee — Thomas Carlyle, John Ruskin, Alfred Tennyson, Charles Kingsley, Charles Dickens — defended him. The Royal Commission found that the punishments *"were excessive,"* that they were *"far greater than the necessity required,"* that *"the punishment of death was unnecessarily frequent,"* and that the floggings had been

reckless and at Bath *"positively barbarous"* — and declined to condemn the use of martial law. Eyre was recalled. He was never tried.

Reading Jamaica's liberty variable against the framework

Five contributions.

First: plurality among the enfranchised is not liberty; it is a division of the spoils, and it can be the *engine* of foreclosure. Every constitutional victory the Jamaica Assembly ever won was won against the only authority capable of restraining it, and each victory therefore deepened the subjection below. The framework must stop treating *"does the order permit rival centres of power?"* as a sufficient test of liberty. The correct question is **rival to whom, and on whose behalf** — because a vigorous, genuine, hard-won plurality among masters is not merely compatible with total foreclosure beneath them. In Jamaica it was causally connected to it.

Second: retail enfranchisement is the most efficient instrument of foreclosure in the collection. Rights granted individually, by private Act, to named persons, *"with certain restrictions,"* for a fee, on proof of baptism — this dissolves a class into a queue, converts citizens into clients, buys off exactly the men who would have led, costs the order almost nothing, concedes everything except the seat that matters, and remains revocable. **A right that must be petitioned for is a favour; a favour creates a client; a client cannot form a class; and a class that cannot form cannot demand.** Go and find this device in every colony in the corpus. It is always there.

Third: a caste line is a staffing decision, and its concessions are timed to the floor's needs. The free coloureds of Jamaica received full civil rights in 1830 because the militia could not be filled, and they defended the order in 1831 because they had at last been given something to lose. Module 2 found the same law from the other end, in the thirty acres offered to Juan de Bolas. **The boundary of a settlement moves exactly as far as the floor's shortfall requires, and not one inch further.**

Fourth — and this is the diagnostic the corpus should carry away — when representative government can no longer be a caste monopoly, a caste will abolish representative government. Do not test an elite's constitutionalism by its rhetoric; its rhetoric will always be magnificent, and in Jamaica's case it was also, legally, correct. **Test it by waiting until the constitution begins to admit the excluded, and then watching**

what the elite does. Jamaica's Assembly beat the King in 1680 and killed itself in 1866, and the two acts have exactly the same motive.

Fifth, and without comfort: where the plural body is a caste, its abolition can increase the liberty of the excluded — at the price of their self-determination. Crown Colony rule gave black Jamaicans better courts and worse politics; it took the planter off the bench and took the Jamaican off the ballot. **Liberty is not one quantity**, and its components can be traded against one another, and in 1866 Jamaica traded them — though it should be said, since it is true, that nobody asked the four hundred thousand people concerned which trade they would have preferred.

Legibility is not pardon. It is not a defence of the Jamaica Assembly to observe that its constitutional arguments were sound; it is an indictment of what sound constitutional arguments can be made to carry. And it is not a defence of Governor Eyre to observe that the Assembly he dissolved deserved dissolving. Four hundred and thirty-nine people were killed to produce the panic in which that vote was taken, and one of them was an elected member of the House that took it.

A note on sources. The formula *"to entitle to the same Rights and Privileges with English subjects, with certain restrictions"* and the individual private Acts cited (CO 139/31 (293), 23 December 1774; CO 139/31 (318), 22 December 1775) are quoted from Edward Crawford's extraction of the private Acts of the Jamaican Assembly relating to people of African or part-African descent, made from the list of Jamaican Assembly Acts at the Public Record Office (now The National Archives), Kew; the Acts themselves are handwritten and the transcriptions should be collated against the originals before publication. The title of the Devises Act of 1761 — *"An Act to prevent the inconveniences arising from exorbitant grants and devises, made by white persons to negroes, and the issue of negroes; and to restrain and limit such grants and devises"* — is quoted from the Act. Its ceiling on inheritance is given in the sources as £2,000, and one secondary account gives £1,200; the higher figure is used here as the better attested, and the discrepancy is noted rather than resolved. The exclusions of 1711 and 1733, the concession of the right to give evidence around 1813, Richard Barrett's removal of the fees in 1826, and the grant of full civil rights in 1830 and of the Jewish franchise in 1831 are given from the statutory record as reported in the modern literature and are credited as scholarship. Population figures for 1833 (approximately 16,600 whites, 31,300 free coloured, 11,000 free black, 311,000 enslaved) are as given in the nineteenth-century compilations and should be treated as estimates, save for the enslaved figure, which comes from the registration returns. George William Gordon's warning about being governed by such a governor is quoted as it appears in the standard accounts and is flagged for collation. The casualty figures for the suppression of the Morant Bay rebellion — 439 killed, some 354 executed after summary courts martial, about 600 flogged, over 1,000 houses burned — are those of the Royal Commission and the standard scholarship, and are contested at the margins; the number of whites killed by the rebels is variously given as around eighteen to twenty-five. The Royal Commission's findings are quoted from its report of 1866. The role of the Maroons in the suppression and in the capture of Paul Bogle is attested in the Commission's evidence and in the standard histories. The membership of the Jamaica Committee and the Eyre Defence Committee is as given in the contemporary record. The account of Crown Colony rule's public works and land settlement rests on the

standard economic histories of post-emancipation Jamaica and is paraphrased and credited; the judgement that it improved some conditions while foreclosing self-government is this study's, offered as an argument and not as a finding of fact.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH JAMAICA — MODULE 10

FIFTY-SIX BOROUGHS

> *Module 10 · Change and Collapse — how the order was destroyed by a schedule in an English electoral statute that does not mention Jamaica, what a rebellion actually contributes, and what the twenty millions bought*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

LANDSCAPE II — BRITAIN, 1823–1833

The metropolitan floor is reconstituted

This study opened by describing the England that took Jamaica: a regicide republic six years old, held by thirty thousand men under arms, hunting for a story that would let it put the sword down. It must now describe the Britain that let Jamaica go, because that is where the collapse happened. Not in the cane pieces of St James. In Westminster, in a fight about something else.

The Britain of the 1820s was a country that had won a world war and did not know what to do with the peace. There was distress in the manufacturing towns and in the countryside. There had been Peterloo in 1819 and the Six Acts after it. There were the Swing riots of 1830, and there was a revolution in Paris in the same summer, and there were men in England who thought another one was coming.

And in the space of five years, the constitution of the metropole was taken apart and rebuilt.

In **1828** the Test and Corporation Acts were repealed, and the Protestant Dissenters — the Baptists, the Methodists, the Congregationalists, the Quakers — were admitted to public office for the first time since the Restoration. Hold that date. The Nonconformists were the shock troops of British abolitionism: it was their chapels that raised the petitions,

their ministers who went to Jamaica, their congregations that gave up sugar. In 1828 they were let into public life.

In **1829** Catholic Emancipation passed, and it destroyed the Tory party — split it, brought down Wellington's government, and shattered the Anglican-Tory constitutional monopoly that had held since 1688.

And from **1830 to 1832** came the Reform crisis: three bills, two general elections, the Lords in revolt, the Days of May, the King forced to promise to create enough peers to swamp the upper house, and Wellington unable to form a ministry. Britain came nearer to revolution in the spring of 1832 than at any moment since the Glorious Revolution itself.

The Representation of the People Act received the royal assent on 7 June 1832. Attached to it was a table. **Schedule A: fifty-six boroughs which had returned members to Parliament were to return none at all.** Schedule B: thirty more were to return one instead of two.

That schedule is the most consequential document in the history of British colonial slavery, and it does not mention slavery. It does not mention Jamaica. It does not mention sugar, or Africa, or the West Indies, or a single human being held in bondage. It is a list of English market towns.

Who sat in those boroughs

The West India interest sat in those boroughs.

Module 8 has already established the shape of it: a bloc estimated at anywhere between twenty and sixty members, depending on how tightly one draws the definition — absentee planters, sugar merchants, colonial agents, and the friends and relations of all three — and a great many of them seated on exactly the kind of small, cheap, purchasable constituency that Schedule A abolished at a stroke.

In December 1832 the first election under the reformed system was held. The Agency Committee — a body formed in 1831 by the impatient wing of the abolition movement, which had broken with the gradualism of Wilberforce's heirs and demanded immediate emancipation — went out and bound parliamentary candidates to pledges. Over two hundred pledged men were returned.

By 1833 the Society of West India Planters and Merchants, the great lobby that had defended the plantation interest since 1775, had **eleven** members of Parliament left holding seats. Of those eleven, seven still troubled to attend its meetings.

Read that sequence again and mark what is absent from it. There is no moment at which the West India interest is defeated in debate. There is no vote it loses on the merits. There is no argument that breaks it. **The planters were not out-argued. Their seats were abolished** — by an Act concerning the representation of the people of England and Wales, passed for reasons that had nothing to do with them, in a crisis they had no part in.

And one more change, from below

There is a second shift in these years and it belongs in the landscape, because it shows the same pattern operating inside the abolition movement itself.

The Anti-Slavery Society of the 1820s was respectable, cautious and gradualist. It was outflanked. In 1824 a Leicester Quaker named Elizabeth Heyrick published a pamphlet called *Immediate, not Gradual Abolition*, and the women's anti-slavery associations that took up its argument — which raised money, ran the sugar boycott, and eventually funded the Agency Committee — forced the leadership's hand. The movement that abolished slavery in 1833 was not the movement Wilberforce had led. It had been captured from beneath by people who would not wait.

Elite chaos, in other words, was not confined to the pro-slavery side. It was general. The whole metropolitan political order was being reconstituted at once, and the Jamaican planter class — three thousand miles away, unrepresented in its own right, dependent on friends whose boroughs no longer existed — was a passenger.

❧

JAMAICA

The rumour

Now cross the water, and watch the seam fail in the direction nobody had planned for.

Module 7 established that the Jamaican seam was a barrier to attention rather than to information: the facts of the order were public in London and nobody looked. But a seam is a membrane, not a wall, and it does not choose which way things pass

through it. Through 1830 and 1831 the metropolitan argument about emancipation crossed the Atlantic — in the newspapers that arrived by every packet, read aloud by literate house servants; in the letters of the missionaries; in the talk of the Kingston wharves; and above all in the chapels and the class-leaders' meetings that Module 4 described.

And it arrived transformed. What the enslaved of western Jamaica came to believe, by the autumn of 1831, was that **the King had freed them, and the planters were holding them in slavery in defiance of the law.**

They believed, when it began, that the British troops would come over to their side.

That is the framework's finding, and it is worth stating flatly: **an order that maintains a seam cannot control the direction of the traffic.** The planters had spent a hundred and seventy years ensuring that nothing true about Jamaica would trouble England. They had no machinery whatever for stopping England from troubling Jamaica.

Sam Sharpe

Samuel Sharpe was an enslaved man on Croydon Estate in the parish of St James, and a deacon of the Baptist church at Montego Bay — a *daddy*, in the language of the Native Baptists, a class leader, one of the men who signed the tickets.

The Methodist missionary Henry Bleby visited him in his cell before his execution and published what he heard. Bleby found him *"certainly the most intelligent and remarkable slave I had ever met,"* and wrote:

> *"He thought and he had learned from the Bible that the whites had no more right to hold the black people in slavery than the black people had to make the white people slaves. Minister, he said, I would rather die upon yonder gallows than live in slavery."*

That is the stolen robe of Module 4, speaking in its own voice, in a prison cell, to a white minister who wrote it down. And it is unanswerable in the planter's own terms — which is exactly why, in 1805, the Assembly had made it illegal to preach.

What Sharpe planned was not a rising. It was a **general strike**.

He had understood the leverage with complete precision, and the leverage was the one Module 6 described. Cane must be cut at the moment of ripeness and crushed within hours, or the sugar will not crystallise. Crop begins after Christmas. A workforce that simply declines to return to the fields on the appointed morning does not have to burn anything: it stops the mill, and the mill cannot be restarted, and the crop rots in the field.

Sharpe proposed that the enslaved of the western parishes should refuse to work after the Christmas holiday unless they were paid wages, and should refuse peacefully.

On the night of 27 December 1831 the trash house at Kensington Estate was set alight, and it was out of his hands.

What followed lasted ten days. As many as sixty thousand people may have been involved — the figure is a contemporary estimate and should be treated as such. Estates burned across St James, Hanover, Westmoreland and Trelawny. Fourteen white people were killed. The militia and three regiments of regulars put it down, and the Maroons came out again under the sixth article of Cudjoe's treaty. Something over two hundred enslaved people were killed in the fighting, and several hundred more — the figures given range from about three hundred to well over five hundred — were executed afterwards, many of them after summary proceedings, some in public, with the heads displayed.

Martial law ran until February. Sam Sharpe was hanged in the square at Montego Bay on 23 May 1832. On the morning of his execution his owner's family brought him a clean white shirt.

What the rising did, and what it did not do

Here the study must be careful, because this is exactly the point at which a case study of this kind goes wrong, and the framework has a name for the error.

The Whig story is that the enslaved rose, and Britain repented, and slavery ended. It is a story about causation, and in that form the causation does not hold.

The rising did not free anybody. It was crushed in ten days by a colonial militia, three regiments, and a treaty signed ninety-two years earlier. Its leaders were hanged. Its people were flogged. And it was not the first: Tacky's Revolt in 1760 was, relative to the island's capacity to resist at the time, at least as dangerous — and it changed nothing whatever, except that it got Obeah made a capital offence.

So what was different in 1831?

Not the rising. **The ledger-holder.**

And this is the module's central contribution to the framework, and it rescues the Baptist War from both the hagiography and the dismissal:

> **A rebellion's causal contribution is almost always to the cost column, not to the decision. It changes the price of holding the order. Whether that price is paid depends entirely on who is holding the ledger when the bill arrives.**

In 1760 the bill for Tacky's Revolt arrived at a Parliament in which the men who owned the estates sat on boroughs of their own, in a metropole whose sugar was protected, whose robe was intact, and which had no alternative supplier and no reason to look for one. It was paid without comment.

In 1832 the bill for Sam Sharpe's rising — martial law, three regiments, two hundred and twenty-six damaged estates, a suspended crop — arrived at a Parliament that was six months from being dissolved and replaced by a different one, in a country whose Nonconformists had just been admitted to office, whose electorate was about to be reconstituted, and whose free traders were beginning to ask why the British breakfast table should subsidise a class of colonial proprietors at all.

Same act. Different ledger. And the second effect of the rising mattered more than the first, and it was an own goal: the chapel burnings, the Colonial Church Union, and William Knibb on a ship to England with a pair of iron shackles in his luggage. Module 7 has told that story. **The planters' response to the rising did more to end slavery than the rising did.**

The buy-out

The Slavery Abolition Act received the royal assent on 28 August 1833. Module 8 has already given its shape, and it need only be priced here.

Twenty million pounds — something on the order of forty per cent of the British government's annual expenditure — paid in compensation to over forty thousand claimants for the loss of their property in human beings. Fifteen million of it was borrowed, through the house of Rothschild. Not one penny of it went to a freed person.

And **apprenticeship**: the freed bound to work for their former owners, without wages, for something over forty hours a week — more if they were domestics — for six years in the case of field labourers. It was ended early, in 1838, after the abuses were documented and campaigned against.

Which means the emancipated of Jamaica paid for their own emancipation twice. Once in the unpaid labour of the apprenticeship, which was the balance of the purchase price. And once as subjects and eventually as citizens of the Empire whose taxes serviced the loan — for the borrowing raised to fund the Act was rolled over into the government's gilt programme, and ultimately into an undated bond, the 4% Consolidated Loan, which was redeemed on 1 February 2015. (The Treasury's own answer to a Freedom of Information request in 2018 states that the money borrowed to fund the Slavery Abolition Act was

therefore fully repaid in that year; how much of the original principal was still outstanding by then is not known, and the Treasury holds no record of the 1927 consolidation. The honest statement is the mechanism, not a figure.)

And on 9 February 2018, HM Treasury posted the following to its several hundred thousand followers on Twitter:

> *"Millions of you helped end the slave trade through your taxes."*

The tweet was deleted.

Three collapses, not one

The framework should stop speaking of *the* collapse of an order, because Jamaica had three, and they had almost nothing to do with each other.

1834. Slavery ended — abolished by a reformed Parliament, over the objections of a lobby whose seats had been abolished, and paid for by a loan.

1846. The planters' *economic* position ended, when the Sugar Duties Acts equalised the tariff and the protection that had been the whole basis of the plantation's margin was phased out to nothing by 1851 (Module 6). This was done by free traders in the same session as the repeal of the Corn Laws, and they were not thinking about Jamaica. They were thinking about the price of a British breakfast.

1866. The planters' *political* position ended, when the House of Assembly voted itself out of existence rather than share the island with a black electorate, and handed Jamaica to a governor and a nominated council of six (Module 9).

Three deaths, three causes, and only one of them had anything to do with the moral argument. Compress them into a single narrative called *the end of slavery* and you will get the history wrong and the mechanism wrong at the same time.

The robe recycled

One thing more, and it is the collapse's dividend.

Having abolished slavery at a cost of forty per cent of one year's public expenditure, Britain acquired something worth a great deal more than twenty million pounds. It acquired a **robe**.

The West Africa Squadron patrolled the Atlantic to suppress the trade. The anti-slavery treaties were pressed on every power that would sign and several that would not. The

doctrine of "legitimate commerce" — that Africa must be opened to trade in order to be closed to slaving — became the standing justification of British engagement with the continent. And within two generations, at Berlin and after, the partition of Africa was carried out and defended in the language of suppressing the Arab slave trade and civilising the interior.

The guilt of one colony became the licence for the next. The robe cut in London in 1833 was worn into Uganda and into Kenya, and this collection already contains the modules in which it was worn.

Module 12 will take that up properly. It is named here because it is what the twenty millions actually bought, and because a study that stopped at the compensation would have missed the transaction.

Reading the Jamaican collapse against the framework

Five contributions.

First: the order was not defeated in the colony. Its constituency in the metropole was abolished. The brief for this study predicted a collapse driven by the metropole's will emptying. Jamaica requires the prediction to be sharpened: **the will did not empty. The people holding it were replaced.** The British electorate that abolished slavery in 1833 was not the electorate of 1830 having changed its mind; it was a *different electorate*, constituted by an Act passed for other reasons, in which fifty-six boroughs — including many of the seats on which the West India interest had sat — simply ceased to exist. The framework should carry this as a distinct mechanism of collapse: **not conversion, but franchise.** An order that rests on a bloc of votes in a distant assembly can be destroyed by a reform of that assembly's electoral geography, without a single voter changing his mind about anything.

Second: a rebellion changes the price, not the decision. Tacky in 1760 and Sharpe in 1831 were both crushed, and both crushed easily. The difference lay entirely in who received the invoice. **The causal weight of a rising sits in the cost column; its effect is a function of the ledger-holder's balance sheet at the moment the bill arrives.** The same rising, ten years earlier, buys nothing. This is not a diminishment of the rebels; it is a statement about where their leverage actually was, and Sharpe — who planned a strike at the mill in crop time rather than a war — understood it better than most of his historians have.

Third: the seam leaks in both directions. The order maintained the seam to keep the metropole from attending to Jamaica. It had no instrument at all for keeping Jamaica from attending to the metropole, and in 1831 the metropolitan debate crossed the water and returned as the belief that the King had freed them. **An order that builds a membrane does not get to choose which way things pass through it.**

Fourth: the collapse of an order and the collapse of its elite are different events, and they can be decades apart. 1834, 1846, 1866. The framework should never again speak of a colonial collapse in the singular without asking *which* collapse, *whose*, and *by what agency*.

Fifth: the robe is recycled, and the recycling is sincere. Britain's abolition of slavery was real, was expensive, and was believed in — and it became, within a generation, the moral warrant for the conquest of Africa. **The guilt of one colony is the licence for the next.** And the recycling works precisely *because* it is not cynical: a nation that has genuinely paid a price for a moral act acquires, in its own eyes, a standing that it will then spend. The framework should watch for this everywhere, and it should note, without comment, that in February 2018 a British government department reminded its citizens that their taxes had helped end the slave trade.

Legibility is not pardon — and it must be said in the other direction too, because this module has spent a great deal of effort demonstrating that Sam Sharpe's rising did not, in the strict causal sense, free anyone. That is a claim about mechanism. It is not a claim about worth, and the framework should be honest that it has no instrument for measuring worth at all. A man said that he would rather die on the gallows than live in slavery, and then he did, and the sentence he spoke is true whether or not it moved a single vote in Westminster. The arithmetic of this study can tell you why an order fell. It cannot tell you what was owed to the people who refused to live inside it, and it should not pretend to be able to.

A note on sources. The provisions of the Representation of the People Act 1832 — Schedule A (fifty-six boroughs wholly disfranchised) and Schedule B (thirty partially) — are from the statute. The repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts (1828), Catholic Emancipation (1829), and the course of the Reform crisis are from the standard constitutional histories. Elizabeth Heyrick's *Immediate, not Gradual Abolition* (1824), the role of the women's associations, and the formation of the Agency Committee in 1831 are given from the standard histories of the abolition movement and are paraphrased and credited. The figures for the West India interest in Parliament (twenty to sixty members on varying definitions; eleven Society-affiliated MPs holding seats in 1833, of whom seven attended meetings; over two hundred pledged candidates returned in December 1832) are as given in Module 8, from the recent scholarship on the Society's minute books. Henry Bleby's report of his conversations with Samuel Sharpe, including the words *"I would rather die upon yonder gallows than live in slavery,"* is quoted from *Death Struggles of Slavery* (London, 1853), a

public-domain text; the wording is given as it appears in the standard reproductions and should be collated against an original printing. Figures for the rising of 1831–32 are contested throughout and are given as ranges: participants (as many as sixty thousand, a contemporary estimate); white deaths (fourteen); enslaved killed in the fighting (over two hundred); enslaved executed afterwards (variously reported between about three hundred and over five hundred); estates damaged (some two hundred and twenty-six). The terms of the Slavery Abolition Act 1833 — the twenty million pounds, the fifteen million borrowed through Rothschild, the over forty thousand claimants, and the apprenticeship — are from the Act and the standard accounts; the distribution of the compensation is from Nicholas Draper and the Legacies of British Slavery project. The account of the loan's consolidation into the 4% Consolidated Loan and its redemption on 1 February 2015 is quoted from HM Treasury's response to a Freedom of Information request of February 2018 (FOI2018-00186); the caveat that the proportion of the original principal outstanding at the 1927 consolidation is unknown is the Treasury's own, and this study does not go beyond it. The HM Treasury tweet of 9 February 2018 was widely reported before its deletion and is quoted from those reports. The Williams thesis and Drescher's *Econocide* remain, as in Module 6, a live and unresolved dispute, and no figure is offered here for the profitability of the British slave system at the point of abolition; the structural observation this study does make — that the planter's margin rested on a tariff, and that a tariff is a political asset — does not depend on the outcome of that dispute.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH JAMAICA — MODULE 11

FORTY THOUSAND NAMES

> *Module 11 · The Grim Accounting — what the order built, where it built it, what it cost, and why the record we have is a record of who was paid*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The column that is supposed to contain the achievements

The discipline of this collection is to credit the achievement without swallowing the self-justification, and it has never yet been difficult. France built roads and ports and hospitals in Algeria, and a great white city at Algiers, and the study said so. France gave Vietnam a written alphabet that a peasant could learn in a season, and schools, and a railway, and the study said so. Britain drove a railway through Kenya and planted a cotton economy in Buganda, and those studies said so — and then set the cost beside it and left the sum to the reader.

So: what did Britain build in Jamaica?

One hundred and seventy-nine years of slavery, in the single richest colony of the largest empire on earth. Take the inventory honestly, and give it every advantage.

There are **roads** — running from the estates to the ports, cut and metalled by the enslaved. There are **harbours**, and there are genuinely beautiful Georgian towns: Falmouth, Montego Bay, Spanish Town, the wharves of Kingston, built with sugar money by enslaved masons and carpenters whose work still stands. There are the **estates** themselves — the aqueducts, the water-wheels, the boiling houses, the stills — and Module 6 has already conceded that these were among the most advanced productive installations in the world of their day. There are the **great houses**. There is the **common law**, with its courts and its juries and its habeas corpus, which Module 9 has already examined and found to be a caste privilege. There is the **English language**. There are the parish churches, and eventually cricket.

And there is the **breadfruit**.

Two naval expeditions were sent across the world to fetch it. The first ended in the most famous mutiny in the history of the Royal Navy. The second succeeded, and in 1793 William Bligh landed breadfruit plants in Jamaica, and they took, and the tree is now so much a part of the island that it is hard to imagine the place without it.

It was brought there to feed the enslaved more cheaply than imported salt fish could.

That is a genuine feat of botany, seamanship, and imperial logistics, undertaken at public expense across two voyages and eighteen thousand miles, and it exists because somebody in London did a sum about the cost of feeding people he owned. It stands as the emblem of the whole column, and the column is otherwise almost empty. **No university. No school system. No public health service. No native administration. No press, no literature, no learned society, nothing whatever for the three hundred thousand people who were the colony.**

Why the column is empty

The framework should not treat this as neglect, or as cruelty, or as an oversight that a better class of governor might have remedied. It is a structural consequence, and it follows directly from Modules 4 and 6.

A coloniser builds infrastructure for people he has to bargain with.

France built schools in Vietnam because she needed a native administration to run a country of twenty million with a handful of Frenchmen, and needed a market to sell into, and needed a mandarinate she could not simply abolish. Britain drove the railway into Kenya because she needed to move goods, and later needed to govern people whose labour she had to *induce*, however brutally, rather than simply own. In every case there was a counterparty — a peasantry, a chieftaincy, a clergy, a class of évolués — and something had to be given to it, however grudgingly and however little.

Jamaica had no counterparty. The order owned its workforce outright, replaced the wastage by purchase, and sold into a market protected by statute. It needed nothing from the people on the island except their bodies, and it needed no consent from anyone at all.

Enter it in the framework in these terms: **the "development" of a colony is a function of the coloniser's need for the colonised, not of his benevolence. Where he needs nothing from them but their labour, and can buy replacements, he will build the road to the port and stop.** The empty column is not a failure of the Jamaican order. It is the Jamaican order, seen from the side.

Where the buildings actually are

And the wealth did not stay, because Module 6 has already shown where it went: through the London commission houses, into the mortgages, out to the absentees.

So the honest place to look for the achievement of British Jamaica is not Kingston. It is Yorkshire.

Harewood House, built on the Lascelles' West Indian fortune. Fonthill, built on the Beckfords' Jamaican estates. The docks of Liverpool, the counting-houses of Bristol, the Glasgow tobacco-and-sugar merchant palaces, the country seats, the parliamentary boroughs, the collections, the libraries, the foundations, the schools endowed by men whose money came out of the boiling houses of St James. **The built environment of British Jamaica is in England**, and that is not a rhetorical flourish. It is what total extraction looks like on a map. The reason the achievement column in Jamaica is thin is that its contents were cashed and shipped.

And the one entry that does exist

There is a development column for Jamaica, and Module 9 has already delivered its uncomfortable finding. Almost everything in it dates from **after the planters lost power**.

Sir John Peter Grant, sent out after Morant Bay, reformed the courts and took the planter magistrates off the bench. A constabulary was established. Public works were undertaken. The first large-scale irrigation project came in 1868. The Jamaica Agricultural Society was founded in 1895. The Crown Lands Settlement Scheme of the 1890s let smallholders buy land on terms they could meet.

All of it under Crown Colony rule. All of it done by an appointed governor and a nominated council of six, in a colony that had just abolished its own two-hundred-year-old representative assembly rather than share it.

Record that in the ledger and leave it there. It does not resolve into a moral, and this study will not force one.

The cost column

Now the other side, and it requires no commentary at all.

Between roughly **seven hundred and fifty thousand and nine hundred and thirty thousand** African captives were landed in Jamaica between the conquest and the abolition

of the trade. At the abolition of slavery in 1834 the enslaved population of the island stood at **311,070**.

The difference is not a statistic. The difference is the order.

Deaths exceeded births, year upon year, by something like three per cent per annum across the eighteenth century. On Edward Long's own estate at Lucky Valley there were seventy-two deaths and thirty-seven births in six years, and he attributed it to the diseases the Africans had brought with them.

The mechanisms are already in this study and need only be named again, without elaboration, because elaboration would be a kind of consumption. The fortnightly search of every dwelling for wooden swords. The nose slit and the face burned for a second offence. The master accountable to no law for a death under punishment, and thirty pounds to the King for a wanton one. Five pounds from the public purse for a runaway brought in dead. The axe kept beside the rollers, because stopping the mill cost more than an arm. The gibbet at the crossroads with a living man in it. And, on one estate in Westmoreland, recorded in his own diary by an overseer named Thomas Thistlewood in the plainest and most bookkeeping prose, a catalogue of sexual and scatological torture so exact that the historians who work on it — Trevor Burnard above all — have had to argue about how much of it a reader can be asked to bear. This study will not reproduce it. It records that it exists, that it was written down by the man who did it, and that he was not an outlaw or a monster in the eyes of his neighbours but a respectable member of the parish who dined with the magistrates.

The risings, and their answers. **Tacky's Revolt**, 1760: some four hundred rebels killed, the leaders burned alive or hung in iron cages to die of thirst. **The Baptist War**, 1831–32: fourteen white people killed; over two hundred enslaved killed in the fighting; somewhere between three hundred and more than five hundred executed afterwards. **Morant Bay**, 1865: four hundred and thirty-nine killed, some three hundred and fifty-four executed after summary courts martial, about six hundred flogged including women, over a thousand houses burned.

"For themselves and posterity for ever"

And then the Maroons, because the arc that began in Module 5 has to be closed here, in the accounting, and it closes badly.

Article III of the treaty of 1739 granted Cudjoe's people the lands between Trelawny Town and the Cockpits — fifteen hundred acres — *"for themselves and posterity for ever."*

In 1795 two Trelawny Town Maroons were convicted of stealing pigs and sentenced to be flogged. The flogging was administered — by the account that has come down — at the hands of a runaway slave whom the Maroons had themselves captured and returned to the authorities, under Article IX, for their ten shillings.

The treaty's own instrument was turned on them. They rose. It became the Second Maroon War, and it was fought, on the British side, in the shadow of Saint-Domingue: the Haitian Revolution was in progress a few days' sail away, and the Jamaican authorities were in no mood to leave an armed and undefeated black polity in the mountains.

General George Walpole negotiated a surrender. Its terms were that the Maroons would beg the King's pardon on their knees, return all runaways, and be resettled **within Jamaica**. Walpole gave them his word — his personal word, as an officer — that they would not be transported off the island.

The Earl of Balcarres, the governor, gave them three days to come in, and when most of them did not make the deadline he declared the treaty breached, and deported them.

Something like five hundred and eighty-one people — the majority of them women and children — were put aboard the *Dover*, the *Mary* and the *Anne* in 1796 and shipped to Halifax, Nova Scotia. Seventeen died on the voyage. Nineteen more died in the first Canadian winter. Fifty-eight escaped the ships and stayed in Jamaica. In 1800 the survivors were loaded onto vessels again and carried to Sierra Leone, where they were used to suppress a rebellion of the Black Nova Scotians and were rewarded with the rebels' houses and land.

The Jamaica Assembly auctioned Trelawny Town's fifteen hundred acres to help defray the cost of the war. The town itself was converted into a military barracks, and renamed Maroon Town.

General Walpole was disgusted. He refused the ceremonial sword the Assembly voted him, resigned his commission, went home, got himself elected to the House of Commons, and stood up and told them that he had given his word and that the governor had made a liar of him. Henry Dundas, the Secretary of War, backed the governor. Nothing was done.

"For themselves and posterity for ever." **Fifty-seven years.**

That entry belongs in the accounting because it settles something the framework has been circling since Module 5. The Maroons of 1739 were not fools and they were not cowards and this study will not permit them to be treated as villains. They made the only bargain that was available to two hundred and thirty-one men in a mountain, and they kept it — they kept it in 1760, and in 1831, and in 1865 when they took Paul Bogle out of the bush and handed him over. And when the order no longer needed them, it broke the bargain, seized the land, sold it, and shipped them to Canada.

The satrap's bargain is not a bad bargain because the satrap is weak. It is a bad bargain because the other party writes the termination clause.

The other dead

The framework's honesty requires one more entry, and then requires that the entry be immediately qualified, because a half-honest ledger is worse than none.

The order killed white people too, in numbers that appalled contemporaries. Trevor Burnard's work on Jamaican mortality has established that the island destroyed its colonists at a rate that made the white population, like the black one, dependent on continuous replacement from outside. The soldiers of the Western Design rotted where they landed. The Irish and Scots prisoners and the transported vagrants and the indentured servants of the first decades died in droves. Bookkeepers and overseers died at thirty of fevers nobody understood. The machine consumed everyone who entered it.

Record it. It is true, and it is a fact about the machine.

And then say the rest of it plainly, because a reader is entitled to be protected from a false equivalence that the mere presence of two numbers in the same paragraph will otherwise create. The white man came, in the overwhelming main, voluntarily, to get rich; he could leave, and Module 5 showed that he did, in such numbers that the floor could not be manned. The African came in a hold. The two costs are not commensurable, they do not offset, and nothing in this ledger balances anything else in it. **The order consumed its own agents. That is a description of the machinery, not a mitigation of the crime.**

The machine restarts

And when it was over, it was not over.

From 1845 the planters of Jamaica began importing indentured labourers from India, and later from China — on the order of thirty to forty thousand people from India across the following seventy years — for a purpose nobody troubled to conceal: to supply a workforce that could not walk away, and thereby to destroy the bargaining power of the freed. The provision grounds had made the freedmen into smallholders who could refuse a wage. The remedy was to import people who could not refuse.

Emancipation did not end the search for human beings who could be made to work on terms they had not chosen. **It changed the paperwork.**

The record

And now the last entry, and the one this module is named for.

The single finest archive of British slavery in existence is the **compensation record of 1834**. Over forty thousand claims. Each one named. Each one valued, adjudicated, cross-referenced and preserved. From it, historians have been able to reconstruct the ownership of British Caribbean slavery in extraordinary detail — the merchants and the mortgagees, the clergymen and the widows, the country houses and the boroughs and the banks, family by family, street by street, to the shilling.

It names the claimants.

The people they were compensated *for* appear in it as numbers.

Module 6 predicted this and did not know how exact the prediction would prove. An extraction that requires no mechanism generates no documents about the extracted. The Kenyan carries a *kipande* with his name in it. The Ugandan grower can point to a price and a ginner. The Algerian can name the fifth. The Jamaican appears in the census of 1661 in a list between the women and the arms; in a land patent as the consideration tendered for a hundred acres; in a triennial return as an increase or a decrease; and in the compensation ledger of 1834 as a valuation.

We know, to the shilling, what they were worth. We do not know most of their names.

That is not an accident of preservation, and it is not the fault of the archive. It is the order's own filing system, working exactly as it was designed to work, and still working now — because the reason the history of who *profited* from Jamaican slavery can be written with far greater precision than the history of who *suffered* it is that Britain kept careful records of the things it valued, and the people were not among them.

Reading the Jamaican accounting against the framework

Five contributions.

First: the development column can be empty, and when it is empty it is empty for a reason. Infrastructure is what a coloniser builds for people he must bargain with. Where extraction is total (Module 6) and formation is withheld (Module 4), there is nobody to bargain with, and the coloniser builds the road to the port and stops. **Development is a function of the coloniser's need, not of his benevolence** — and the corpus should

therefore expect the *thinnest* development records in precisely the colonies that were most profitable, which inverts the intuition that wealth trickles into public works.

Second: the built environment of a plantation colony is located in the metropole. Do not look for what Jamaica built in Jamaica. Look in Yorkshire, in Wiltshire, on the Liverpool waterfront. **Total extraction is legible as architecture, three thousand miles from where it was earned.**

Third: what was built in Jamaica was built after the plurality was abolished. Courts, constabulary, irrigation, land settlement — all of it Crown Colony work, done by an autocracy, after the Assembly voted itself away rather than share. This is Module 9's uncomfortable coda restated as a line in a ledger, and the framework should carry it *unresolved*, because resolving it would require choosing between two goods and this study does not have the standing to choose.

Fourth: the satrap's bargain contains a termination clause, and the satrap does not write it. Fifteen hundred acres, "for themselves and posterity for ever," granted in 1739 to the one force the order could not beat; auctioned in 1796, the people deported to Canada, the town turned into a barracks. The Maroons kept every article of that treaty for fifty-seven years, including the ones that cost them their honour. It did not save them. **A bargain with an order is only as durable as the order's need for you**, and the framework should say so wherever it finds an auxiliary, a client, a *harki*, a chief, a loyal battalion.

Fifth, and methodologically the most important: an order's archive is its moral system, made durable — and it is still operating. We can name over forty thousand people who were paid for the abolition of slavery in Jamaica. We cannot name most of the three hundred and eleven thousand people they were paid for. That asymmetry is not a gap in the record; it *is* the record, functioning precisely as designed. **A historian who works from the surviving documents without noticing whose documents they are will reproduce the order's priorities exactly**, and will do so in perfectly good faith, and will produce a history in which the owners are individuals and the owned are a quantity. That is the trap this collection was built to see, and Jamaica is where it is most nearly inescapable.

Legibility is not pardon. To lay out this ledger is not to have settled it, and this study will not perform the settlement. It will say only that the sums are here, that they were done by the people who did them, in their own hands, in their own account books, and that they came out right.

A note on sources. Population figures are as established in Module 5 and carry the same ranges and caveats: African captives disembarked in Jamaica (roughly 750,000–930,000); the enslaved population at abolition (311,070, from the registration returns); the excess of deaths over births (in the region of three per cent per annum through the eighteenth century); Long's Lucky Valley figures (seventy-two deaths, thirty-seven births, 1779–85, from his 1788 letter to Pitt as reported in the recent scholarship). Casualty figures for Tacky's Revolt, the Baptist War and the Morant Bay rebellion are as given in Modules 5, 9 and 10, and are contested at the margins; ranges are given rather than single figures. The account of the Second Maroon War — the flogging of the two Trelawny Town Maroons, Walpole's terms and his personal undertaking, Balcarres's three-day ultimatum, the deportation of about 581 people (some accounts say just under 600) aboard the *Dover*, *Mary* and *Anne* in 1796, the seventeen deaths at sea and nineteen in the first Nova Scotian winter, the fifty-eight who avoided the ships, the removal to Sierra Leone in 1800, the auction of the Trelawny Town lands, and Walpole's resignation and protest in the Commons — is given from the standard scholarship (Campbell, Chopra, Siva) and from the Nova Scotia archival record, and is paraphrased and credited rather than quoted; the figures vary slightly between accounts and are given as reported. Article III of the treaty of 1739 (*"for themselves and posterity for ever"*) is quoted exactly, as in Module 5. Bligh's delivery of breadfruit to Jamaica in 1793 and its purpose as a cheap food for the enslaved are from the standard accounts of the *Providence* voyage. Thomas Thistlewood's diaries are, as in Module 7, deliberately not quoted; the account here rests on Trevor Burnard's scholarship and is credited to it. The figures for Indian indentured migration to Jamaica from 1845 (on the order of thirty to forty thousand across the period to the First World War) are approximate and should be verified before publication. The compensation records — over forty thousand claims — and the reconstruction of British slave ownership derived from them are the work of the Legacies of British Slavery project (Draper, Hall and others), whose findings are paraphrased and credited; the argument made here about what that archive's asymmetry means is this study's own.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH JAMAICA — MODULE 12

THE SAME BOOK

> *Module 12 · Convergence and Divergence — what Jamaica shares with the collection, why it did not become Haiti, and the strongest case for the defence, stated fully and answered*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

What converges

Set Jamaica beside the other studies in this collection and most of it is familiar, which is the point of a framework.

The floor. Force first, always; the robe afterwards. Jamaica laid its floor in a legal vacuum and wrote the code before it had a story, exactly as the framework predicts.

The reversed robe. Cut for the metropole, never for the conquered — and in Jamaica the prediction is exceeded, because the founding justification of the conquest does not merely fail to address the islanders. It does not mention them.

The satrap's bargain. Juan de Bolas in 1660; Cudjoe in 1739; the Maroons of Moore Town taking Paul Bogle out of the bush in 1865. Set them beside the Ganda chiefs of the 1900 Agreement, beside the Algerian *caïds*, beside the *harkis*. It is the same instrument every time: the order meets a force it cannot beat, and hires it — and then, when it no longer needs it, discards it, because the other party writes the termination clause.

The naturalisation arc. Samuel Long came ashore in 1655 as a lieutenant in a beaten army. His great-grandson Edward Long, judge and taxonomist, sat down in 1774 to explain in the language of natural history why the world his ancestor's sword had made was simply the way the world *was*. *The Architect and the Inheritor*, running its entire course inside one family tree — and running faster in Jamaica than anywhere else in the collection, because there was no incumbent order to overcome and no conquered population to absorb.

Convergence without contact. The Assembly at Spanish Town in 1664 and John Locke in Shaftesbury's study in 1669 wrote the same clause — absolute dominion for the master, twelve peers for the freeman, and the express provision that the slave's belief alters

nothing — with no communication and no common draft. *No Hidden Hand*, arriving unbidden in two legal documents five years apart.

Retail enfranchisement. The private Acts *"with certain restrictions"* are the Algerian naturalisation-by-application, the Vietnamese *évolué*, the Portuguese *assimilado*, the advanced native, the exempted, the certificated. Wherever a colonial order faces a class it cannot suppress and will not admit, it admits them one at a time, by name, for a fee.

The great divergence: why Jamaica was not Haiti

But there is one comparison that every reader of this study has been carrying since Module 1, and it deserves a direct answer rather than a graceful evasion.

Saint-Domingue and Jamaica were the same machine. The same crop. The same emptied field, the same imported subject, the same ratio of ten to one and worse. The same mountains and the same maroons in them. The same two deaths for every birth. The French colony was, by 1789, richer than the British one, and crueller, and its planters were as confident and as leveraged and as absent.

Saint-Domingue produced the only successful slave revolution in the history of the world.

Jamaica produced Sam Sharpe, and a hanging in a square.

Why?

Not because the enslaved of Jamaica were less brave, or less numerous, or less capable, or less desperate. They rose in 1673, in 1690, in 1760, in 1776, in 1824, in 1831. They fought a guerrilla war in the mountains for eighty-four years and were never beaten. They organised through chapels and provision grounds and Sunday markets and oaths. Everything the enslaved of Saint-Domingue did, the enslaved of Jamaica did, and did repeatedly, and paid for.

The difference is in the metropole, and this study has been assembling the answer for eleven modules:

First, the floor was never withdrawn. In 1789 the French state began to destroy itself, and by 1793 the floor in Saint-Domingue had evaporated: the garrison dissolved, the colonial administration split three and four ways, the metropole's authority became a matter of which faction's commissioners had landed most recently, and into that gap the enslaved walked. Britain's state never faltered. Through the American war, through the French wars, through Reform and Chartism, the three thousand regulars stayed in Kingston, and after 1793 they were reinforced, and the Royal Navy stayed on the station.

Second, the Maroons were bought (Module 5). Saint-Domingue's were not.

Third, the intermediate caste was admitted in 1830 — and fought for the order in 1831 (Modules 8 and 9). Saint-Domingue's *gens de couleur* were refused, and Vincent Ogé was broken on the wheel for asking, and they turned.

Fourth, the elite never defected (Module 8). Saint-Domingue's *grands blancs* flirted with autonomy in 1789 and destroyed themselves.

Jamaica did not become Haiti because Britain did not become France.

That is the coldest sentence in this study, and it should be read without triumph and without condescension in any direction. It says nothing about the courage of the people who rose. It says everything about where the decisive variable sat. **The thing that had to break was three thousand miles away, and it did not break.**

The counter-position

Now the obligation this collection places on its final module: state the strongest case for the defence, fully, in its own voice, and answer it without flinching.

The counter-position is not the planters'. That case is dead, and this study has spent eleven modules killing it, and it deserved to die.

The counter-position is **Britain's**, and it is formidable.

Grant every word of it. Grant the axe beside the rollers and the nose slit and the face burned. Grant the two deaths for every birth, and the ten shillings a head, and the forty thousand names in the compensation ledger and the nameless three hundred thousand beneath them. It is all true, and Britain did it, and there is no defence of it and none is offered.

And then look at what Britain also did — and find its equal anywhere in the recorded history of the world.

In 1807, at the very height of the trade's profitability, in the fifteenth year of a war for national survival, with every rival power expanding its own slaving, the British Parliament abolished the slave trade.

In 1833 it abolished slavery itself, and it paid for it: twenty million pounds, something on the order of forty per cent of a year's entire public expenditure, borrowed and serviced for generations. Name another empire that has purchased the freedom of other men's slaves at that price.

And then, for more than half a century, it maintained a naval squadron off West Africa for the sole purpose of preventing other nations from doing what it had itself done. Between 1808 and 1860 the West Africa Squadron seized some sixteen hundred slave ships and freed on the order of a hundred and fifty thousand human beings. Roughly sixteen hundred of its own sailors died on that station in the middle decades of the century, most of them of fever, in what naval men considered the worst posting in the service. Two serious political scientists, Pape and Kaufmann, have described it as **the most expensive international moral action in modern history** *— and it is not obvious that they are wrong.*

And none of this was imposed on Britain by anybody. It was done by Britons. By Quakers. By Thomas Clarkson, who rode tens of thousands of miles round the ports of England collecting sworn evidence from sailors. By Elizabeth Heyrick, who would not wait. By the women's associations who ran the boycott and funded the Agency Committee. By hundreds of thousands of ordinary people who gave up the sugar in their tea and signed petitions in a country where most of them had no vote to give.

So name the cost. Name every entry. But do not pretend that the civilisation which built the plantation did not also build the thing that destroyed it — and do not pretend that the destroying thing came from somewhere else. It came from the same Bible, the same common law, the same Parliament, and the same people.

The answer

That is the case, and this study will not sneer at it, because it is true. The answer has four movements, and none of them is a dodge.

First: concede it, entirely

It is all true, and it is not a small thing, and there is no honest way round it.

The Quakers meant it. Clarkson meant it. The men who died of fever off Ouidah meant it. Knibb meant it. And the sums were real — the twenty millions were not a gesture, they were a very large fraction of the fiscal capacity of a state that had just fought Napoleon for a generation.

And here the study's own findings must be turned in the counter-position's favour, because honesty requires it. Module 4 called the Baptist faith of the Jamaican chapels a **stolen robe**. That was not quite right, and the correction matters. It was not stolen. It was **given** — by people who did not understand what they were handing over.

When Samuel Sharpe told Henry Bleby in his cell at Montego Bay that he had learned from the Bible that the whites had no more right to hold black people in slavery than black people had to enslave whites, he was telling the exact truth about where he had learned it. **The creed contained its own refutation.** It contained it all along, and it went on containing it through every year in which Edward Long was drawing his taxonomic diagrams, and in the end the refutation was picked up and used.

That is a fact about the creed, and it belongs to the creed's credit, and this study records it as such.

Second: set the findings alongside, without withdrawing the concession

And yet.

Module 10: it was not a conversion. It was a **franchise**. The Parliament that abolished slavery in 1833 was not the Parliament of 1830 having changed its mind; it was a *different* Parliament, produced by an Act whose Schedule A abolished fifty-six English boroughs for reasons that had nothing whatever to do with Jamaica. The West India interest was never out-argued. Its seats ceased to exist.

Module 8: it was not defeated. It was **paid** — twenty million pounds, on terms Canning had specified for it a decade earlier, voted by a House in which it held eleven seats. And the money went, in large part, not to Jamaica but to mortgagees and annuitants

in Britain, because the estates had been drained into London long before the people on them were freed.

Module 6: and the plantation's real economic base was not slavery at all. It was the **tariff** — and the tariff was demolished in 1846 by free traders who were not thinking about slavery, in the same session as the Corn Laws, because they were thinking about the price of a British breakfast.

Module 11: and the finest archive of the entire business names forty thousand claimants, and counts the people they were paid for.

None of that makes the moral achievement false. It makes it **partial, purchased, and contingent** — and those are three quite different things from *insincere*. A framework that cannot hold "they meant it" and "it happened because fifty-six boroughs were abolished" in the same hand is not a framework.

Third: what the achievement was then used for

And now the movement that must not flinch.

Britain did not merely abolish slavery. It **became the nation that had abolished slavery** — and Module 3 established, at some length, what such a self-description is.

It is a robe.

And a robe is spent.

The West Africa Squadron was sincere and its dead were real, and it was also the instrument by which Britain acquired the right to stop and search any vessel on the Atlantic; and treaty ports; and coaling stations; and Freetown; and Lagos, annexed in 1861 on anti-slavery grounds and never given back. The suppression of the "Arab slave trade" was the explicit, repeated, and entirely public warrant for the British penetration of East Africa — Zanzibar, the Imperial British East Africa Company, the Uganda Protectorate. The Brussels Act of 1890 dressed the partition of a continent in the language of emancipation, and the men who signed it were not lying.

And in 1923 the Devonshire Declaration announced that in Kenya *"the interests of the African natives must be paramount."* This collection contains the modules that describe what that paramountcy consisted of: the *kipande* round the neck, the reserves, the forced labour, the Emergency, the camps.

The guilt of one colony became the licence for the next.

And the licence worked *because it had been earned*. This is the point, and it is the study's central contribution to the framework, and it is worth stating with as little ornament as possible:

> **A robe you have genuinely paid for is the strongest robe there is.**

Hypocrisy is weak. It can be exposed, and once exposed it stops working. But a nation that has really spent forty per cent of a year's revenue, and really buried its sailors off the fever coast, and really given up the sugar in its tea, acquires in its own eyes a **standing** — and it will spend that standing, and it will spend it in perfectly good conscience, and the men who spend it will not be able to hear the objection, because they know what their fathers paid.

A robe of interest recruits a man's greed. A robe of expiation recruits his self-respect. And a man defending his self-respect will go very much further than a man defending his money.

The framework's last finding, then: a moral achievement does not retire. It is capitalised. And the question this collection must henceforth ask of every great act of public conscience is not only whether it was sincere — it usually was — but **what was subsequently bought with it, and from whom, and at what price.**

(And note, as a small and exact illustration, that the price is still being marked up. The West Africa Squadron's dead numbered somewhere around sixteen hundred men between 1830 and 1865. The figure that circulates in British public argument today is seventeen or twenty thousand. Nobody decided to inflate it. The robe simply grew, as robes do, in the direction its wearers needed. And in February 2018 a British government department reminded several hundred thousand followers that *"Millions of you helped end the slave trade through your taxes."* The tweet was deleted.)

Fourth: and do not let the answer become cynicism

Because cynicism is the mirror-image of the flattery this study refuses, and it is exactly as lazy, and it would be the last betrayal of the people this study is about.

The abolition of British colonial slavery is one of the very few events in this entire collection in which an order acted **against** its own extraction column, at a real and quantified cost, because a great many ordinary people came to believe that it was wrong. Landscape II explains how that became *possible*. It does not explain it *away*. The Reform Act made the arithmetic work; it did not make anybody give up sugar, or ride ten thousand miles collecting depositions, or sail to Jamaica to preach in a colony that would burn your chapel, or stand up in the House of Commons like General Walpole and say that he had given his word and been made a liar of.

So divide the credit, and divide it honestly.

To the Quakers, and Clarkson, and Heyrick, and the women's associations, who did an extraordinary and expensive thing that nobody made them do.

To a schedule in an electoral statute, which made it arithmetically possible.

To the Baptist War, which set the price.

To William Knibb, who was handed the shackles by the men who burned his chapel.

And to **Samuel Sharpe** — who read the book the order had spent a century and a half refusing to teach him, and understood it better than Edward Long ever did, and said so to a Methodist minister in a cell, and was hanged in the square at Montego Bay on 23 May 1832 wearing a clean white shirt that his owner's family had brought him that morning.

Long and Sharpe read the same book.

One of them used it to prove that the other was a different species of the same genus. The other used it to prove that no man may own another. Both were literate, both were Jamaican, both were sincere, and only one of them was right — and he was hanged for it, and it took the House of Commons a further sixteen months to agree with him.

That the order contained the argument which destroyed it is to the order's credit. That it hanged the man who made the argument is not. Both sentences are true, and a framework which can hold only one of them is not a framework. It is a party.

Reading Jamaica against the framework — the final contributions

First: the metropole's stability is the colony's fate. Jamaica did not become Haiti because Britain did not become France. In a colony whose floor is imported, the decisive variable is not the courage of the governed, the competence of the elite, or the ratio of the population. It is the structural integrity of a state on the other side of an ocean. The framework should say this plainly and stop apologising for it: **in the colonial bend, the outcome is decided in the metropole, and everything that happens in the colony is a bid.**

Second: a moral achievement is capitalised, not retired. Ask always what was bought with it.

Third: a robe that has been paid for is stronger than one that has not, because it recruits its wearer's self-respect rather than his interest — and self-respect is a deeper reservoir than greed. This is the sharpest single revision this study makes to the framework's account of the robe, and it is the most uncomfortable, because it means that the *better* an order's best act, the *more dangerous* the licence it acquires.

Fourth: the creed contains its own refutation, and the refutation must be picked up by the people it was denied to, at their own cost. Nobody hands it over. Long and Sharpe read the same book; only one of them was hanged for what he found in it.

Fifth, and finally: the framework's own limit. This study can tell you why an order stood for a hundred and seventy-nine years, and why it fell, and who paid, and who was paid. It has no instrument whatever for measuring what was owed. It should not pretend to have one, and it should not be used as though it did. **Legibility is not pardon; and it is not absolution, and it is not accounting, and it is certainly not the last word.** It is only a way of seeing the machine — which frees nobody, restrains nobody, and, as Thomas Gage demonstrated in 1648 by naming the floor of force and then sailing with the fleet, can be picked up and used as a warrant by anyone at all.

That is why this collection is *tested, never revealed*. A revealed truth commands. A tested one can only be checked — and must be, and by somebody else, and preferably by somebody with an interest in finding it wrong.

A note on sources. The figures cited in the counter-position are given as accurately as the record permits, and one of them deliberately corrects a common inflation. The West Africa Squadron seized approximately 1,600 vessels and freed on the order of 150,000 people between 1808 and 1860, intercepting an estimated six to ten per cent of the illicit trade; approximately 1,587 of its men died on that station between 1830 and 1865, principally of disease (the figure is the National Museum of the Royal Navy's), and independent fact-checking of the widely circulated claim of 17,000 to 20,000 naval deaths finds it unsupportable, with an estimate of around 2,000 deaths from all causes between 1825 and 1865. The characterisation of the Squadron as "the most expensive international moral action in modern history" is Robert Pape and Chaim Kaufmann's and is credited to them. The terms of the Slavery Abolition Act 1833, the twenty million pounds and its proportion of public expenditure, the apprenticeship, and the HM Treasury statement of February 2018 are as given in Modules 8 and 10. The account of Clarkson's evidence-gathering, Heyrick's *Immediate, not Gradual Abolition* (1824), the women's associations, and the petition campaigns rests on the standard histories of British abolitionism and is paraphrased and credited; no precise figure for petition signatures is offered here, since the published estimates vary and the point does not require one. The annexation of Lagos in 1861 on anti-slavery grounds, the anti-slavery warrant for the East African penetration, and the Brussels Act of 1890 are given from the standard imperial histories. The Devonshire Declaration of 1923 is quoted from the White Paper. Henry Bleby's report of Samuel Sharpe's words in his cell is quoted as in Module 10, from *Death Struggles of Slavery* (1853), with the same flag for collation; the detail of the clean white shirt brought by his owner's family on the morning of his execution is reported in the Jamaican historical literature and is credited as such. The comparison with Saint-Domingue rests on the modern scholarship — Burnard and Garrigus's *The Plantation Machine* above all — and is paraphrased and credited; the causal claim made here about the metropole's stability is this study's own, offered as an argument and not as a finding of fact.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*